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Introduction: Overcoming the 
Constraints to Green Electricity 
in Africa
Ana Pueyo and Simon Bawakyillenuo
Abstract The phenomenon of inadequate power supply in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) has been a subject of great interest over the years because of its 
intractable nature and its importance for development; SSA accommodates 
about 55 per cent of the more than one billion people without access to 
electricity globally. Moreover, in many SSA countries, electricity access rates 
are decreasing because electrification efforts are slower than population 
growth. In recent years, however, certain SSA countries have demonstrated 
that with political will and access to appropriate finance, electricity access 
can be accelerated. The overwhelming calls for clean (green) energy sources 
into the energy mix cannot be overemphasised. Drawing from different 
disciplines, this IDS Bulletin provides new perspectives that go beyond the 
identification of obstacles to renewable energy development in SSA. The 
contents of these contributions underscore the complexity surrounding the 
clean electrification challenge in SSA; and demonstrate the benefits of a 
multidisciplinary approach in the design of interventions.
Keywords: sub-Saharan Africa, clean electricity, technical challenges, 
economic challenges, political challenges, multidisciplinary approach.
1 Introduction
Nearly ten years ago, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was defined as 
‘underpowered’ in a World Bank report diagnosing the state of  its 
physical infrastructure (Eberhard et al. 2008). SSA was in the middle 
of  a power crisis, with a deficit of  generation capacity, poor quality of  
electricity supply, very low access rates, and higher prices than other 
developing countries, but still below cost recovery.
One decade later, sub-Saharan Africa is still underpowered. Eighty 
per cent of  enterprises experience regular power outages (World Bank 
2017) and the region hosts 55 per cent of  the more than one billion 
people without access to electricity globally (IEA and World Bank 2017). 
Reinforcing this gap, only 37 per cent of  sub-Saharan Africans have 
electricity while the second region with the lowest access, South and 
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Southwest Asia, provides electricity to 82 per cent of  the population. 
Besides, in many SSA countries, electricity access rates are actually 
decreasing because electrification efforts are slower than population 
growth.
The last decade has also brought positive developments. First, populous 
low-access countries like Kenya, Malawi, Sudan, Uganda and Zambia 
have shown that rapid progress can be achieved with political will and 
access to appropriate finance. Second, there is increased awareness in 
the international development community about the importance of  
energy for human development, and the need for energy to be ‘green’. 
This reflects in the definition of  Sustainable Development Goal 7 to 
‘ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for 
all’ by 2030. What is more, the renewed interest in universal and clean 
energy in the donor community has made more funding, technical, and 
policy support available for renewable energy (RE) investment in SSA.
When developing the policy framework to support investment in 
renewable energy, donors and national governments should learn from 
the mistakes of  the past. In particular, since the 1980s, the World Bank 
and other donors had promoted a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to power 
sector reform, consisting in unbundling state monopolies, liberalisation, 
and privatisation. It was expected that the ‘standard model’, as it was 
called, would improve the performance of  African state-owned utilities 
and attract much-needed investment. However, reform did not work as 
expected. The standard model copied the experiences of  countries like 
Norway, Chile and the UK, but proved inappropriate for the very small 
power systems and struggling utilities of  sub-Saharan Africa. The broken 
monopolies that emerged had increased their transaction costs and 
reduced economies of  scale, while political meddling persisted despite 
attempts to liberalise (Besant-Jones 2006). In fact, reform was never 
consummated in any SSA country. Many of  the former state monopolies 
morphed into ‘hybrid models’, combining and often confusing the roles 
of  public and private actors (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008).
This IDS Bulletin departs from the premise that power sector reform 
should be context-specific. It follows on from the IDS Research Report 
Green Investment Diagnostics for Africa,1 that departed from the premise 
that there are many reasons why there is not enough renewable energy 
investment in sub-Saharan Africa, but some reasons are more important 
than others. Policymakers should therefore focus on the most binding 
constraints. The research proposed a systematic approach to identify 
these binding constraints and applied it to two countries: Kenya and 
Ghana. Results showed that both countries needed very different 
policies to attract investment (Pueyo et al. 2017).
With this IDS Bulletin, we want to go further than the identification 
of  binding constraints, to reflect on the reality of  a wider set of  
countries (seven SSA countries are included in this issue) from a 
wider set of  disciplines. The authors of  the articles in this IDS Bulletin 
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provide insights from power systems engineering, macroeconomics, 
microeconomics, and political economy to overcome constraints to 
green electricity in Africa. One of  the biggest contributions of  this issue 
is therefore allowing a dialogue between academics and practitioners 
that would not normally publish in the same journals. The remainder of  
this introductory article summarises their contributions, grouping them 
under three sections about technical, economic, and political challenges.
2 Overcoming technical challenges
The articles by Rawn and Louie, and Edwards, Dent and Wade 
focus on two technical issues particularly relevant for Africa. First, 
Rawn and Louie explore two potential pathways for electrification in 
sub-Saharan Africa: grid extension/enhancement and off-grid solutions, 
taking the perspective of  a traditional power system planner. Second, 
Edwards et al. explore the challenges and opportunities of  increasing 
the penetration of  variable renewables like wind and solar in the small 
African power systems, using capacity adequacy assessments.
Rawn and Louie start by highlighting the particularities of  SSA as 
compared to other countries that have successfully achieved universal 
electrification. As opposed to these previous successful experiences, 
SSA lacks governments with big surpluses that can pay for the heavy 
investments required, or a critical mass of  mostly urban consumers 
able to cross-subsidise the poorer rural population. Another important 
difference is that in the past, grid extension had always been considered 
as the endpoint of  all electrification efforts, but now technological 
progress has made off-grid solutions increasingly competitive with the 
grid in rural areas.
The article by Rawn and Louie links to other contributions in this 
IDS Bulletin when it talks about the political economy of  each pathway. 
The grid model requires heavier state intervention and is more open to 
rent-seeking and patronage; it also generally allows for bigger economies 
of  scale and a cheaper service. As raised by McCulloch, Sindou and Ward 
in another article in this issue, an off-grid, private sector-based model is 
more difficult to control by the state. If  it deprives the government of  
useful rents, it could be sabotaged through restrictive regulation or by 
extending the grid with a subsidised tariff to villages where off-grid systems 
operate. Coordination with political actors is therefore essential, and a 
significant role of  the state and subsidisation are unlikely to go away.
Edwards et al. focus on a particular challenge for grid systems: the 
variability of  some renewable energies, mainly wind and solar. SSA 
power systems are remarkably unreliable, with frequent blackouts 
that cause significant economic losses to consumers. Wind and solar 
energy cannot contribute to avoiding generation caused by blackouts 
when the wind is not blowing and the sun is not shining. Therefore, 
many policymakers wonder if  they are appropriate solutions for their 
reliability problems. Edwards et al. explore this issue by carrying out 
a simplified version (due to data availability) of  a capacity adequacy 
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assessment of  wind in Kenya. Adequacy assessments are concerned 
with the risk of  there being insufficient resources to supply demand in 
a given power system. Their analysis compares temporal patterns of  
wind availability with patterns in system demand and the availability 
of  hydrological resource, to assess the extent to which the resources 
complement each other. Their results show that the large wind projects 
that Kenya is building are likely to contribute to the generation 
adequacy of  the system, thanks to the complementarity between wind 
resource and demand, and between wind and hydro resources. This is 
possible thanks to the quality and consistency of  wind in a number of  
sites in Kenya. A similar assessment should be done in SSA countries 
with good or excellent wind resources to understand whether they will 
contribute to the reliability of  power supply.
The analysis by Edwards et al. relates in particular to the article by 
Osiolo, Pueyo and Gachanja, which points at system costs as one of  
the most important constraints to renewables in Kenya. In particular, 
Kenya suffers a deficit in transmission infrastructure, and some of  the 
sites with outstanding wind resource are located in remote areas without 
transmission lines. There is therefore a trade-off between the resource 
quality and access to transmission infrastructure, an issue that also 
comes up in the articles by Baker, and Lucas, del Río and Sokona.
3 Overcoming economic challenges
Two articles in this IDS Bulletin, by Willenbockel, Osiolo and 
Bawakyillenuo, and by Lucas et al., look at economic approaches to 
overcome the challenges to renewables in Africa.
The first article, by Willenbockel et al. applies a macroeconomic 
perspective, using computable general equilibrium modelling, to 
debunk the common narrative that green energy is not compatible with 
economic growth. The article shows the distributional implications 
of  a shift to renewables in Kenya and Ghana. It concludes that in 
both countries, it is feasible to reduce the carbon content of  electricity 
generation without adverse consequences for economic growth, and 
without noteworthy distributional effects. Kenya shows much larger 
economic benefits than Ghana, though, thanks to abundant low-cost 
geothermal resources that would reduce electricity prices, and trigger 
a moderate real exchange rate appreciation (less fossil fuel imports), 
thus reducing the price of  imports and leading to an economy-wide 
real income gain. Ghana has a much smaller potential for economically 
viable renewables and has an active domestic fossil fuel extraction 
sector. Hydro is the only RE option with a clear cost advantage over 
gas, yet the potential for hydro expansion is limited. There is therefore 
a moderate scope for an RE transition in Ghana, with marginal 
impacts on macroeconomic growth. Willenbockel et al.’s article shows 
that Ghana’s attraction to a fossil fuel-based model, as described in 
Bawakyillenuo’s article in this IDS Bulletin, is justified economically due 
to the possibility of  higher tariffs at the beginning of  the transition, 
the lower cost of  gas, and a pre-existing gas infrastructure, as well as 
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the contribution of  natural resource extraction to real gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth.
The article by Lucas et al. uses a microeconomic lens to analyse 
renewable energy auctions, a policy instrument widely applied in SSA 
nowadays after the initially successful experience of  South Africa. 
Donors have been heavily involved in the design and implementation 
of  RE auctioning schemes in SSA, providing funding and technical 
assistance and a package of  de-risking and credit enhancement. 
These measures have mostly attracted large international companies. 
The authors argue that renewable energy auctions make a lot of  
sense technically and economically for SSA. As opposed to feed-in 
tariffs (the previous policy trend in the continent), renewable energy 
auctions allow the market to set the most competitive price and avoid 
overloading the administration with unsolicited proposals. They 
also provide opportunities to reduce risks through the pre-selection 
of  sites and to create local jobs through local content requirements. 
The authors review the design elements of  the auctioning schemes in 
Ghana, Uganda and Zambia, showing some key elements that seem 
to be working: the pre-selection of  sites, as opposed to geographic 
neutrality typical in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries; and technology specificity with a focus 
on solar photovoltaic (PV) due to its decreasing cost, simplicity, and fast 
turnaround. They also point at some remaining obstacles to successful 
auctions, mainly poor planning. These reflections mirror those by Rawn 
and Louie, who in their article emphasise the importance of  long-term 
planning and low technical complexity.
In addition to the challenges raised in the article by Lucas et al., the 
article by Baker in this IDS Bulletin shows that even for a policy like 
renewable energy auctions, that makes perfect economic sense, political 
challenges can be unsurmountable. Having looked at the articles on the 
technical and economic dimensions in this IDS Bulletin, we now discuss 
the next set of  articles focusing on political economy.
4 Overcoming political challenges
The articles by Baker, Osiolo et al., Bawakyillenuo, and McCulloch 
et al. seek to understand why policies that make perfect technical and 
economic sense are not implemented, or do not work as expected when 
they are.
First, Baker describes the history and future prospects of  South 
Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement 
(REIPPP) programme, an auctioning scheme to procure renewable 
energy-based electricity from private generators. The REIPPP was 
an economically and technically sound policy, and was a success that 
many other SSA countries have tried to replicate. It marked the first 
time that South Africa had both independent power producers (IPPs) 
and renewable energy, and succeeded in turning South Africa into an 
attractive destination for commercial-scale renewables. As a result, RE 
6 | Pueyo and Bawakyillenuo Introduction: Overcoming the Constraints to Green Electricity in Africa
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
added a small but significant contribution to the generation mix and 
many jobs were created as selection criteria included local content and 
job creation requirements. However, new clouds are endangering the 
future success of  the programme. First, the monopolistic national power 
utility, Eskom, is acting as a gatekeeper, being reluctant to lose its grip 
on the sector. Second, grid availability is becoming an obstacle for many 
potential projects. The connection of  a growing number of  RE projects 
located in resource-rich sites is leading to grid constraints in those 
locations. This second problem could be addressed with geographical 
incentives to IPPs or the pre-selection of  sites with sufficient grid 
availability. The first problem, however, is eminently political and harder 
to solve unless there is a coalition of  interests in favour or renewables 
strong enough to counter the power of  Eskom.
The article by Baker is a good continuation to the article by Lucas 
et al., showing that a purely economic perspective is not enough for 
the successful implementation of  auctions in SSA. It also connects 
to many other articles in this IDS Bulletin; for example, to the article 
by McCulloch et al., showing the importance of  donors in the initial 
success of  REIPPP, as well as the need to know the interests of  all 
stakeholders when designing such a policy. Like Osiolo et al., and Rawn 
and Louie, Baker shows that transmission and distribution infrastructure 
can become the Achilles heel of  RE in Africa, when the state monopoly 
managing it has no incentives for long-term investment.
The second article using a political economy approach, by Osiolo et al., 
looks in depth at the policies that might address three prevailing 
constraints to RE investment in Kenya: the poor state of  the 
transmission and distribution infrastructure, a very low rural demand, 
and high levels of  local opposition to RE infrastructure. The article 
looks at how these constraints came to be, which policies could address 
them, and which actors could block or support these policies.
Even if  Kenya is championing market-led approaches for the provision 
of  off-grid electricity, rural poverty and the high costs of  reaching 
remote, poor populations remain a key issue, as in many other 
SSA countries. Despite the decreasing costs of  off-grid solutions (as 
highlighted in Rawn and Louie’s article), these are still beyond the 
means of  a majority of  the rural poor. On the other hand, smaller 
off-grid solutions, such as solar lamps, can increase welfare through 
better quality light and mobile phone charging, but do not enable new 
productive uses to escape poverty. Sometimes the gap between the 
small urban elite and the large rural poor manifests violently in Kenya, 
through protests against new energy infrastructure that delay or block 
projects, and scare investors. The authors argue that an important 
role for donors and the state is unavoidable in Kenya, despite the 
dominant ‘market-led’ narrative. Donor support will be needed for the 
affordability of  rural electrification, and to increase the ability of  the 
population to pay through the promotion of  productive uses. A strong 
state will also be necessary to allocate cross-subsidies that bridge the 
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affordability gap, to coordinate on- and off-grid efforts, and to invest in 
transmission and distribution infrastructure.
The article by Osiolo et al. dialogues with other articles in this issue; 
for example, with Lucas et al. who also point at the importance of  
pre-selecting and de-risking sites to reduce investment uncertainty. 
Lucas et al. also recommend the introduction of  social criteria for 
bid assessment, to reduce historical inequalities, which is particularly 
relevant for Kenya as it designs its own auctioning scheme.
The article by Bawakyillenuo departs from a similar premise as 
the preceding article by Osiolo et al., arguing that the best policies 
to solve Ghana’s constraints to investment in RE might not be 
politically feasible. The article explores three constraints in depth: the 
poor creditworthiness of  the off-taker, the inadequate power sector 
regulation, and lack of  access to appropriate finance. The author argues 
that a dominant natural gas-based paradigm in the political class and 
the national psyche, and the lack of  an organised civil society that 
demands renewable energy make it hard to implement RE policies in 
the country. Some donors are intervening to solve the financial problems 
of  the off-taker, the Electricity Company of  Ghana, pushing for the 
privatisation of  the retailing branch of  the utility. However, a large 
share of  the population opposes privatisation, mainly for fear of  price 
increases. As McCulloch et al. recommend, donors should understand 
the motivations of  all the actors involved and try to build local 
coalitions before pushing for an unpopular privatisation. Otherwise the 
privatisation could be reversed just as rapidly as it was implemented.
The final article, by McCulloch et al., brings to the forefront an 
underlying thread to all other articles in this IDS Bulletin: the essential role 
of  donors to achieve sustainable energy for all in Africa. Their article 
looks in particular at the use of  political economy analyses by donors to 
improve the effectiveness of  their interventions for power sector reform. 
The authors argue that donors, with the high rotation of  their staff and 
the consultants they hire to implement their programmes, are responsible 
to some extent for the uniform approach to reform that has failed in 
the past. The incentive structure is also wrong for targeted, politically 
aware interventions. Donors are often incentivised to spend their money, 
without the possibility to change or stop programmes once they have 
started and no ex-post reflection about successes and failures. The case 
of  Tanzania is used to illustrate the failure of  reform when it does not 
take into account political realities. Finally, McCulloch et al. recommend 
that donors carry out an analysis of  the underlying motivations of  
key actors before they push for reform, to uncover politically feasible 
reform pathways. If  this analysis concludes that reform is impossible, 
donors should then ‘work with the grain’, supporting legitimate credible 
domestic actors to challenge the status quo.
In summary, the contributions to this IDS Bulletin underline the 
enormity of  the clean electrification challenge in Africa; and 
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demonstrate the benefits of  a multidisciplinary approach where 
technical, economic, and political perspectives are involved in the 
design of  interventions. We hope that this IDS Bulletin will inspire future 
initiatives, where many other disciplines not covered here can jointly 
contribute to overcome the constraints to RE investment in SSA.
Notes
1 That report and this IDS Bulletin is part of  the Green Growth 
Diagnostics Project led by IDS in partnership with KIPPRA, ISSER, 
the universities of  Durham and Newcastle, and the Policy Practice, 
www.ids.ac.uk/project/green-growth-diagnostics-for-africa.
2 The rationale and methodology for Green Growth Diagnostics 
was inspired by the Growth Diagnostics approach developed by 
Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2004).
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Planning for Electrification:  
On‑ and Off‑Grid Considerations 
in Sub‑Saharan Africa
Barry Rawn and Henry Louie
Abstract Energy poverty, in particular, the lack of access to electricity, is 
a chronic impediment to sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa, 
affecting over one billion people. Recently, electrification efforts have 
bifurcated into two pathways: grid extension/enhancement and off-grid. 
Expanding and enhancing the existing national grid is the de facto 
approach, but is struggling to keep up with growing populations and 
demand in many countries. Off-grid solutions such as solar home systems 
and mini-grids are seen as a way to ‘leap frog’ the national grid, but face 
distribution, affordability, and regulatory challenges. This article explores 
each electrification pathway through the lens of a traditional power system 
planner. This perspective shows that implicit planning assumptions about 
cost recovery, procurement, reliability requirements, economic benefit, 
what entities are involved, and the role of renewable energy require 
re-visiting and re-invention in the sub-Saharan African context.
Keywords: renewable energy, off-grid, power system planning, energy 
poverty, grid extension, products as a service, electrification, mini-grids, 
micro-grids, probabilistic connection.
1 Introduction
The electrification rate of  households in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
is presently at 37 per cent (IEA and World Bank 2017). Those with 
electricity access are often challenged by an unreliable, unavailable, 
and inadequate supply (Billinton and Jonnavithula 1996). Electricity 
underpins many broader development goals, and its positive association 
with education, health, and economic prosperity has been noted in 
existing literature (IEA and World Bank 2017; Franco et al. 2017; 
Socvacool and Ryan 2016; White et al. 2008). With this impetus, 
governments in countries throughout SAA have moved to increase 
electricity access (Bhattacharyya 2013). To this end, electricity supply 
planning plays a crucial role. However, traditional assumptions and 
notions of  planning as might be followed in countries with mature 
power systems with universal access are challenged in the context of  
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SSA (Trotter, McManus and Maconachie 2017; Eberhard and Gratwick 
2011; Malgas and Eberhard 2011).
A salient difference in power system planning in SSA is the notion that 
electricity supply can be provided not only by extension of  the national 
grid, but also by off-grid systems. Economically viable, sustainable, 
and scalable off-grid electricity access – primarily by small-scale solar 
systems, solar lanterns, and mini-grids – has only recently become 
possible. It is disruptive to traditional planning processes, and may hold 
lessons in jurisdictions where these habits hold sway.
The literature on the subject has explored comparisons between 
on- and off-grid electrification from technical (Trotter et al. 2017; 
Szabó et al. 2011), economic, and development perspectives 
(Wamukonya and Davis 2001). This article focuses on electrification 
through the lens of  a power system planner to probe how the 
underlying assumptions to traditional electricity supply planning tend 
not to be satisfied in SSA, and hence the process must be modified. 
It is suggested that more robust and flexible planning processes will 
be emerging from this context due to tight economic constraints, the 
need to address widely different levels of  demand as well as different 
requirements of  service quality, and the growing experience with 
disruptive technologies like cheaper energy storage.
The remainder of  this article is arranged as follows. Section 2 provides 
a brief  overview of  historical experiences in electrification providing 
valuable lessons for SSA. Section 3 discusses the state of  electricity 
access in SSA, considering on- and off-grid populations. Basic concepts 
of  electricity supply planning are reviewed in Section 4. Sections 5 
and 6 discuss how notions of  traditional electricity supply planning are 
challenged in the context of  on- and off-grid electrification in SSA. 
Conclusions and an outlook are provided in Section 7.
2 Historical experience in electrification
Universal access has not been a spontaneous event in the many 
countries that have achieved it. On the contrary, a number of  conditions 
needed to be satisfied, among which are long-term dedicated private 
and public investment, access to cheap and patient capital, the ability 
to pay for electricity by wide segments of  society, and an unclouded 
political vision and follow-up. This section compares the electrification-
by-grid-extension experience in different countries, highlighting those 
factors and showing possible implications for the African context.
The United States (US) was among the early leaders in the development 
and implementation of  electricity (Wamukonya and Davis 2001). 
However, access to electricity in rural areas notably lagged behind 
many other countries. Electrification began in urban centres serving a 
clientele willing and able to pay high premiums for an electricity service. 
Electricity providers made a concerted effort to install large generators, 
enlist more customers, and lower the cost of  electricity production 
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by reaching higher-capacity factors.1 By being able to run their large 
generating stations fully for as much of  the time as possible, they 
improved the returns to their investment.
Electrification expanded quickly in urban areas, but rural areas lagged 
behind. In 1935, just 10 per cent of  farms in the US had grid access. 
The reasons for the low rate are similar to those identified today in 
countries that struggle with electrification. As summarised in a 1934 
report by the Mississippi Valley Committee, the reasons for low rural 
electrification include ‘… the lack of  interest by operating companies in 
rural electrification… high cost of  construction… restrictions covering 
rural line extension… and high costs’ (Beal 1940). In short, the privately 
owned electric utilities could generate more profit by serving urban 
rather than rural customers.
It took government intervention to make electricity accessible to 
the rural population. The creation of  the Rural Electrification 
Administration and the passing of  the Rural Electrification Act in 
1936 provided the catalyst for rapid rural electrification (Hughes 
1983). Access to finance at low rates and high maturities and good 
communication with rural populations caused rural electrification rates 
to rise to 25 per cent by 1940, and to virtually 100 per cent by the 
1950s. In less than a generation, the rural electrification of  the US was 
complete.
China – a country of  over one billion people and an expansive 
geography – has nearly universal access to electricity. This includes rural 
areas, where half  of  the population live, thanks to the use of  community 
and municipal management. This is in stark contrast to India, the other 
Asian giant, whose rural electrification rate had reached only 70 per cent 
by 2014. As in the US experience, rural electrification in China lagged 
behind urban (Bhattacharyya 2013). The rural electrification rate was 
61 per cent in 1978. By the end of  the 1980s, the electrification rate 
reached 80 per cent, and by the turn of  the millennium, it was virtually 
100 per cent, for a population three to five times the size of  the US.
China realised rapid electrification through various government-backed 
programmes, including the Township Electrification Programme, 
which is the largest renewable energy supply programme in the world 
(Bhattacharyya 2013). Over the last 50 years, the organisation of  the 
rural electrification effort has evolved. More recent success is attributed 
to the empowerment of  local county- or village-level government by 
the central government to manage rural electrification. This bottom-up 
approach, while still governmental and not free-market-led, is unique 
and could be adopted by other countries. The programme leveraged 
locally available energy sources, including small-scale hydro, to build 
out localised grids, which were eventually connected to the national 
grid. While this allowed access to rapidly increase, the localised grids 
were often poorly designed, not standardised, and used low-quality 
components. This underinvestment in the grid led to high system 
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losses, low reliability, and need for replacement once connected to the 
national grid. However, even a lower quality electricity supply provided 
the conditions for the economic improvement and electricity demand 
growth necessary to justify and sustainably finance a grid connection, 
qualifying it as the successful pursuit of  a socioeconomic electrification 
goal (Bhattacharyya 2013).
The experiences of  electrification of  the US and China hence show 
that a heavy involvement of  the state was required, jointly with access 
to patient capital, the existence of  an urban critical mass that could 
pay the actual cost of  the service and, in the Chinese case, a bottom-up 
approach adapting energy supply to the local energy sources and to the 
characteristics of  local demand.
3 Present state of electricity supply in sub‑Saharan Africa
In many African nations, the demand for electricity has outpaced 
centralised infrastructure growth, in terms of  generation sources built, 
transmission lines strengthened, and distribution systems extended 
(Practical Action 2016). The exponential tripling of  population from 
1970 to 2010 gives a rate to be matched in some sense by electricity 
infrastructure. However, population does not equate to an economically 
viable demand for electricity.
3.1 National grids
The total generation supply in SSA, excluding South Africa, is 
approximately 100,000MW in a region with almost one billion people. 
This supply is on a par with Spain, a country whose population is less 
than 50 million. Per capita electricity consumption in SSA shows a 
similar gap and it has not improved since the mid-1980s, as seen in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1 Per capita electricity consumption in sub‑Saharan Africa
Source World Bank Open Data (n.d.).
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Power systems in developing nations tend to have a small number of  
generators covering a large area. In SSA, excluding South Africa, nation 
states have total generation capacities ranging from 0.4GW to 8GW of  
capacity (Macro Economy Meter 2013). For their populations, the capacity 
is on the order of  10–100 watts per capita, versus 500–5,000 watts per capita 
in industrialised countries (Sanjay 2015). Connections between neighbouring 
countries are not strong, making many countries electrical islands. This 
isolation, as well as the small number of  power plants, long distances, and 
heavy reliance on hydropower (Macro Economy Meter 2013; Sanjay 2015) 
or imported fuels2 make SSA power systems particularly vulnerable.
3.2 Off‑grid
Off-grid solutions can address some of  the vulnerabilities highlighted 
above. Furthermore, they can directly target the rural population 
constituting the majority of  some 600 million people who have no access 
to the electrical grid in SSA (IEA and World Bank 2017). In rural areas, 
the lack of  legacy electrical infrastructure has allowed electricity services 
to be re-imagined in the form of  off-grid renewable energy electricity 
solutions provided by for-profit companies and energy entrepreneurs, in 
some cases with the support of  donor agencies (Birol 2015; Byrne et al. 
2014). Technological improvements have enabled these new business 
models. In particular, the steady and comparably drastic drop in solar 
panel, inverter, and LED technology costs due to industry experience 
has lowered barriers to decentralised provision of  electricity (IEA and 
World Bank 2017; IEA 2005; Birol 2015; Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Program 2015; Louie et al. 2015; Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance and Lighting Global 2016; Mandelli et al. 2016).
New off-grid systems often provide limited amounts of  power. For 
example, solar lanterns can only provide light. Solar home systems 
typically consist of  a solar panel with a capacity from 5W to 300W – 
a lead-acid or lithium ion battery in a ruggedised case with an integrated 
LED light and/or ports for charging mobile phones. Larger-capacity solar 
home systems are capable of  powering small appliances such as televisions 
and fans (Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Lighting Global 2016). 
The small size of  these systems has not precluded widespread adoption, 
with over 40 million solar lanterns and solar home systems deployed 
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Lighting Global 2016) and a 
market exceeding US$500 million in 2015 (Global Leap 2016).
Larger scale off-grid systems, referred to as ‘mini-grids’ or ‘micro-grids’, 
provide higher-capacity access to rural customers, and are approaching or 
even exceeding the quality of  service of  grid-connected electricity (Louie 
et al. 2015). Hybrid power systems based on diesel generators, photovoltaic 
panels, and batteries are being developed by for-profit companies which 
can attract sufficient capital to offer power contracts to commercial 
customers with a lower cost of  energy, higher reliability, and greater 
convenience. These systems require specialised planning to be economically 
viable and sustainable, and are still following a technology and system 
integration experience curve towards lower costs and better performance.
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4 Concepts for traditional electricity supply planning
This section introduces some key concepts related to the activity of  
electricity supply planning, which will be necessary to assess the two 
potential electrification pathways for SSA. Electricity supply planning 
differs from day-to-day electricity supply operations by the timescales 
considered, its goals, and the tools used. Electricity supply operation is a 
real- or near-real-time activity focused on maintaining reliability at the 
lowest cost possible. On the other hand, planning horizons are many 
years in the future and decisions are based on uncertain projections of  
conditions, but the goals remain focused on achieving a given reliability 
at least cost (Conejo et al. 2016).
Successful planning outcomes are reached through a set of  activities: 
(1) estimating demand and demand growth, (2) selecting generation 
technologies, (3) planning operations, (4) designing transmission and 
distribution networks, and (5) ensuring an enabling environment for 
plan implementation (Trotter et al. 2017). Sound planning decisions 
balance initial costs with long-term expectations, and the needs of  one 
user against another.
We now introduce several aspects relevant for the two potential 
electrification pathways for SSA from the perspective of  a planner, 
namely: the actors engaged in planning activities; the fulfilment of  
economic and social goals; the quality of  service; and the implications 
of  increased penetration of  renewable energy sources.
4.1 Actors
Electricity supply planning has traditionally been the purview of  utilities 
– both government and independently owned –, regulatory entities and 
at a high level, government ministries or agencies.
Independent power producers also plan and announce their projects, 
but usually in the context of  a national pace set by government 
ministries and the regulator (Eberhard and Gratwick 2011; Malgas 
and Eberhard 2011; Global Leap 2016). It is the responsibility of  the 
wider power sector, which includes technicians, standards reinforcement 
branches of  the regulator, and regulated utility companies to cooperate 
with the plans set. This is part of  the aforementioned activity of  
ensuring and enabling an appropriate environment.
4.2 Economic and social goals
The difference between economic, socioeconomic, and social goals 
can be usefully articulated to support planning activity, including the 
selection of  appropriate technology and policy, as hypothesised in 
Conejo et al. (2016).
A purely economic goal is met via a traditional assessment of  rates of  
return. In this case, the means of  cost recovery is directly from users, 
whose ability to pay can justify the investment. Economic returns can be 
maximised when the capacity factor of  generation assets is high.
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A socioeconomic goal has overall positive social welfare (in the 
economic sense), but requires the careful design of  cross-subsidies. 
In this case, it is not the particular customer, but the collection of  all 
customers who must offer viable cost recovery.
Finally, a social electrification goal acknowledges the environmental 
security and health benefits that may result from access to electricity, as 
a means of  poverty alleviation, and does not specify a direct payback. 
In this case, a trade-off analysis of  these benefits against other options 
contending for support from donors, a community, or a nation state 
budget is warranted. Once an expected means of  cost recovery is 
identified, a planner can consider technologies that are appropriate for 
the expected financing, and for the quality of  electricity access needed.
4.3 Quality of service
The service experienced by a consumer of  electricity can be measured 
by a number of  metrics locally (Billinton and Jonnavithula 1996). These 
refer to both quantity (power3 and energy4) and quality. In aggregate, 
industrial, commercial, and residential users, types in a region may 
consume roughly equal quantities of  electricity, but with stark differences 
in the quality of  supply tolerated. The quality of  service continuum, 
more commonly referred to as ‘access tiers’, has different formulations, 
but generally considers dimensions such as technical quality, legality, and 
affordability (Energy Sector Management Assistance Program 2015).
Technical quality can be partly described by availability and reliability. 
Power system operators need to ensure that at every moment, the 
power consumed (inclusive of  losses on the power lines) matches the 
power generated from some source. If  there is insufficient fuel for power 
plants, or these are not operating due to technical faults, then energy 
cannot be provided to customers, and either electricity rationing or a 
blackout must occur (Macro Economy Meter 2013; Conejo et al. 2016). 
Similar concepts apply to off-grid systems, although at a smaller scale. 
A solar-powered system is limited by the power it can supply at any 
moment, and the energy it can supply from its storage over periods 
when the sun is not available.
Due to these mismatches between demand and supply, the availability 
of  a live electrical connection expressed as a fraction of  a chosen time 
period is often less than one. Beyond the customer level, we use several 
measures of  system reliability, which tend not to acknowledge a specific 
location, but characterise the frequency and duration of  interruptions 
across a region over a chosen time period, as well as the likelihood of  
demand not meeting supply at a system level, which would provoke 
a wider disruption. At the regulatory level, planning processes are 
required to result in levels of  generation and transmission sufficient 
to make this likelihood acceptably low in the face of  credible events. 
This provides the condition called ‘adequacy’, which is a term applied 
to indicate that the generation available has a suitable surplus to 
counteract unplanned events (Billinton 1970).
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4.4 Renewables
Renewable energy has been increasingly incorporated into long-term 
plans due to significant cost reductions, and to subsidies and targets 
as part of  climate change mitigation commitments. Renewables make 
sense from an energy planning perspective when they are low cost 
and improve energy security, being locally available (AfDB 2012). 
However, the most widespread renewable sources of  wind and solar 
introduce new challenges for power planners. Their variability and 
uncontrollability mean that their contribution to meet electricity 
demand is uncertain. Additionally, the best renewable energy resource 
is not always located close to centres of  demand, which requires heavy 
investments in transmission lines to both access and then channel the 
available power to locations with higher demand and price (Smith et al. 
2010). As the proportion of  wind and solar become greater, power 
system operations can be affected, as it becomes more difficult to 
balance supply and demand. Because of  this, planners often request 
technical grid integration studies before they agree to new renewable 
generation plants. A limit on allowed generation development may be 
imposed to remain within these operational limits and the capabilities 
of  planned extension of  transmission links. Because wind and solar can 
be deployed in distributed form in small modular pieces, some amount 
of  generation development may go unplanned and unmonitored.
5 The grid enhancement and extension path
The rest of  this article will explore two parallel paths to electrification, 
indicating where planning activities in developing countries may differ, 
and considering the way forward. The first path is grid extension.
In theory, grid extension is the most cost-effective use of  capital, 
especially when it pursues the connection of  customers near the 
national grid rather than those who are more distant. On the contrary, 
the cost of  installing a power line to a rural area might cost over 
US$20,000 per kilometre. What is more, because rurality and poverty 
are often associated, the customers tend to purchase modest amounts of  
energy and the investment in the power line is recuperated slowly over 
many years.
Some technological improvements have tackled the high cost of  grid 
extension to rural areas, most notably the adoption in South Africa 
of  different standards such as Single Wire Earth Return (SWER) and 
blanket extension. These initiatives have been found to reduce grid 
extension costs to near urban levels, but this required almost a decade 
and necessarily provides a lower tier of  access (Gaunt 2003). Even in 
urban areas, grid overextension, and subsequent lack of  cost recovery, is 
already a problem.
5.1 Actors
The monopolistic and long-term character of  a national grid often 
means that political actors manipulate planning for political gain, and 
this is not restricted to developing countries. However, in developing 
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countries, the political, regulatory, and technician actors have negatively 
interacted to neglect the fifth planning element of  ensuring an enabling 
environment for implementation.
The case of  Nigeria holds several examples of  these challenges 
(Uwaifo 2005). To gain popular support, politicians demanded rapid 
grid extension and the creation of  many small and uneconomical 
power plants. Regional governments also created networks that were 
not appropriately planned or constructed. This determined pursuit 
of  social electrification was not backed by a considered balancing 
of  municipal, state, or federal budget. What is more, a succession of  
military dictatorships resulted in over a dozen years of  non-payment 
and non-investment in the electricity sector, stretching the vertically 
integrated electricity utility beyond financial viability.
Under these circumstances, unlawful practices emerged within the 
utility to recover additional revenue from customers. Such practices 
regarding collection for energy received, and for new connections, 
began with moonlighting employees but led to a completely separate 
ecosystem of  installing and charging for electricity connections, often 
without construction and safety standards. Not only did this generate 
a poor customer experience and lead to a lack of  trust, it also created 
technical challenges for those operating the existing system, now loaded 
with unplanned connections.
It is common for governments in developing countries to establish 
dedicated agencies to promote, coordinate, manage funds, train, build 
capacity or implement rural electrification (Bhattacharyya 2013; Smith 
et al. 2010; Government of  the Republic of  Zambia 2009). These 
agencies are generically called Rural Electrification Authorities (REAs). 
REAs in SSA became popular beginning in the late 1990s to mid-2000s 
– for example, Kenya (1997), Senegal (1998), Zambia (2003), Nigeria 
(2005), and Tanzania (2005) were created during this period. The 
purview of  many REAs consists of  electrification through grid extension, 
but increasingly (Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria) off-grid systems.
Many REAs are charged with developing Rural Electrification Master 
Plans (REMPs). REMPs cover a multi-year period, for example ten 
years, and outline strategies for achieving specific electrification targets 
that align with broader development goals; for example, 51 per cent 
electrification by the year 2030 (IEA and World Bank 2015; Tenenbaum 
et al. 2014). REMPs estimate the cost of  achieving the targets, and 
identify technological, regulatory, and financial and economic barriers, 
risks, and opportunities. Priorities in terms of  geography and customer 
types, for example schools and health facilities, are identified. Although 
created by the government, the budget of  REAs is often supplemented 
by external donors, which might include foundations or other 
governments. REAs often oversee a Rural Electrification Fund (REF). In 
some countries the REA allocates REF monies on a competitive basis to 
for-profit organisations that do the electrification.
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5.2 Quality of service
Power interruptions can occur even in grid systems with adequate 
generation capacity and fuel, but in SSA they are a regular experience 
due to actual energy shortage. In Nigeria, for example, 44 per cent 
of  customers of  the national grid received less than 2–4 hours per 
day and at random, giving them a probabilistic connection referred 
to as ‘bad-grid’ in literature (AllOn 2016). In Malawi, planned load-
shedding is turning into emergency load-shedding as river levels drop to 
unprecedented lows (Sanjay 2015).
In addition to fuel shortages, SSA systems suffer high rates of  
transmission and distribution losses, up to 20 per cent or more, with 
a large share of  these attributable to theft (Smith 2004). As a result of  
poor reliability, self-generation by businesses in SSA is around 10 per 
cent, with some countries reaching 25 per cent and in the Nigerian case 
60 per cent (Foster and Steinbuks 2009; GIZ 2015). These conditions 
lead to even worse service and accessibility due to degrading utility and 
customer equipment (Coney 1996).
In this setting, the first planning activity of  electricity demand 
estimation and its growth is made more difficult. Some demand is 
physically present but not metered or distinguishable from losses due 
to energy theft. Where load-shedding occurs, the so-called suppressed 
demand is uncertain, as it is based on experiments (Godfrey, Quarshie 
and Robiou 1996) or proxies such as diesel-generating set purchase 
(AllOn 2016). Planning infrastructure to target even the estimated 
quantity of  suppressed demand and its growth is difficult, as commercial 
customers that have left the grid may not wish to come back, due to low 
quality of  supply. Where distribution grids are in especially poor repair, 
demand for grid electricity may even go down.
5.3 Economic and social goals
In some countries, a history of  aggressive electrification targets 
coupled with successive sociopolitical shocks have eroded or eliminated 
fundamental business and technical foundations of  the power sector. 
A functioning power sector depends on several key relationships and 
assumptions: payment is reliably collected from customers who find 
the distribution company a trustworthy and cheap alternative to home 
generation, distribution companies invest to maintain and upgrade their 
equipment while paying for energy taken from the system, the owners 
of  generators receive payments to pay for their capital and operating 
costs, and the transmission owners and system operator also invest to 
provide all parties with a reliable connection.
In struggling power sectors (Africa, South America, Eastern Europe) it 
is common to find economically disadvantaged customers who receive 
a low quality of  service, and are also extorted by current or former 
distribution company employees (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). The 
unavailability of  electricity due to rationing and blackouts leads to 
customer dissatisfaction and non-payment of  bills (Winther 2012), as 
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well as significant diversion of  revenue from bills that are actually paid 
away from maintenance.
While the installation of  automatic or remote meters has the technical 
potential to disrupt this negative cycle, the current dysfunction and 
bankruptcy of  distribution companies starves the sector of  revenue 
while representing a daunting renewal challenge in terms of  customer 
trust, workforce, required civil works, and workplace culture. This shifts 
the fourth activity of  designing distribution grids towards replacement 
and reinforcement. Furthermore, it makes paramount the fifth planning 
activity of  re-establishing the environment where plans can actually be 
implemented.
When a power sector has arrived at a state of  grid tension and poor 
service, it becomes common for all customers of  all tiers to operate their 
own generation units purchased on the market. For a factory or large 
hotel, the prospect of  offering electricity to neighbours is too great an 
investment of  capital and effort in addition to their regular business 
activity, so the capacity factor of  these investments remains low and no 
grid extension from these sources occurs. As a result, the economies 
of  scale that are typical of  the power sector are not realised and the 
systems become increasingly expensive and inefficient.
5.4 Renewables
The first consideration when planning the integration of  renewable 
resources into an existing national power system is how their cost 
compares with other alternatives. As we have highlighted, the cost of  
renewable energy has experienced dramatic reductions, and SSA enjoys 
some of  the most plentiful solar resource (Kemeny et al. 2014). However, 
the cost of  renewables in SSA is higher than in developed countries 
as it needs to incorporate foreign exchange, payment, policy, and grid 
availability risk components.
Renewable energy can offer some particular advantages to electricity 
supply planners. For example, the implementation of  many small and 
distributed projects connected to the distribution grid could serve as a 
back-up to centralised generation or reduce final demand. But as we 
have anticipated in a previous section, variable renewables can also 
bring challenges to the stability of  the grid. One way of  mitigating 
this is by building renewable power plants incrementally so that the 
new behaviour of  the system can be observed and accommodated by 
operators. This is particularly relevant for the small systems of  most 
SSA countries, where the share of  renewables in the generation mix 
could increase substantially by adding relatively small plants.
A final consideration refers to the technical capability of  renewable 
power plants to help maintain the voltage and frequency of  the 
transmission system. Grid operators, planners and renewable energy 
developers need a fluent dialogue to adjust the technical parameters 
of  renewables as well as to update the rules and regulations of  a given 
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transmission system to take these into account. The training and analysis 
tools of  transmission company staff to engage in such activities is seldom 
adequate, and this requires extra attention in developing countries to the 
fifth planning activity of  ensuring and enabling the right environment.
6 The off‑grid path
The off-grid path to electrification has typically not been considered 
in traditional electricity supply planning. However, the five planning 
activities previously discussed also apply in the context of  off-grid 
electricity service (Trotter et al. 2017). Unlike traditional grid extension, 
off-grid electrification in Africa has been primarily a bottom-up, 
market-driven, decentralised phenomenon. The planning for off-grid 
electrification is informal and ad hoc with different actors, techno-
economic realities, and service expectations. Renewable energy plays a 
crucial role in most off-grid electrification approaches.
6.1 Actors
In SSA, much more so than in developed countries, individual 
households and businesses are engaged in their own electricity supply 
planning. They do this by acquiring small-scale generator sets, dry cell 
batteries, solar lanterns, solar home systems, or by subscribing to an 
electricity service provided by a mini-grid.
Off-grid system manufacturers and distributors also act as planners. 
There are over 100 companies involved in the off-grid electricity 
access space (Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Lighting Global 
2016). By offering products – solar lanterns and solar home systems – 
with specific capabilities, manufacturers are implicitly engaged in the 
demand estimation and generation technology selection activities of  
electricity service planning. The customer participates in these activities 
by acquiring certain products based upon their needs, preferences, and 
ability to pay. Whereas planning for on-grid electricity service involves 
determining which regions to serve through new electrical connections, 
an off-grid system distributer performs an analogous activity by 
choosing which geographic markets to enter.
Governments are not entirely divorced from planning aspects of  off-grid 
electricity supply, however. Some REAs are engaged in the planning 
of  off-grid systems – particularly larger scale mini-grids and in some 
instances solar home systems and lanterns (Bhattacharyya 2013; IEA 
and World Bank 2015; Tenenbaum et al. 2014). Governments can 
also contribute to an enabling environment for off-grid access by: 
setting quality standards for off-grid products, licensing and regulating 
companies across the value chain – including importers, suppliers, and 
installers – and setting tariff caps and subsidies (Smith et al. 2010).
6.2 Quality of service
The quality of  service requirements for electricity in rural off-grid 
settings has been shown to be different from urban settings connected to 
the grid. This can be better understood by considering the main drivers 
for household electricity demand in rural areas.
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The first driver is the proliferation and ubiquity of  mobile phones. The 
mobile phone subscription rate in SSA is surprisingly high – estimated 
to be 76 subscriptions per 100 people (Louie et al. 2015). Mobile phones 
are extremely beneficial to villagers, allowing farmers to check market 
prices before selling, simplifying logistics, or enabling mobile payment 
(Louie and Dauenhauer 2016). Even in areas without reliable mobile 
service, mobile phones are popular as they can often be used as radios 
or to play music (Kemeny et al. 2014). Recharging the phones can 
require travel to the nearest electrified town, which could be many 
kilometres away (Adkins, Oppelstrup and Modi 2012).
The second main driver is lighting. In many areas, kerosene has been the 
fuel of  choice for evening lighting. However, kerosene lamps have low 
efficacy and are linked with negative health and safety outcomes (Energy 
Sector Management Assistance Program 2015; Louie and Dauenhauer 
2016). Kerosene lamps are often used indoors, where they might spill, 
or come in contact with flammable materials. Studies have shown an 
increased risk of  cancer, respiratory infection, asthma, tuberculosis, and 
cataracts associated with kerosene use (Lam et al. 2012).
Mobile phone charging and electric lighting require only modest 
amounts of  power and energy – typically less than 50W and less than 
10KWh per year. Consequently, the electricity supply can be modestly 
sized, with limited availability – a few hours per day following sunset – 
and be deemed acceptable.
The reliability and adequacy requirements can also be low due to fuel 
stacking. Fuel stacking is the use of  multiple energy sources to meet the 
same energy need (Energy Sector Management Assistance Program 
2015). For example, households with electricity service might use an 
electric stove as well as charcoal for cooking. Fuel stacking builds in 
redundancy to the energy mix so that an electricity supply with low 
reliability and adequacy can be more easily tolerated.
Estimating demand for off-grid users is a particularly challenging and 
error-prone planning activity (Blodgett et al. 2017). The state-of-practice 
demand prediction for larger size systems like mini-grids is to utilise 
door-to-door surveys to gather information on actual and aspirational 
appliance ownership and usage, from which the demand is predicted. 
The predictions can be largely inaccurate (Louie and Dauenhauer 
2016), which can lead to over- or under-designed systems. Over-designed 
grids are an inefficient use of  capital, as money is wasted on excessively 
sized equipment, and the surplus energy cannot be sold elsewhere as 
can be done in an interconnected grid. Under-designed mini-grids are 
unreliable due to either power or energy limitations, but solar PV-based 
mini-grids benefit from modularity and can grow as demand grows.
6.3 Economic and social goals
The economic viability of  off-grid systems is based on the premise that 
off-grid customers are willing and capable of  paying a premium for 
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electricity. A business recharging mobile phones, for example, is often 
able to collect a fee ranging from 10 US cents to 50 US cents per charge. 
Given the small capacity of  mobile phone batteries, this is approximately 
equivalent to US$50/KWh – roughly 500 times the rate that is charged 
in the US. In addition, this sum is not insignificant to the rural villager 
who might average US$3 per day in income. Non-electric lighting is also 
expensive, with 80 per cent of  household fuel expenditures related to 
kerosene or candles reported in some areas (Adkins et al. 2012).
As a simple example, a US$400 solar home system with a 100W panel 
optimistically can supply 500Wh per day, or 182.5KWh per year. That 
same consumption would cost a grid-connected customer US$12.78 per 
year at a moderately subsidised rate of  7 US cents/KWh. Under these 
same rates, the solar home system would need to last 31 years for the 
investment to pay off, far longer than can be realistically expected. 
The spread of  solar home systems is a testament to the high cost of  
energy experienced in rural areas. Electricity rates paid by the smallest 
customers of  a for-profit mini-grid typically are in the range of  US$1 to 
US$5/KWh. Selecting a rate that balances ability to pay with financial 
sustainability is important in mini-grid planning. Since many customers 
lack a credit profile, investing in a connection to house or business is 
financially risky. Collection of  payment for energy consumption can be 
managed under pre-pay schemes in which a customer purchases units 
of  energy, and their access is disabled once these units are consumed 
(Smith et al. 2010; Roach and Cohen n.d.).
Despite consideration of  all of  these factors, the financial sustainability 
of  a mini-grid can be tenuous. Scaling up can improve financial 
performance for developers, but requires de-risking to attract external 
funding. Wider availability of  business and performance data, along 
with best practices, can contribute to de-risk these investments.
6.4 Renewables
Renewable energy is central to off-grid electrification strategies. They 
are considered as the most economic off-grid electricity solution 
(IRENA 2015) because delivering petrol or diesel to rural and remote 
sites can triple their cost. However, systems with high-reliability 
requirements or those dependent on weather-driven renewable 
resources require some form of  battery energy storage (typically 
lead-acid or lithium ion batteries), which can significantly add to their 
cost (Mandelli et al. 2016). The disposal of  these batteries at the end 
of  their life introduces additional logistical challenges, and can lead to 
serious environmental problems if  it is not managed properly (Bensch, 
Peters and Sievert 2017).
7 Differentiated strengths: synthesis and conclusions
Historically, electricity access was conceptualised as a binary indicator 
– a home or business had access to the electrical grid, or they did not. 
This is the situation presumed in traditional planning methods. More 
recently, electricity access has come to be viewed along a quality-of-service 
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continuum, regardless of  source, that acknowledges the different use-cases 
and realities of  users. On one end of  the continuum is a user with few 
resources and a limited ability to pay for electricity. Their electricity need 
is modest – basic night lighting and perhaps recharging a mobile phone. 
There are also customers that are grid-connected, which allows them 
to use appliances such as televisions and air conditioning but the supply 
is unreliable and of  low quality; other users such as businesses require 
high-quality, high-reliability electricity, and have the means to pay for a 
grid connection and back-up generators and batteries. On the far end of  
the continuum is an industrial user who may require as much energy as 
many of  the other types of  customers, and require either a high-voltage 
grid connection or their own power plant. Energy system planning 
practice in SSA must find solutions to support the development of  all 
these tiers of  users, without the benefit of  strong government surpluses.
In this article, we have discussed two potential pathways for 
electrification in SSA: grid extension and off-grid systems. The 
choice of  one or the other, or both in different geographies depends 
on the desired tier of  access, their economic viability, and the new 
opportunities brought by technological progress. Although grid coverage 
has traditionally been seen as the endpoint for all electrification 
paths, experience has shown that insisting on grid extension can lead 
to overextended systems providing poor service. Off-grid systems 
could be a temporary salve that allows economic growth to the level 
where payment to a centralised system is viable. Such an approach 
was followed in the Chinese rural electrification model. However, the 
African model might provide a different role for off-grid systems, where 
they are sufficient for economic growth and increasing access to higher 
energy tiers. Under this scenario, non-industrial value-creation activities 
would lower the energy intensity of  the economy while cheaper energy 
storage would improve the performance of  mini-grids. In this case, the 
off-grid renewables model could eventually support grid extension from 
energy hubs, which themselves derive only limited trading and reliability 
advantages from the national transmission grid.
State-led and market-led approaches can coexist in SSA for the 
provision of  electricity through the previous pathways (Byrne et al. 
2014). In any case, the review of  previous electrification experiences 
has shown little precedent for rural electrification by market forces 
alone. Rather, strong government support – financially, politically, and 
regulatory – were essential to achieve universal access in countries 
like China or the US. Low ability to pay for electricity in rural areas 
of  SSA also implies that subsidisation will be an essential component 
for universality. However, the state must ensure the viability of  these 
subsidies for the power sector as a whole to avoid the financial collapse 
of  electric utilities, a common feature in the African power sector. 
As developed countries look towards uncertain future scenarios and 
changing business models for utilities, they will stand to learn much 
from the discoveries of  SSA practitioners of  energy planning.
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Notes
1 Capacity factor is the ratio of  actual energy produced by an energy-
generating unit or system in a given period, to the hypothetical 
maximum possible (i.e. energy produced from continuous operation 
at full rated power). Open Energy Information https://openei.org.
2 All countries compared for ‘Energy > Electricity > Installed 
generating capacity per thousand people’, CIA World Factbooks 2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013. Population figures from World Bank: (1) United 
Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects, (2) United 
Nations Statistical Division, Population and Vital Statistics Report 
(various years), (3) Census reports and other statistical publications 
from national statistical offices, (4) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, 
(5) Secretariat of  the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography 
Programme, and (6) US Census Bureau: International Database. 
Aggregates compiled by NationMaster. Retrieved from  
www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Energy/Electricity/
Installed-generating-capacity-per-thousand-people.
3 Power, measured in watts (W), is the flow of  energy over a unit of  
time. Some appliances have high power requirements, for example 
an iron, whereas others have low power requirements, for example 
an LED bulb.
4 Energy, measured in watt hours (Wh) is the product of  power and 
time. Power and energy are analogous to speed and distance; speed 
refers to the rate of  travel, whereas power refers to the rate of  energy 
consumption.
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Assessing the Potential Impact of 
Grid-Scale Variable Renewable 
Energy on the Reliability of 
Electricity Supply in Kenya*
Gruffudd Edwards,1 Chris J. Dent2 and Neal Wade3
Abstract Securing a sufficient supply of reliable and affordable electricity 
is a major challenge for countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), due to low 
current access levels, and rapid population and economic growth. This 
article will review application and technical modelling issues associated 
with generation adequacy assessment (i.e. assessing the risk of available 
generation being less than demand) in the context of SSA countries with 
significant capacities of renewable energy, with Kenya as the main case 
study. One major challenge in performing such studies in SSA is often 
availability of the necessary data on renewable resource and demand – the 
article will further demonstrate how useful information may be gained on 
the extent to which wind and hydro energy resources complement each 
other in Kenya, in the context of limited data availability.
Keywords: electricity, renewable, energy, reliability, Africa, Kenya, grid, 
adequacy, risk, demand, resource.
1 Introduction
Securing a sufficient supply of  reliable and affordable electricity is a huge 
challenge for countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Many countries 
in the region are experiencing rapid increases in the size of  their 
populations, and even more rapid growth in their economies (World Bank 
Group 2017a). As a result, the region experienced a 45 per cent increase 
in annual energy consumption during 2000–12 (World Energy Outlook 
2014), with the growth in some countries much higher.
In 2009, the World Bank stated (Eberhard et al. 2008) that SSA was 
amid a power crisis characterised by unreliable supplies, largely due 
to insufficient generating capacity, high prices, and often higher costs. 
Indeed, in 2008, the World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country 
Diagnostic (AICD) project (Eberhard et al. 2011) calculated that while 
there was a need for 7,000MW of  additional power generation capacity 
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to be installed in SSA countries each year, the total installed in prior 
years was only one seventh of  that. This is a costly problem for SSA 
countries (Deloitte 2015), with the AICD project calculating in 2009 
(Rosnes and Vennemo 2009) that the region would have to spend 
roughly 4 per cent of  gross domestic product (GDP) annually on power 
sector investments to meet the demands of  economic development, 
keep pace with population growth, and increase energy access. Despite 
major efforts towards increasing the reach of  electricity networks in 
recent years, the SSA average rate of  access in 2014 was only 35 per 
cent. Access rates are much lower in some countries – for example, 
Chad’s is only 4 per cent, while Ethiopia’s is 25 per cent, with 73 million 
people without access.
Thus, building very significant generation capacity is both essential and 
inevitable in the near future. For many reasons – including location, 
maturity of  technology, and speed of  building – traditional fossil fuel 
power plants are well suited to fill the gap. However, many stakeholders 
in the SSA power sector are keen to see these power systems largely 
avoid such a highly polluting stage. Hydro power is already a major 
component of  SSA’s generation fleet, and plentiful resource means that 
more reservoirs will likely be built. However, in some cases the potential 
for economically and politically viable development is insufficient to 
meet the growing demand alone. There is therefore a strong desire to 
see high penetrations of  variable renewable generation (VG) within 
many systems (AREI 2015).
The power systems of  SSA countries generally face four fundamental 
and interrelated problems (although the extent of  each varies 
considerably between countries):4 (i) unreliable supply due to insufficient 
(functioning) generation capacity to meet all of  the demand on the 
system; (ii) unreliable supply due to failing or insufficient power 
distribution infrastructure; (iii) very large percentages of  the population 
without access to the grid; (iv) prices that are too high for the majority 
of  current and potential new customers but still below cost recovery. It 
stands to reason that when assessing the value of  proposed large-capacity 
VG projects in a SSA power system, the relevant policymakers and 
stakeholders should possess as much insight as is reasonably possible 
on the extent to which they might alleviate these problems. Or, if  VG 
projects are proposed specifically to deal with one or two of  these 
problems, rigorous assessment should be available on their impact on 
the others. It is immediately evident that to truly assess impacts on these 
problems, especially given the complex interrelationships between them, 
a thorough interdisciplinary approach is needed.
This article will explore in detail impacts of  VG on problem number (i) 
– an area of  analysis known as capacity adequacy assessment. Indeed, 
the International Energy Agency’s ‘Energy Outlook’ summary for 2016 
(World Bank Group 2017a) states that the deployment of  renewable 
generation already plays an important role in the mitigation of  
traditional energy security concerns, by moderating oil and gas imports. 
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However, they warn, rising shares of  VG puts the reliability of  electricity 
supply under pressure in a different way, due to their unpredictable 
and intermittent nature. Despite the hugely ambitious scale of  current 
and near-future planned VG investments, there has been almost no 
system-level analysis of  the reliability impacts of  grid-scale VG in SSA 
countries, either from the academic community or from government 
and industry.
The ability of  the generators within a power system to consistently 
meet the demands made of  them by customers is known as the system’s 
generation adequacy. It may be captured through a variety of  metrics, 
with the most meaningful being risk-based and probabilistic in nature. 
A popular example is the expected value for the number of  periods 
(e.g. 30-minute intervals) within a year where the available generation is 
insufficient to fully meet demand – known as the loss of  load expectation 
(LOLE). Unfortunately, there has been very little research on the potential 
contribution of  VG to the generation adequacy of  SSA power systems. 
Indeed, detailed risk-based assessment of  generation adequacy in 
developing countries in general has rarely been addressed in the academic 
and industrial literature, an exception being the work of  Billinton and 
Pandey et al. in several publications, for example Billinton et al. (1995).
This is not to say that it is unknown whether the addition of  a large 
VG project might in fact decrease the reliability of  an SSA power 
system. Adding capacity to a system cannot decrease its generation 
adequacy, although operational constraints might limit the adequacy 
contribution of  VG capacity. While operational problems caused by 
VG might be mitigated through curtailment (i.e. the system not taking 
the full available output of  VG at times when this is challenging), this 
clearly reduces the contribution VG can make and increases unit cost. 
Understanding precisely the extent to which this and other technical 
issues limit the potential contribution of  VG to capacity adequacy in 
the new context of  SSA power systems is challenging, as is discussed in 
Section 3 of  this article, and is currently beyond the scope of  analysis 
performed by SSA power system operators and regulators.5
Despite the technical barriers to conducting full and rigorous capacity 
adequacy assessments to assess the contribution of  large-capacity VG 
projects to SSA capacity adequacy, it is possible for policymakers and 
other stakeholders to conduct much simpler analysis to gain insight 
on this vital issue. This article presents an illustrative example of  how 
to conduct such analysis when the data and technical expertise for a 
complete probabilistic study are not available. This example investigates 
the wind resource in Kenya, comparing temporal patterns in its 
(random) availability with patterns in system demand and the (random) 
availability of  the hydrological resource to assess the extent to which the 
resources complement each other.
Before the presentation of  methods, models, and data sources in 
Section 4 and the presentation of  results in Section 5, the article 
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presents the context of  the Kenyan power system in Section 2, and 
provides motivation for the type of  analysis conducted in Section 3.
2 Overview of the Kenyan power system
Kenya is situated on the eastern coast of  Africa, bisected by the equator. 
It has a coastal length of  470km (Theuri 2008), varied terrain, and rises 
to 5,199 metres above sea level. The population is rapidly expanding, 
having increased from 31 million people in 2000 to 46 million in 2015 
(World Bank Group 2017a). The economy has been growing even 
more rapidly, with GDP increasing from US$12.7 billion in 2000 to 
US$63.4 billion in 2015 (ibid.). In 2010, only 20 per cent of  the total 
population of  Kenya, and only about 5 per cent of  the rural population 
had access to electricity, although this situation is rapidly improving 
(Ogola, Davidsdottir and Fridleifsson 2011).
The peak demand on the system rose from 1,107MW in the 2006–07 
financial year to 1,512MW in 2014–15.6 The energy regulator’s 
central forecast in Republic of  Kenya Energy Regulatory Commission 
(ERC 2013) sees the peak rising from 1,606MW in 2013 to 11,318MW 
by 2033. The forecast, however, has much associated uncertainty, with 
the feasible ‘low growth’ forecast being roughly 50 per cent lower than 
the central forecast by 2033, while the ‘high growth’ forecast is roughly 
50 per cent higher. A lack of  capacity in the past means that there is 
still a widespread belief  that the system is highly unreliable, despite the 
high level of  reliability currently experienced in the cities (except during 
floods).7 Many areas of  Kenya continue to experience an unreliable 
supply, however: to a small extent due to insufficient transmission 
capacity, but mainly due to problems with insufficient distribution 
capacity and maintenance challenges.
In March 2015, the capacities of  the Kenyan power system, grouped 
by generation type, were as follows: hydropower – 820.6MW; fossil 
fuels (including emergency power) – 717MW; geothermal – 588MW; 
wind generation – 25.6MW. While most of  the electricity historically 
generated in Kenya has been from hydropower, it has not supplied 
most of  the country’s total energy needs – petroleum has, over the years, 
accounted for about 80 per cent of  the country’s commercial energy 
requirements (Oludhe 2008). It is also stated in Oludhe (2008) that 
the hydropower potential in Kenya in the form of  large reservoirs is 
estimated at about 2,263MW, while the small schemes have a total 
potential of  3,000MW. Further, there is excellent geothermal resource 
within the Rift Valley, with the generation potential estimated at over 
2,000MW, and geothermal capacity is rapidly being built.
Although equatorial areas are assumed to have poor-to-medium 
wind resource, Kenya experiences seasonal monsoon winds, and its 
topographic features have endowed the country with excellent wind 
resource areas (ibid.). Consequently, it is likely that multiple very large 
wind generation projects, of  the order of  hundreds of  megawatts, 
will be constructed in the coming years (ERC 2011, 2013). Kenya’s 
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equatorial position also means that it has excellent solar resource in 
many areas, although there are currently no plans for any large-scale 
solar power projects (ERC 2011).
3 Generation adequacy in Kenya and other SSA countries
Adequacy assessment is concerned with the risk of  there being 
insufficient resources to supply demand in a power system, considering 
scheduled and unscheduled outages, and availability of  renewable 
resources. Generation adequacy assessment (GAA) studies therefore 
calculate quantitative measures of  the risk of  shortfalls, such as the 
probabilities of  shortfalls at different times. Adequacy should not be 
confused with the flexibility of  the system, which is its ability to deploy 
its resources to respond to changes in net load, both predicted and 
unpredicted (net load is defined as the remaining system load not served 
by VG). Neither should adequacy be confused with the security of  a 
power system: its ability to withstand sudden, unexpected disturbances 
without any serious consequences for the supply to customers.
The generation adequacy of  traditional power systems historically 
has often been measured by reserve margin: the amount by which 
generation capacity exceeds the projected peak demand, expressed as 
a percentage of  that peak value. This is a simple and static approach 
that benefits from being very easy to calculate and understand, and is 
adopted occasionally by system operators in SSA countries, for example 
Ghana in 2010 (Power Systems Energy Consulting 2010). A much 
more meaningful approach to GAA is to explicitly consider the risks 
of  generation capacity being insufficient to fully meet demand, using 
probabilistic methods to model the balance of  supply and demand at 
each point in time.
Since GAA is usually conducted for the mature power systems of  
developed countries, they are concerned with the frequency and severity 
of  those very rare events when not all demand can be met, referred to 
as generation shortfall events. Although there are many possible metrics 
to capture a system’s capacity adequacy from this perspective, the most 
popular are: the loss of  load expectation (LOLE), the average duration 
during a year for which the generation capacity available will be less than 
the demand); and the expected energy not served (EENS), the average 
total energy demanded by customers that cannot be delivered by the 
generators during a year. The assessment of  such risk-based metrics is 
based on a model of  the possible random conditions the system might 
face – including weather outcomes and customer behaviour.
Some LOLE-based analysis informs the long-term planning process 
for Kenya, as part of  the Least Cost Power Development Plan methodology 
(ERC 2011). However, the statistical methodology for converting a set 
of  generators into a risk profile is not as detailed as the international 
best practice, and makes a strong implicit assumption that risks should 
be identical on every day of  the year (which might not be the case if  
demand or quality of  VG resource varies through the year).
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When significant VG capacity is present, accurate results require that 
the probabilistic method accurately represents spatial relationships 
in the resource availabilities, for example how often it is windy or 
calm across the entire region where the VG is located. Where there 
is significant presence of  energy-constrained generation such as 
hydropower, it is also vital to capture temporal relationships in the 
resource availabilities. This is the case in Kenya, due to a combination 
of  the historical dominance of  hydropower and the very significant 
inter-annual variability of  the hydrological resource – i.e. the Kenyan 
system has experienced serious capacity problems in the past following a 
series of  dry years.
This problem is being effectively mitigated by the Kenyan government 
by ensuring that hydropower makes up a smaller percentage of  the 
generation mix as the system grows. However, the percentage certainly 
remains high enough that rigorous capacity adequacy assessment 
must consider the operational decisions of  hydro generation. Energy 
constraints also typically apply, to some extent, to thermal generators in 
SSA countries. For instance, this is the case in Ghana, where the supply 
of  natural gas from neighbouring Nigeria has been very unreliable 
(Power Systems Energy Consulting 2010), among other problems. 
Kenya is, however, rather unusual in that its extensive geothermal 
capacity renders it less vulnerable to fuel supply issues.
It was stated in the introduction that the main contribution of  this 
article is to provide an illustrative example of  a desktop study that 
provides insight into the potential contribution of  VG to the reliability 
of  an SSA power system. The full probabilistic generation adequacy 
assessments described in this section go beyond such desktop studies; 
however, presenting some background knowledge about full studies 
motivates desirable features of  simpler analysis. A useful desktop study 
should reveal the salient aspects of  spatial relationships for the VG 
resource availability, as well as relationships between temporal patterns 
in the resource availability, system demand, and the hydrological 
resource availability. In simpler terms, it is vital to examine the extent to 
which wind generation can provide power when demand is high and the 
power available from hydropower is compromised by drought.
4 Illustrative example: the Kenya model
This section proceeds with the main objective of  the article: to present 
an illustrative example of  a desktop study of  the VG resource in an SSA 
country, designed to gain insight about the ability of  associated VG 
capacity to increase the power system’s capacity adequacy. The chosen 
example explores the potential contribution of  large wind energy 
projects to generation adequacy in the Kenyan power system. It does so 
by examining temporal relationships between wind resource availability 
and demand, also between the wind and hydropower resources, on a 
coarse resolution. This section presents the data sources available and 
sets up the models and Kenyan system scenarios used in the analysis.
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4.1 The Kenyan power system scenario
We adopt two simple scenarios for the Kenyan power system in the 
relatively near future, taken from the 2013–33 Least Cost Power 
Development Plan (LCPDP) (Ummel and Fant 2014). One scenario 
has the peak power demand of  the system as 4,000MW (4GW), which 
is close to the forecasted demand of  3,939MW in the year 2022. The 
second scenario has the peak demand as 6,000MW (6GW) – close to the 
forecasted demand of  6,147MW in 2026. In the 4GW scenario, there 
is 925.5MW of  installed wind capacity. The wind projects included in 
this scenario deviate somewhat from the LCPDP, and rather includes 
those projects that seemed most likely to be built at the time of  writing 
(August 2016), based on their legal and financial status. They are: Lake 
Turkana – 310MW; Meru – 400MW; Kajiado – 100MW; Ngong Hills 
– 25.5MW; and Lamu – 90MW. This is referred to as the Original wind 
capacity scenario.
For the 6GW demand scenario, we assume that wind capacity has 
grown proportionally, i.e. increased by 50 per cent to 1,388.25MW. 
We consider two scenarios for the spatial distribution of  wind capacity 
in this case: (i) the Additional Locations variant, where four additional 
projects have been built – in areas of  strong wind resource where, 
according to online news reports, some interest has been expressed 
in developing projects; (ii) the Increased Capacity variant, where only 
the same five projects exist, but where the capacity of  each has been 
increased. In the Additional Locations variant, the additional capacity is 
distributed equally among the new locations. The motivation for the 
two scenarios for capacity distribution is that there is uncertainty over 
the extent of  geographical spread of  wind projects in Kenya when 
looking forward to 2026 – and by including scenarios that represent the 
plausible extremes for this aspect of  the modelling, sensitivity to this 
uncertainty can be quantified.
4.2 The wind power generation model and data available
The general approach adopted involves direct use of  historic series to 
represent possible future output for the chosen scenarios, similarly to 
several examples in the literature, for example Ummel and Fant (2014). 
The necessary steps of  obtaining time series datasets for the wind power 
outputs are as follows:
 l (W.1) Obtain concurrent time series of  wind speeds at locations close 
to the wind energy projects;
 l (W.2) Adjust patterns in average wind speed across hours of  the day 
to reflect values at the turbine hubs, i.e. at the centre of  the rotating 
blades;
 l (W.3) Calibrate the series through some mathematical transformation 
to match any known statistics for the wind resource at the project sites;
 l (W.4) Convert the calibrated wind speed series to power output 
series and add them to establish the total wind power available. 
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With only limited data available, it is necessary to make many strong 
modelling assumptions to proceed. Therefore, for each major step 
listed above, two model variants were developed based on contrasting 
assumptions, to assess the sensitivity of  results to those assumptions.
For step W.1, concurrent and hourly resolution wind speed series were 
found spanning a period of  22 years, from 1980 to 2001, as provided 
by the SWERA project (Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment) 
(Theuri 2008; NREL 2017). SWERA is a global project to supply 
high-quality renewable energy resource information, using a combination 
of  analytical, numerical, and empirical methods to obtain high-resolution 
VG resource maps for many developing countries. Their modelling 
activity is also responsible for the complete and quality-assured time 
series of  meteorological recorded data used here. The wind speeds 
were recorded at nine meteorological stations, each one close to a wind 
project. The stations for the Original and Increased Capacity wind project 
scenarios are Dagoretti, Lamu, Makindu, Marsabit, and Meru. For the 
Additional Locations scenario, the four extra recording stations were Lodwar, 
Malindi, Narok, and Nyeri. Due to the limited number of  suitably 
located meteorological stations in Kenya, it was not possible to develop 
contrasting model variants for this step of  the wind resource modelling.
A pattern in mean wind speed across hours of  the day is known in 
statistics as diurnal seasonality, and dealing with any such seasonality is 
step W.2 of  the modelling process. It is well established in the literature, 
for example Sturt and Strbac (2011), that diurnal seasonalities diminish 
significantly with height in some climates, and it is unlikely that the 
hub-height of  every turbine will match that of  the recorded data. As 
the extent to which diurnal seasonalities diminish with height in Kenya 
is also unknown, this is a type of  uncertainty that must be addressed by 
contrasting model variants. Thus, in one variant, referred to as the Base 
model, all diurnal seasonalities are removed. In the Keep Diurnal model, 
they remain unchanged.
The next step, W.3, involves calibrating the series to any known statistics 
of  the wind resource at the project locations (rather than reasonably 
nearby). For the chosen exemplar, there are no statistics available for the 
wind resource at the precise project locations, but reasonable estimates can 
be made. The two quantities estimated were the mean wind speed, and 
the mean of  the wind speed cubed – both of  which were obtained from 
the SWERA wind resource map of  Kenya (Theuri 2008). The former 
set of  values were extracted directly from the resource maps, by careful 
visual inspection coupled with coordinates for the modelled wind projects. 
The mean values of  the cubed wind speeds were inferred indirectly 
from SWERA energy density maps – i.e. the mean kinetic energy 
contained in 1m3 of  air, which required estimates of  air density at the 
project sites. These density estimates were obtained using meteorological 
rules of  thumb regarding the reduction of  air density with altitude and 
temperature, both of  which are high for the Kenyan locations.
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With the two wind speed statistics estimated for each project, the 
next part of  modelling step W.3 was to apply simple mathematical 
transformations to the wind speed time series, so that they precisely 
match the mean values, as well as matching the mean cubed values as 
closely as possible. Two model variants were developed here: the Base 
model that applied both linear and power transformations to the series, 
and the Linear Scaling model that applied only linear transformations. 
That is, for the Base model, if  the original wind speed at time t is yt  , 
the new wind speed is a·( yt  )b, with coefficients a and b established to 
fit the estimated wind speed statistics as closely as possible. For the 
Linear Scaling variant, the transformation is restricted to only a·( yt  ). The 
coefficients were established by simple trial and error, while restricting b 
to the physically sensible range of  0.7 to 1.3.
Proceeding to modelling step W.4, the transformed wind speed series 
were converted to normalised powers, i.e. proportions of  the wind 
project’s maximum power, using a function known as a power curve. 
Being a complex area of  considerable modelling uncertainty, two simple 
contrasting model variants were again developed: the Single Turbine 
variant, where a generic power curve for a typical single wind turbine 
was used (as may be easily found online). Adopting such a power curve 
is the equivalent of  assuming that all turbines in each project experience 
the same hourly-averaged wind speeds, i.e. that the geographical spread 
of  the wind project is insufficient to necessitate deviation from the power 
curve of  a single turbine. The Base model variant assumes that the 
geographical spread of  each project is significant, and that the single 
turbine power curve should be considerably smoothed – i.e. reducing the 
steepest changes in turbine output over a small wind speed range, and 
extending the range of  wind speeds for which some power is produced. 
This process was conducted in accordance with several examples in the 
literature. Finally, the normalised power series from both variants were 
scaled by the capacities of  the planned projects, and summed.
Although the three branching points in the wind power modelling 
mean that there are eight variants for the overall process, we did 
not investigate all of  these, since we are interested in the sensitivity 
surrounding each modelling assumption individually. Thus, the overall 
Base model is that in which the Base variant was chosen at each stage, 
while for example the overall Single Turbine model is one where the 
Base variant was chosen in steps W.2 and W.3, but the Single Turbine 
alternative was chosen in step W.4.
4.3 The demand model
A year-long, hourly resolution time series of  generation dispatch 
(i.e. total power generated) was obtained from Kenya Light and Power, 
the country’s electricity retailer and distributer. The series is taken as a 
proxy for temporal patterns of  demand in both system scenarios, after 
being linearly scaled up to a peak level of  4GW and 6GW, respectively. 
The validity of  such a simple transformation is supported somewhat 
by the fact that in the LCPDP forecasts, the demand load factor – the 
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energy consumed in a year divided by the energy consumed if  the 
demand were constantly at its peak level – remains almost unchanged. It 
is interesting to note that there is no discernible pattern in the demand 
across weeks of  the year (i.e. annual seasonality), although there are 
obviously diurnal and weekly seasonalities.
Since there is little demand on the system for space heating and cooling, 
there is no obvious mechanism for demand to vary from year to year 
given constant underlying patterns, unlike the UK, for example, so there 
is little need to explicitly model this uncertainty.
4.4 The hydrological resource model
The analysis of  relationships between the wind and hydrological 
resources presented in this article is limited to monthly resolution data, 
for two reasons: (i) finer resolution data on the hydropower resource 
is difficult to obtain, and (ii) we cannot be certain what the operating 
strategy for hydropower might be in the scenarios, particularly 
the extent to which close coordination between wind projects and 
hydropower reservoirs might be achievable.
Kenya has many hydropower reservoir and run-of-river schemes, 
including a cascade scheme of  large reservoirs in a single river basin. 
As the analysis presented in this article aims to be illustrative and 
transparent, a single variable is required that can represent, in a 
reasonable way, the hydrological resource available. Water flow into the 
Masinga reservoir was chosen since, as explained in Bunyasi (2012), the 
Masinga dam’s roles are to regulate water flow into subsequent dams, 
particularly during the dry seasons, as well as to prevent flooding. While 
downstream reservoirs have much greater power capacities, Masinga 
dominates in terms of  energy capacity. The downstream reservoirs 
have other sources of  river inflows apart from Masinga discharge, but 
during the dry season – when capacity adequacy is critical – these are 
insufficient for operation. The quantity modelled here is the net inflow, 
i.e. the gross inflow minus evaporation and spillage, and annually averaged 
values are provided in Bunyasi (2012) for the period 1982–2011.
To obtain monthly (rather than annual) resolution time series, data 
limitations mean that precipitation must be used as a proxy variable, 
following calibration. Use was made of  two such data sources, and 
each is associated with a contrasting model variant, again for sensitivity 
analysis. The first model variant, labelled Perfect Correlation, uses a 
monthly-resolution precipitation time series for an unspecified location 
in Kenya, obtained from the World Bank’s climate data repository 
(World Bank Group 2017b) spanning the coincident period 1982–2011. 
The modelling assumption made is that the relative contribution from 
each month to the annual Masinga dam inflow is identical to the 
relative contribution of  each month to the total annual precipitation in 
the World Bank data. In other words, there is 100 per cent correlation 
across the county regarding the division of  total precipitation between 
months of  the year.
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For the contrasting model, labelled No Correlation, it is assumed that 
there is no relationship between the division of  total precipitation 
among the months at the unknown Kenyan location and the inflow 
to the Masinga dam, so that the World Bank time series is not 
representative of  the inflow to this hydro scheme. Instead, this model 
variant uses the fixed climatological profile of  precipitation for a 
nearby location, and scales it to match each year’s annual net inflows. 
The climatological profile was obtained from Climate-Data (2017) for 
Makuyu, located in the hills feeding the Masinga reservoir.
For a year where the wet season rains were plentiful, the hydrological 
resource during the following dry season is likely to be better than if  
the rains were poor. However, this is not a direct relationship, since 
the resource available during the dry season depends on the water 
within the reservoir when that period begins, which might reflect the 
out-turn of  precipitation over several recent years. For example, a wet 
season with poor rains might have a greater impact on the hydro power 
resource if  it was preceded by a cluster of  dry years. For this reason, 
insight can be gained by working with deviations from the mean pattern 
of  precipitation – referred to here as inflow anomalies. Taking this a 
step further, we work with cumulative inflow anomalies: for any month t, 
this is the sum of  inflow anomalies from the beginning of  the time series 
period to that month.
A large positive cumulative anomaly implies that the dams are likely 
to be relatively full, while a large negative value implies that levels are 
likely to be relatively low, and it is thus adopted as a rough proxy for the 
resource available. This approach has limitations, particularly lack of  
knowledge of  how full the reservoir was at the beginning of  the period; 
no representation of  spilling water due to the level being too high; and 
not considering the need to maintain minimum flow for ecological or 
recreational reasons.
5 Results
This section presents the results of  analysis conducted on the wind 
energy resource in Kenya, with respect to the potential of  wind 
generation to support capacity adequacy in the Kenyan power system, 
using the models and scenarios presented in the previous section.
5.1 Seasonal patterns in the mean wind power
The first question investigated was the extent to which the wind varies, 
on average, between seasons, and whether any such seasonality is 
complementary to the extremely seasonal nature of  the hydrological 
resource. Since demand does not display annual seasonality, it need not 
be considered on this temporal resolution. Such questions have received 
little attention in the literature, with the notable exception of  the PhD 
thesis of  Dr Christopher Oludhe (Oludhe 1998).
Figure 1 presents the annual seasonality for the Original wind capacity 
scenario, and the Base model for the conversion of  wind speeds to power, 
averaged over the 22 years in the historical sample. It also presents the 
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annual seasonality for the hydrological resource, using the No Correlation 
model variant. Values are normalised to facilitate comparison, and the 
months that roughly correspond to the four seasons experienced by 
Kenya are indicated. The figure demonstrates that the wind resource is 
fairly consistent throughout the year, with quite modest seasonality. The 
relative availability of  the resource during the ‘hot dry’ month is rather 
disappointing; however, it is good during the longer ‘cool dry’ season. 
The plot also demonstrates how distinct the wet and dry seasons are. Very 
similar relationships are revealed by alternative model and scenario choices.
5.2 Load duration curves for demand net wind
The analysis presented in this section explores the temporal relationship 
between the wind resource and demand on an hourly resolution. More 
specifically, it explores the probability distribution of  the system demand 
net of  wind generation, and compares this with the distribution of  gross 
demand. The analysis therefore adopts a statistical approach to shed light 
on the extent to which the wind resource tends to be available to reduce 
the highest demand values experienced by the system, thus improving 
its reliability. It also provides some insight on the extent to which wind 
generation would be able to reduce the depletion of  the hydrological 
resource and/or the consumption of  expensive fuel during hours of  
moderate demand. The probability distributions are presented in the 
form of  load duration curves, which are plots with demand levels plotted 
on the horizontal axis (either gross or net of  wind), and the number of  
hours where the demand level was exceeded in the modelled series are 
plotted on the vertical axis. In more technical terms, they are plots of  the 
complementary cumulative distribution function of  demand.
Figure 1 Normalised monthly mean profiles of the modelled wind resource (Base 
model, Original scenario) and the hydrological resource (No Correlation model)
Source Authors’ own.
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Several 22-year time series of  net demand were obtained, one for each 
scenario and model variant. For each scenario, demand-net-wind series were 
obtained by repeating the scaled-up demand trace 22 times, and subtracting 
the 22-year-long wind power traces (for each variant). Figure 2 presents 
Figure 2 Modelled duration curve for demand net wind generation, Original wind 
capacity scenario, linear scale for hours)
Figure 3 Modelled duration curve for demand net wind generation, Original wind 
capacity scenario, log scale for hours)
Source Authors’ own.
Source Authors’ own.
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results for the Original scenario of  wind capacity distribution, using a linear 
scale for the number of  hours, while Figure 3 uses a logarithmic scale for 
this. The number of  hours where the demand levels were exceeded in the 
22-year series are presented in raw form, rather than as average hours per 
year, to preserve the true discrete nature of  the data.
The plots include curves for the Base, Linear Scaling, and Single Turbine 
model variants, as well as where no wind capacity is present (i.e. gross 
demand). The curve for the Keep Diurnal variant was omitted from the 
figures, since they are visually indistinguishable from the base case. In 
general, the results are strikingly non-sensitive to the model variants. 
One partial exception is that results are moderately sensitive to the 
choice of  power curve for peak net demand levels.
The plots strongly suggest that wind generation can indeed have a 
significant impact in reducing the frequency of  the highest net demand 
levels, and thus can contribute directly to capacity adequacy assessment. 
Figure 2 indicates that the impact is particularly evident for demand in 
the range of  about 2,700–3,700MW, while Figure 3 indicates that the 
impact remains significant right up to the highest possible demands. 
Figure 2 also seems to support the idea that wind capacity would 
reduce demand levels throughout a typical day, ensuring that more of  
the hydrological resource can be reserved for when it is most needed – 
although there are many constraints, both technical and non-technical 
that might limit the extent to which this is possible.
Duration curves were also plotted for the two other wind capacity 
distributions, Increased Capacity and Additional Locations, for the Base 
model variant, to examine sensitivity to the number of  locations. It 
was found, rather surprisingly, that there is very little difference in the 
duration curves for these variants, with a small difference occurring at 
the high net demand extreme only. There are two implications of  this: 
firstly, we have some evidence that any conclusions drawn about the 
relationships between wind, hydro resource, and demand are robust to 
changes in the location and geographical spread of  wind power projects 
compared to current plans. This also constitutes evidence that wind 
projects should be built where they are most likely to be profitable, in 
Kenya at least, with no motivation to compromise on this for a greater 
overall contribution to capacity adequacy. The curves are not included 
as figures for brevity, since the two model’s results were so similar.
5.3 Temporal relationships between the wind and hydrological resources
This section presents analysis of  the temporal relationship between 
the wind and hydrological resources, in statistical terms, to establish 
the extent to which the two are complementary. The more they are 
complementary, the greater the potential of  wind capacity to contribute 
to capacity adequacy. Figure 4 presents 20-year series for modelled wind 
generation and Masinga reservoir inflow, using the Original scenario for 
wind capacity, the Base model variant for converting wind speed series 
into wind power, and the Perfect Correlation model for the reservoir inflow.
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The plot shows that the height of  the wet season inflow peaks exhibit 
clear but complex clustering behaviour. The wind power series also 
displays long-term trends, over many years, but such behaviour is much 
smoother and less pronounced than for inflow. Indeed, the availability of  
the wind resource is consistently high, with even the worst month being 
>40 per cent of  the best month. For the No Correlation model variant, the 
inflow series displays the same characteristics, but the exact location and 
amplitude of  spikes within the clusters are occasionally quite different. 
The resources therefore appear to be somewhat complementary, 
although the relationship requires further elucidation – in particular, due 
to limited access to metered wind power output for calibration, results 
based on relative wind resource between months are expected to be more 
robust than the assessment of  absolute level of  wind resource.
Figure 5 provides an alternative view of  the same datasets, making use 
of  the cumulative inflow anomaly described in Section 4.4 which acts as 
a proxy for the Masinga reservoir level. In this case, the data are shown 
as a scatter plot, rather than as coincident time series. The cumulative 
anomalies naturally have a mean of  zero, and were normalised to have 
a maximum of  one for clarity of  presentation. The wind power values 
are for the Original wind capacity scenario, and the Base wind model. 
Results are shown for both variants of  the Masinga inflow model.
The figure shows that there is not a strong relationship between the 
two variables. During the most extreme anomaly values (roughly in the 
range -0.44 to -0.36), when wind generation might be most needed to 
help avoid generation shortfalls, the resource is disappointing (though 
Figure 4 Normalised 20-year series, monthly resolution, for the modelled wind 
resource (Base model, Original scenario), and the Masinga reservoir inflow 
(Perfect Correlation model) 
Source Authors’ own.
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there are few data points so confident conclusions cannot be made 
on this basis). However, most of  the strongest months for the wind 
resource occur when the anomaly is either moderately or strongly 
negative, i.e. in the range -3.6 to -1, providing evidence that wind can 
make a useful contribution to adequacy. The two inflow models display 
good agreement for central values, but considerable disagreement at 
the extremes. The extent to which the wind resource is present when 
most needed appears somewhat more favourable when the Masinga 
inflow is modelled using the No Correlation variant. As the dataset is too 
small to draw firm conclusions, a more meteorological analysis, based 
on the long-term climatology of  the region could greatly improve 
understanding of  the relationship.
6 Conclusions
This article took as its premise the following idea: when evaluating 
the merits of  potential investments in large-capacity VG projects, 
policymakers and stakeholders in the power systems of  SSA countries 
(and elsewhere in the global South) would benefit from some insight 
into the impact the project might have on one of  the biggest problems 
experienced by those systems. That problem is unreliable supply, and 
in some cases a constant suppression of  demand, due to insufficient 
capacity adequacy. However, assessing the contribution of  large 
VG projects to capacity adequacy in SSA countries is technically 
challenging, and has typically proved to be beyond the resources 
available to the system operators and regulators in studies to date. Both 
the need and the technical challenge are greatest in those countries 
where demand is growing rapidly, and that are likely to see a large 
penetration of  variable renewable generation.
Figure 5 Relationship between wind resource (Base model, Original scenario) and 
cumulative Masinga inflow anomalies, for both inflow models
Source Authors’ own.
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Despite the high technical barriers associated with thorough capacity 
adequacy assessment – perhaps chief  among them being access to 
relevant data – this article has demonstrated that valuable insight can be 
gained from a relatively straightforward desktop analysis where limited 
data are available. In such a situation, the key uncertainties associated 
with the lack of  data can be dealt with by developing several simple 
model variants, each using a different data source where possible.
The illustrative example of  this approach presented in this article 
examined the wind resource in Kenya, with the objective of  gaining 
insight into the potential for wind generation projects, with very large 
capacities in relation to the Kenyan power system, to contribute to 
capacity adequacy roughly within the next decade. Several variants 
were developed for the wind capacity scenarios and for the process of  
transforming wind speed time series into generated power. Assessing the 
wind resource with respect to capacity adequacy requires temporally 
matched time series for the system demand and the hydrological resource 
available – so several model variants were also developed for these series.
Results of  the analysis indicate that there is a moderately 
complementary relationship between the wind resource and demand, 
and between the wind and hydro resources. The wind resource is also 
strikingly consistent, and seems able to significantly reduce many (but 
not all) of  the highest demands likely to be experienced by the future 
system. This supports a view that the large wind projects that are either 
currently being built in Kenya, or will be in the near future, are likely to 
contribute significantly to generation adequacy of  the system.
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Exploring the Macroeconomic 
Impacts of Low-Carbon Energy 
Transitions: A Simulation Analysis 
for Kenya and Ghana
Dirk Willenbockel, Helen Hoka Osiolo and 
Simon Bawakyillenuo
Abstract The study applies purpose-built dynamic computable general 
equilibrium models for Kenya and Ghana with a disaggregated 
country-specific representation of the power sector, to simulate the 
prospective medium-run growth and distributional implications associated 
with a shift towards a higher share of renewables in the power mix, up to 
2025. In both countries, the share of fossil fuel-based thermal electricity 
generation in the power mix will increase sharply over the next decade 
and beyond according to current national energy sector development plans. 
The overarching general message suggested by the simulation results is 
that in both countries it appears feasible to reduce the carbon content 
of electricity generation significantly without adverse consequences for 
economic growth and without noteworthy distributional effects.
Keywords: low-carbon growth, scenario analysis, CGE, green growth, 
renewable energy, climate change mitigation, sustainable energy.
1 Introduction
This study provides a forward-looking simulation analysis of  
economy-wide and distributional implications associated with 
alternative pathways for the development of  the electricity sector in 
Kenya and Ghana. From an economic perspective, significant shifts in 
the power mix of  an economy, as well as policy measures to induce or 
support such shifts, are bound to affect the structure of  domestic prices 
across the whole economy with repercussions for the growth prospects 
of  different production sectors and for the real income growth paths of  
different socioeconomic groups. Understanding these economy-wide 
repercussions is crucial for a study concerned with the obstacles to – and 
political feasibility of  – adopting a low-carbon growth strategy. The 
analysis requires the adoption of  a multisectoral general equilibrium 
approach that allows the capture of  the input–output linkages between 
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the electricity sector and the rest of  the economy, as well as the linkages 
between production activity, household income and expenditure, and 
government policy.
Thus, we employ purpose-built dynamic computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models for Kenya and Ghana with a detailed country-specific 
representation of  the power sector to simulate the prospective 
medium-run growth and distributional implications associated with a 
shift towards a higher share of  renewables in the power mix, up to 2025.
The following section explains the methodological approach and 
describes the key features of  the CGE models in a non-technical 
manner. Each model is calibrated to a social accounting matrix (SAM) 
which reflects the observed input–output structure of  production, 
the commodity composition of  demand, and the pattern of  income 
distribution for the country at a disaggregated level at the start of  
the simulation horizon. Section 3 spells out the data sources for the 
construction of  the social accounting matrices and outlines the model 
calibration process. Sections 4 and 5 present the results of  the dynamic 
simulation analysis for Kenya and Ghana respectively. In each case, we 
first develop a stylised baseline scenario that simulates the evolution of  
the economy under current power sector expansion plans up to 2025 
and then contrast this baseline with an alternative lower-carbon energy 
scenario. Furthermore, the sensitivity of  results to alternative projections 
for world market fossil fuel prices is explored. Section 6 draws conclusions.
2 The analytic framework
2.1 Rationale for the adoption of a CGE approach
CGE models are widely used tools in energy and climate mitigation policy 
analysis.1 The prime appeal of  adopting a general equilibrium approach 
to energy policy and energy-related environmental policy analysis arises 
from the fact that energy is an input to virtually every economic activity. 
Hence, changes in the energy sector ‘will ripple through multiple markets, 
with far larger consequences than energy’s small share of  national income 
might suggest’ (Sue Wing 2009: 2). The unique advantage of  the CGE 
approach over partial equilibrium approaches is its ability to incorporate 
these ‘ripple effects’ in a systematic manner.
In contrast to partial equilibrium approaches, CGE models consider 
all sectors in an economy simultaneously and take consistent account 
of  economy-wide resource constraints, intersectoral intermediate 
input–output linkages, and interactions between markets for goods and 
services on the one hand, and primary factor markets including labour 
markets on the other. CGE models simulate the full circular flow of  
income in an economy from (i) income generation through productive 
activity, to (ii) the primary distribution of  that income to workers, 
owners of  productive capital, and recipients of  the proceeds from land 
and other natural resource endowments, to (iii) the redistribution of  that 
income through taxes and transfers, and to (iv) the use of  that income 
for consumption and investment (Pueyo et al. 2015).
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2.2 Specification of the dynamic CGE models for Kenya and Ghana
In terms of  theoretical pedigree, the CGE models for Kenya and 
Ghana employed in this study can be characterised as modified dynamic 
extensions of  standard comparative-static single-country CGE models 
for developing countries in the tradition of  Dervis, de Melo and 
Robinson (1982), Robinson et al. (1999), and Lofgren et al. (2002). Models 
belonging to this class have been widely used in applied development 
policy research. Apart from the incorporation of  capital accumulation, 
population growth, labour force growth, and technical progress,2 
the main difference to the standard model is a more sophisticated 
specification of  the electricity sector as detailed in Sections 2.2.2 and 3.2.
2.2.1 Domestic production and input demand
Domestic producers in the model are price-takers in output and input 
markets and maximise intra-temporal profits subject to technology 
constraints. The technologies for the transformation of  inputs into real 
outputs are described by sectoral constant-returns-to-scale production 
functions. In line with common practice in energy-focused, top-down 
CGE models,3 technology specifications belonging to the generic class 
of  KLEM (Capital (K), Labour, Energy, Materials) production functions 
are employed to capture substitution possibilities among energy and 
non-energy inputs and among different energy sources.
2.2.2 Electricity supply
In standard energy-focused top-down CGE models, electricity 
generation and distribution is typically treated as a single production 
activity. In these models, a transition towards a higher share of  hydro, 
solar, or wind in the power mix is represented in a highly stylised abstract 
form as a substitution of  fossil fuel inputs by physical capital under the 
assumption of  a continuous space of  available technologies. The lack of  
explicit detail with regard to the characterisation of  current and future 
technology options entails the danger that simulation results may violate 
fundamental physical restrictions such as the conservation of  matter 
and energy (Böhringer and Rutherford 2008) or exceed other technical 
feasibility limits (McFarland, Reilly and Herzog 2004; Hourcade 
et al. 2006). Moreover, the lack of  technological explicitness limits the 
ability of  top-down models to incorporate detailed information on cost 
differentials among alternative energy technologies from engineering 
cost studies (Hourcade et al. 2006). In response to these limitations 
of  conventional top-down CGE models, various approaches to the 
incorporation of  detailed ‘bottom-up’ information on energy technology 
options into a CGE modelling framework have emerged.4
The present study adopts a similar hybrid top-down bottom-up 
approach by decomposing electricity generation according to power 
source and by treating transmission and distribution (T&D) as a separate 
activity. This approach enables us to incorporate extant information 
on levelised cost of  electricity (LCOE) differentials by power source 
into the simulation analysis and to consider exogenous policy-driven 
changes in the power mix that are not necessarily driven by changes in 
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relative market prices. A consideration of  off-grid renewable generation 
scenarios is beyond the remit of  the present study and beyond the scope 
of  the models applied here.5
2.2.3 Primary factor supply
The model distinguishes skilled and unskilled labour. The dynamic 
labour supply paths are exogenous and both types of  labour are 
intersectorally mobile. The supply of  agricultural land and natural 
resource endowments is imperfectly elastic, i.e. the supply of  these 
primary factors varies endogenously in response to changes in the 
corresponding factor price. The accumulation of  productive capital 
by sector is co-determined by capital return differentials – i.e. sectoral 
investment is a positive function of  a sector’s rate of  return to capital 
relative to the economy-wide average return to capital.
2.2.4 Final domestic demand
Consumer behaviour is derived from intra-temporal utility-maximising 
behaviour subject to within-period budget constraints. The commodity 
composition of  investment and government demand is kept constant 
according to the observed shares in the benchmark SAM, while the 
total volumes of  government and investment demand grow in line 
with aggregate income and are determined by the macro closure rules 
detailed in Section 2.2.6.
2.2.5 International trade
In all traded commodity groups, imports and goods of  domestic origin 
are treated as imperfect substitutes in both final and intermediate 
demand. The equilibrium ratio of  imports to domestic goods in any 
traded commodity group varies endogenously with the corresponding 
relative price of  imports to domestically produced output in that 
commodity group. On the supply side, the model takes account of  
product differentiation between exports to the rest of  the world and 
production for the domestic market in all exporting sectors. The 
equilibrium ratio of  exports to domestic goods in any exporting sector 
is determined by the price relation between export and home market 
sales. Both Kenya and Ghana are treated as small open economies – 
i.e. changes in their export supply and import demand quantity have no 
influence on the structure of  world market prices.
2.2.6 Equilibrium conditions and macro closure
The prices for goods, services, and primary factors are flexible and 
adjust in order to satisfy the market clearing conditions for output 
and factor markets. Foreign savings and hence the current account 
balance follow an exogenous time path. This time path is kept fixed 
across the simulation scenarios considered in subsequent sections in 
order to enable meaningful welfare comparisons across the scenarios. 
This external sector closure entails that the real exchange rate adjusts 
endogenously to maintain external balance-of-payments equilibrium. 
A standard balanced macroeconomic closure rule (Lofgren et al. 2002) 
is adopted, according to which the shares of  government demand, 
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investment demand, and hence private household consumption 
demand in total absorption remain invariant. Under this macro closure, 
household and government saving rates adjust residually to establish the 
macroeconomic saving–investment balance.
3 Data sources and model calibration
3.1 The social accounting matrices for Kenya and Ghana: overview
Each model is calibrated to a SAM which reflects the input–output 
structure of  production, the commodity composition of  demand, and the 
pattern of  income distribution for the country at a disaggregated level at 
the start of  the simulation horizon. Starting point for the construction of  
the model-conformable SAMs are the input–output matrices for Kenya 
and Ghana contained in the GTAP 9 database (Aguiar, Narayanan 
and McDougall 2016). This data set provides a detailed and internally 
consistent representation of  the global economy-wide structure of  
production, demand, and international trade at a regionally and sectorally 
disaggregated level for the benchmark year 2011.6
The GTAP database treats electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution as a single aggregate activity and the data on household 
income and household consumer expenditure are for a single aggregate 
household. For the purposes of  the present study, both the electricity 
activity and the household sector are disaggregated as detailed in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.2 Disaggregation of the electricity sector
For Kenya, the electricity activity is disaggregated into T&D, hydro, 
geothermal, thermal, and wind. The electricity sector decomposition 
for Ghana splits the sector into T&D, hydro, and thermal. From a SAM 
perspective, the decomposition of  the power activity for each country 
involves splitting the single electricity activity of  the original GTAP 
input–output matrix into the various electricity subsectors distinguished 
in the CGE models in such a way that (i) the cost composition by input 
type in the subsectors is adequately represented; (ii) the contribution of  
each subsector to value-added and gross output value of  the electricity 
sector is captured; and (iii) the accounting consistency of  the SAM is 
Table 1 Levelised cost of electricity by technology and country (US cents/KWh)
 Ghana Kenya
Hydro 6.8–11.2 7.4–10.9
Wind 12.6–19.5 7.7–10.3
Geothermal Not applicable 4.7–7.5
Solar PV 16.0–26.9 9.9–14.8
Thermal – oil 19.0 26.0–42.0
Thermal – gas 13.0 13.3
Source Pueyo et al. (2016).
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preserved. To perform this non-trivial task, we combine data on the 
cost composition for different power generation technologies as well as 
for transmission and distribution from Peters (2016), Sue Wing (2008), 
and Lehr et al. (2011) with the LCOE estimates for Kenya and Ghana 
(Table 1) by Pueyo, Bawakyillenuo and Osiolo (2016) and data on 
the power mix in the benchmark year reported in Republic of  Kenya 
(2014) and EnCG (2016). A matrix-balancing algorithm is employed to 
establish full SAM consistency.7
3.3 Disaggregation of the household accounts
The household disaggregation for Ghana distinguishes five household 
groups – labelled H1 (bottom quintile) to H5 (top quintile) – by 
household income quintile in the benchmark year, and is based on 
income and expenditure data from the Ghana Living Standards Survey 
(GLSS 6; GSS 2014). The available data do not support a consistent 
rural–urban split at the level of  detail required for SAM construction 
purposes. The household sector decomposition for Kenya draws upon 
the household disaggregation generated by Kiringai et al. (2007). The 
Kenya model distinguishes four household groups – labelled Rural Low, 
Rural High, Urban Low and Urban High – which represent respectively 
the bottom and top 50 per cent of  rural and urban households by 
expenditure level.
3.4 SAM dimensions
The benchmark SAM for Kenya distinguishes 19 production activities, 
seven primary production factors including three sector-specific natural 
resource factors (forest, fish, and mineral stocks) beside skilled and 
unskilled labour, capital, and agricultural land, and four household 
categories. The Ghana SAM for the benchmark year contains 
18 production activities, eight primary factors including oil/gas 
resource stocks in addition to the same factors as in the Kenya SAM, 
and five household groups. Both SAMs contain 18 commodity groups 
(Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Other Mining, 
Beverages and Tobacco, Processed Food, Textiles and Clothing 
including Footwear and Leather Goods, Refined Petrol, Chemicals 
including Plastic and Rubber Goods, Other Light Manufacturing, 
Other Heavy Manufacturing, Electricity, Construction Services, Trade 
Services, Transport Services and Other Services).
3.5 Model calibration
The numerical calibration process involves the determination of  the 
initial model parameters in such a way that the equilibrium solution 
for the benchmark year exactly replicates the benchmark SAM. The 
selection of  values for the sectoral factor elasticities of  substitution, 
the elasticities of  substitution between imports and domestically 
produced output by commodity group, and the target income 
elasticities of  household demand is informed by available econometric 
evidence from secondary sources and uses estimates provided by 
the GTAP behavioural parameter database (Hertel and van der 
Mensbrugghe 2016).
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4 Dynamic scenario analysis: Kenya
4.1 Overview
The simulation analysis for Kenya considers four dynamic scenarios 
up to 2025 that differ with respect to (i) the evolution of  the power mix 
in on-grid electricity generation, and (ii) the evolution of  world market 
fossil fuel prices. Table 2 provides a concise outline of  the alternative 
scenario assumptions along these two dimensions.
The specification of  the lower-carbon scenarios is motivated by the 
results of  the comparative LCOE analysis by Pueyo et al. (2016, 2017) 
which indicates a clear cost advantage of  geothermal over all 
other electricity generation technologies, and by the presence of  a 
considerable potential for the further expansion of  geothermal capacity 
in the country. The consideration of  alternative conceivable time 
paths for the evolution of  international fossil fuel prices is motivated 
by the strong sensitivity of  the cost differences between thermal and 
renewables to fossil fuel price projections.
4.2 Baseline scenario
The dynamic baseline scenario provides a projection of  the evolution of  
Kenya’s economy up to 2025 under the assumptions that international oil 
and gas prices remain at low 2015/16 levels and that the evolution of  the 
electricity generation capacity from hydro, geothermal, and wind follows 
Kenya’s Ten-Year Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014–2024 (Republic of  
Kenya 2014) under the Plan’s moderate load growth scenario.
The construction of  the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 
benchmark SAM outlined in Section 3. For the period up to 2015, 
Table 2 Outline of scenarios for Kenya
Business-as-usual power mix Lower-carbon power mix
Low fossil fuel prices Baseline scenario Lower-carbon scenario
Power mix follows current Ten-Year Plan:
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Constant share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Falling share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Rising Share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
High fossil fuel prices (HFFP) HFFP scenario Lower-carbon HFFP scenario
Power mix follows current Ten-Year Plan:
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Constant share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Falling share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Rising Share of Geothermal
Rising but small share of Wind
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Source Authors’ own.
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the forward projection takes account of  the most recent available data 
observations, while the projections from 2016 to 2025 draw upon expert 
forecasts for the determination of  the main model-exogenous drivers of  
economic growth.
Population and labour force growth is based on UNDESA (2015) 
medium-variant projections according to which the total population 
of  Kenya rises from 42.5 million in 2012 to 58.6 million in 2025. 
The second exogenous driver of  economic growth in the model is 
the economy-wide total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate, which 
reflects the speed of  autonomous technical progress. In the development 
of  the baseline scenario, the time path for the annual TFP growth 
rate is determined indirectly by imposing a target growth path for 
Kenya’s real gross domestic product (GDP) and by calibrating the TFP 
parameter of  the model dynamically to match this target growth path. 
The GDP baseline growth rates up to 2015 are the reported actual 
national accounts figures and the projections up to 2018 are taken from 
KIPPRA (2016). The assumed constant growth rate of  7.5 per cent per 
annum beyond 2018 is an optimistic compromise between the annual 
growth rate target of  10 per cent envisaged in Kenya’s aspirational 
Vision 2030 development plan (Republic of  Kenya 2007, 2013) for the 
same period and the growth rates projected by the CGE model under 
the assumption that TFP grows at a pace that is more in line with the 
country’s actual observed growth performance over recent years.
The assumed evolution of  the power mix in the baseline scenario draws 
upon Kenya’s Ten-Year Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014–2024 
(Republic of  Kenya 2014) while taking into account that under the 
assumed baseline economic growth path, the electricity demand growth 
over the simulation horizon endogenously generated by the CGE model 
is significantly lower than in the Ten-Year Plan.
As shown in Table 3, the baseline scenario assumes that hydro, 
geothermal, and wind generation evolves in line with the moderate load 
growth scenario of  the Ten-Year Plan while thermal (gas- and oil-fired) 
generation fills the gap between total demand and non-fossil-based 
supply. Correspondingly, the direction of  the changes in the power mix 
over the period 2015–25 are broadly in line with the Ten-Year Plan 
moderate scenario, in the sense that (i) the hydro share drops markedly 
despite a substantial increase in absolute capacity; (ii) the geothermal 
share remains roughly constant following the rapid increase over the 
period 2011–15, which means that absolute geothermal generation 
grows strongly and approximately in proportion to total electricity 
demand; (iii) the share of  thermal rises strongly; and (iv) the wind share 
roughly doubles but remains below 1 per cent. The main difference to 
the Ten-Year Plan scenario is that, due to the lower overall electricity 
demand growth, the baseline 2025 thermal share is slightly lower 
(35.2 per cent versus 39.2 per cent) and greener as it contains no 
coal-fired generation.
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4.3 Lower-carbon scenario
4.3.1 Scenario specification
Considering alternative conceivable pathways towards a less carbon-intensive 
power mix, the LCOE analysis for the Green Growth Diagnostics for 
Africa (GGDA) project by Pueyo et al. (2015) identifies geothermal electricity 
generation as the most promising technology option for Kenya. This 
assessment is in line with the Kenyan government’s own assessment:
In Kenya, more than 14 high temperature potential sites occur along the 
Rift Valley with an estimated potential of  more than 10,000MW. Other 
locations include Homa Hills in Nyanza, Mwananyamala at the Coast 
and Nyambene Ridges in Meru. The expansion to existing geothermal 
operations offers the least-cost, environmentally clean source of  energy 
(green) and highest potential to the country (Republic of  Kenya 2014: 101).
The following simulation analysis contemplates a deliberately drastic 
scenario in which the geothermal share in total domestic generation 
increases from 2018 onwards along a steep linear schedule to reach 75 per 
cent in 2025, so that the 2025 geothermal share is 23.6 percentage points 
higher than in the baseline. The thermal share drops correspondingly from 
35.2 per cent in the 2025 baseline to 11.6 per cent (Table 4 and Figure 1). 
The hydro and wind shares remain unchanged. In absolute terms, this 
assumed expansion of  geothermal electricity generation by 2025 is very 
close to the Ten-Year Plan’s least-cost high growth scenario, in which 
geothermal is projected to generate 26,000GWh by 2024. The falling share 
of  thermal does not imply an absolute contraction of  thermal generation. 
Given the strong overall electricity demand growth, thermal generation still 
grows year on year, albeit at a lower rate than in the baseline.
Table 3 Domestic electricity generation by type – baseline scenario
 Electricity generation (GWh)
Year Total Hydro Geothermal Thermal Wind
2011 7,250 3,427 1,453 2,352 18
2015 10,675 3,427 5,333 1,868 47
2020 22,735 4,466 11,343 6,829 97
2025 35,641 4,466 18,331 12,529 315
 Shares (%)
2011 100.0 47.3 20.0 32.4 0.2
2015 100.0 32.1 50.0 17.5 0.4
2020 100.0 19.6 49.9 30.0 0.4
2025 100.0 12.5 51.4 35.2 0.9
Source All figures for 2011 and all GWh figures for Hydro, Geothermal, and Wind:  
Republic of Kenya (2014: Tables 6 and 33). Domestic total generation figures are 
model-determined and Thermal shares beyond 2015 follow residually.
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Table 4 Geothermal and thermal shares in total power mix – lower-carbon scenario 
(percentage shares)
Year Baseline Lower-carbon
 Geothermal Thermal Geothermal Thermal
2015 50.0 17.5 50.0 17.5
2020 49.9 30.0 65.4 14.6
2025 51.4 35.2 75.0 11.6
Source Authors’ assumptions as explained in text.
Figure 1 Power mix in baseline and lower-carbon scenarios
Source Authors’ assumptions as explained in text.
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4.3.2 Results
The assumed gradual shift from high-cost thermal to lower-cost 
geothermal electricity generation entails a notable drop in the effective 
average supply price relative to the baseline scenario (Table 5). In 
2025, the domestic electricity price – here expressed relative to the 
equilibrium wage of  unskilled workers – is over 12 per cent lower than 
in the baseline scenario. The reduction in the cost of  electricity affects 
the production costs and thus the supply prices across all sectors and is 
more pronounced in sectors with a higher share of  electricity in total 
cost such as mining, the chemical industry, and heavy manufacturing 
than in sectors with a low power intensity.
The assumed low-carbon transition entails a strong reduction in fossil 
fuel imports. Both refined petrol and crude oil imports drop by nearly 
Hydro Geothermal Thermal Wind
Table 5 Sectoral impacts for Kenya – lower-carbon scenario (percentage deviations 
from baseline level 2025)
 Output Exports Imports Producer price
Agriculture 0.1 -1.6 2.8 -0.4
Forestry -0.6 -2.5 -0.3
Fishing 0.7 -1.4 -0.2
Crude oil – – -9.7 –
Mining -2.6 -2.7 1.6 -1.3
Food processing 0.2 -1.6 2.7 -0.4
Beverages and 
tobacco 0.6 -1.2 1.6 -0.4
Textiles and clothing -0.4 -1.6 2.4 -0.7
Petrol refining -9.7 -9.8 -1.2
Chemicals, rubber, 
plastics 0.3 0.0 1.5 -1.1
Other light 
manufacturing 0.1 -0.6 1.4 -0.9
Other heavy 
manufacturing 0.7 0.8 0.0 -1.4
Electricity 4.9 -12.5
Construction 1.0 -0.4
Trade services 0.1 2.0 -0.3
Transport services -0.8 -1.7 3.0 -0.7
Other services 0.6 -1.3 2.8 -0.3
Source Authors’ simulation results.  
Note The reported trade flow changes exclude commodity groups with negligible 
trade volumes.
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10 per cent in volume terms relative to the baseline scenario towards 
2025 (Table 5). The indirect effect on crude oil imports arises due to 
the fact that in the baseline scenario, Kenya’s domestic petrol-refining 
sector – which actually ceased production in the second half  of  2013 – 
is reactivated as envisaged in the 2015 National Energy and Petroleum 
Policy (Republic of  Kenya 2015). In the baseline projection, this sector 
operates at a modest scale using imported crude oil, with a negligible 
2025 baseline contribution to GDP and total employment.
As Kenya remains a net importer of  fossil fuels in the baseline scenario, 
the drop in the fossil fuel import bill is associated with a real exchange 
rate appreciation on the order of  0.7 per cent. The real appreciation 
lowers the prices of  imports relative to domestically produced goods 
from the perspective of  domestic residents. This induces a substitution 
effect towards imports for commodities in cases where the exchange rate 
effect dominates the simultaneous drop in the prices of  domestic output 
due to the electricity cost reduction in the new equilibrium. A further 
positive effect on imports across all final goods arises due to the positive 
aggregate real income effects associated with the shift towards lower-cost 
electricity generation. Thus, Table 5 shows moderate welfare-raising 
increases in the import quantities relative to baseline levels for most 
traded non-fuel goods and services, and these are generally more 
pronounced for the commodity groups with smaller domestic supply 
price reductions.
On the export side, the real exchange rate appreciation effect per se 
reduces in tendency the price of  exports relative to the price obtained 
in the domestic market from the viewpoint of  domestic producers, and 
thus shifts the optimal profit-maximising output mix between export 
and home market production in favour of  the latter. Correspondingly, 
Table 5 reports moderate drops in export quantities for most sectors. 
An exception is heavy manufacturing, which is the sector with the highest 
electricity cost share. In this case, the cost reduction effect dominates the 
exchange rate effect, so that exports expand. The trade effects can also 
be explained from a balance-of-payments perspective: the reduction in 
the fossil fuel import bill relaxes the balance-of-payments constraint as 
it allows domestic residents to enjoy simultaneously an increase in real 
imports and a higher share in domestically produced output, as less of  
that output needs to be shipped abroad to pay the import bill.
The equilibrium impact on real gross output by production sector for 
2025 compared to the baseline scenario is also shown in Table 5. The 
sectoral employment effects have the same direction and broadly the 
same orders of  magnitude, and are therefore not separately shown. 
Not surprisingly, in percentage terms the effect on the size of  the small 
domestic oil refinery sector in relation to the baseline is most pronounced 
as the demand growth for fuel by thermal power plants slows down.
It is worth emphasising that no sector contracts in absolute terms and thus 
no sector sheds existing workers along the dynamic scenario time path. 
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A negative-signed output effect in Table 5 merely indicates that the sector 
grows at a lower rate and that new workers are hired at a slower pace 
than in the baseline scenario, for example while the domestic refining 
sector at the 2025 endpoint of  the simulation horizon is projected to be 
nearly 10 per cent smaller than in the baseline scenario for the same year, 
the sector is still 127 per cent larger in 2025 than in 2017.
In line with economic theory, the real exchange appreciation tends to 
shift productive resources from traded to non-traded activities. Among 
the non-power sectors that expand relative to baseline are all sectors 
that have simultaneously negligible or small export/output shares and 
negligible or little competition from imports in their domestic market, 
such as construction services, the fishery sector, and trade services. In 
contrast, the small domestic mining sector with its baseline export–
output ratio of  over 75 per cent and an import share of  over 50 per cent 
in Kenya’s domestic demand for mining products is squeezed noticeably 
as mining exports drop and mining imports rise. The sectors that 
expand despite relatively high trade shares are heavy manufacturing 
and chemicals, which are among the most electricity-intensive sectors 
and thus benefit disproportionally from the reduction in energy input 
costs. However, the main message is that the effects of  the assumed 
low-carbon transition on the sectoral composition of  output and 
employment are very moderate.
The real resource savings associated with the switch to a lower-cost 
mode of  electricity generation is reflected in a moderately positive 
transitory effect on GDP growth, as shown in Figure 2. The cumulative 
effect of  the small annual growth rate increments reported in Figure 2 
over the period 2018–25 entails that the level of  real GDP by 2025 is 
1.1 per cent higher than in the baseline scenario.
Figure 2 Annual growth rates of real GDP for Kenya by scenario (in per cent)
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Turning to the effects on the functional income distribution – i.e. the 
distribution of  primary income by type of  factor – Figure 3 displays 
the impacts on real factor prices (i.e. nominal factor prices deflated 
by the consumer price index) in 2025 relative to the baseline level in 
the corresponding year. By 2025, the real returns to all factors except 
mineral resources are slightly higher than in the baseline. Capital 
returns rise relative to labour wages and the wage gap between skilled 
and unskilled increases marginally.
The differential factor price effect arises from factor intensity differentials 
between sectors that grow quicker and sectors that grow slower than in the 
baseline. On balance, the higher-growing sectors as a group are relatively 
skill- and capital-intensive and thus their additional factor input demand 
drives up capital returns and skilled wages more than unskilled wages.
For households with a single source of  factor income, Figure 3 directly 
indicates the direction of  the effects on total factor income. Figure 4 
shows the implications for mixed-income households with factor 
income mixes equal to the income compositions of  the four household 
categories the benchmark SAM. Both lower- and higher-income 
households gain. However, since the urban and rural high-income 
groups have higher shares of  capital and skilled labour in their total 
income mix than the low-income groups, the former groups gain 
disproportionally. In other words, the low-carbon transition has a 
pro-poor effect in an absolute or ‘weak’ sense (i.e. the poorer households 
are better off than in the baseline), but is not pro-poor in a relative or 
‘strong’ sense (i.e. the poorer households do not gain disproportionally).8
4.4 Sensitivity of results to future fossil fuel prices
As the cost differentials between thermal and renewable technologies 
are necessarily contingent on the assumptions about future fossil fuel 
Figure 3 Impact on factor returns in Kenya by scenario (percentage deviation 
of factor prices relative to consumer price index (CPI) from baseline or high 
fossil-fuel price (HFFP) level 2025)
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prices over the lifetime of  thermal power plants, and the results of  
the quantitative low-carbon scenario analysis are driven by the size 
of  these cost differentials, we now briefly assess the sensitivity of  the 
findings in the previous section to a variation in the assumed exogenous 
international fossil fuel price time paths. In contrast to the baseline 
scenario, crude oil and refined petrol world prices are now assumed to 
return to higher levels beyond 2016. More specifically, between 2016 
and 2018 oil prices rise linearly to a level that is 62 per cent higher 
than the 2018 baseline price (but still 19 per cent lower than the 2011 
benchmark price) and then stay put at that level beyond 2018.
The high fossil fuel price (HFFP) scenario under baseline assumptions 
about the power mix provides the relevant reference scenario for 
comparison with the HFFP lower-carbon scenario. As the purpose of  this 
study is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of  the sensitivity of  Kenya’s 
economy to oil price shocks, the exposition of  this reference scenario can 
be concise and focuses on key differences to the baseline scenario.
In macroeconomic terms, the simulated oil price shock is an adverse 
terms-of-trade shock, i.e. the aggregate ratio of  import prices paid by 
Kenya to export prices paid by the rest of  the world for Kenya’s exports 
rises. Thus, Kenya must devote more domestic productive resources 
to export production at the expense of  production for the home 
market in order to pay for the higher import bill. The welfare-reducing 
terms-of-trade shock requires a real exchange depreciation on the order 
of  7.6 per cent by 2025 relative to the baseline. The depreciation effect 
discourages imports and stimulates exports. The effects on GDP growth 
are displayed in Figure 2. GDP growth rates are hit strongly initially and 
then recover partially as international oil prices settle at the new higher 
level and the economy adapts to the shock. By 2025, the annual growth 
rate is still about 0.7 percentage points below the baseline growth rate. 
The simulation results suggest that by 2025 the level of  GDP would be 
some 9 per cent below base.
Figure 4 Impact on real household income – lower-carbon scenario (percentage 
deviation from baseline level 2020 and 2025)
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Since higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of  geothermal 
vis-à-vis thermal power generation, the positive effect of  the shift to a 
higher geothermal share on real GDP growth is noticeably stronger 
than in the previous lower-carbon scenario. The cumulative effect of  
the increases in annual GDP growth means that by 2025 GDP is 2.6 per 
cent higher than in the HFFP reference scenario. The corresponding 
GDP increase reported in Section 4.3 for the low-oil-price case 
amounted to 1.1 per cent.
The real exchange rate appreciation associated with the lower 
dependency on fossil fuel imports is on the order of  1.2 per cent 
by 2025 and thus likewise slightly more pronounced than the 
corresponding real appreciation of  0.7 per cent reported in Section 4.3. 
The general pattern of  the sectoral effects is the same as in the earlier 
lower-carbon scenario, but in quantitative terms the sectoral changes in 
output, employment, and trade flows are again moderately stronger.
The same conclusion applies to the impacts on the functional income 
distribution (Figure 3), except for the impact of  the low-carbon transition 
on the real returns to agricultural land. The export–output ratio of  
agriculture is higher in the HFFP reference scenario than in the baseline 
scenario, since Kenya needs to export more to pay for the higher 
fossil-fuel import bill. Thus, the stronger real appreciation under the 
HFFP low-carbon scenario which slows down agricultural export growth 
has a stronger effect on agricultural output growth than in the low-carbon 
scenario under low oil prices. As a result, agricultural land rents grow 
slightly slower than in the HFFP reference scenario up to 2025.
5 Dynamic scenario analysis: Ghana
5.1 Overview
The scenario design for the Ghana study follows the same basic logic 
as the Kenya study (Table 2). The specification of  the lower-carbon 
scenarios is again motivated by the results of  the LCOE analysis by 
Pueyo et al. (2016, 2017), as detailed in Section 5.3.
5.2 Baseline scenario
The construction of  the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 
benchmark SAM for Ghana outlined in Section 3. According to the 
UNDESA (2015) medium-variant projections used here, the total 
population of  Ghana rises from 25.5 million in 2012 to 33.7 million 
in 2025. The GDP baseline scenario growth rates up to 2014 are 
the reported official national accounts figures (GSS 2015) and the 
projections up to 2018 are taken from World Bank (2016). For the 
period beyond 2019, it is assumed that annual GDP continues to grow 
at rates just below the World Bank forecast for 2017/18. The growth 
rates imply that aggregate GDP in 2025 is 2.7 times higher than in 2011 
and per capita GDP doubles over this period.
The assumed evolution of  the on-grid power mix in the baseline takes 
account of  the Strategic National Energy Plan 2006–2020 (EnCG 2006), 
the Energy Sector Strategy and Development Plan (Ministry of  Energy 
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2010), the Ministry of  Petroleum’s Gas Master Plan (Republic of  Ghana 
2015a), the Ghana Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP) 
(Republic of  Ghana 2015b), and is also informed by a range of  other 
sources including World Bank (2013), EnCG (2016), and IRENA (2015).
The key assumptions for the construction of  the baseline scenario are that 
(i) hydro capacity remains constant beyond 2015 up to 2025, i.e. the hydro 
share drops as total generation grows (Figure 5); (ii) the on-grid share of  
non-hydro renewables remains negligibly small, i.e. the binding constraints 
to investments in renewable energy capacity in Ghana identified by Pueyo 
et al. (2017) are not relaxed, and thus Ghana’s official aspirational target 
to reach a renewable share (excluding large-scale hydro) of  10 per cent 
by 2020 is not achieved; (iii) the rising gap between hydro generation 
and total demand for electricity is entirely bridged by additional thermal 
generation, and thus the share of  thermal in total generation is rising; and 
(iv) the share of  gas in total thermal generation is rapidly rising from 2018 
onwards. In line with Ghana’s Gas Master Plan and the recommendations 
in World Bank (2013), the baseline scenario assumes further that natural 
gas extraction from domestic sources develops at a fast pace, so that by the 
2020s a significant fraction of  the expanding gas demand by the power 
sector is covered by domestically sourced supplies.
5.3 Lower-carbon scenario
5.3.1 Scenario specification
Pueyo et al. (2016) suggest that in comparison to Kenya, Ghana’s 
renewable energy potential is considerably smaller and presently hydro 
is the only renewable energy option with a clear cost advantage over 
gas-fired thermal generation, yet the potential for a further expansion 
of  hydro capacity is limited. Based on IRENA (2015) estimates for 
Ghana’s untapped small- and medium-scale hydro power expansion 
potential, we consider a moderate lower-carbon transition scenario in 
which the hydro share in total generation by 2025 is seven percentage 
Table 6 Outline of scenarios for Ghana
Baseline power mix Lower-carbon power mix
Low fossil fuel prices Baseline scenario
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Lower-carbon scenario
Less steep rise of Thermal share
Less steep drop of Hydro share
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
Oil import price 50% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 55% below 2011 level
High fossil fuel prices (HFFP) HFFP scenario
Rising share of Thermal
Falling share of Hydro
Lower-carbon HFFP scenario
Less steep rise of Thermal share
Less steep drop of Hydro share
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Oil import price 19% below 2011 level; 
Gas import price 17% below 2011 level
Source Authors’ own.
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points higher than in the baseline scenario, and the 2025 thermal share 
drops from 83 per cent to 76 per cent. IRENA estimates suggest that the 
LCOE ‘for new small hydropower projects is between 3 US cents and 
11.5 US cents/KWh in developing countries’,9 which is within the range 
of  the LCOE estimate used for the initial calibration of  the hydro sector 
parameters in the CGE model for Ghana (Table 1).
5.3.2 Results
The moderate and gradual shift from thermal to hydro electricity 
generation entails modest changes in the system-wide average cost of  
electricity production over the period 2018–25. By 2025, the electricity 
supply price in this scenario is a moderate 1.1 per cent lower than in the 
baseline.
The dynamic macroeconomic adjustment process in this scenario is 
complicated by the fact that the baseline hydro-thermal generation cost 
differential endogenously generated by the CGE model has a hump-
shaped time profile as shown in Figure 6: over the period 2015–17, 
the thermal generation costs drop sharply relative to hydro unit costs, 
so that by 2017 the initial cost advantage of  hydro turns into cost 
disadvantage. Beyond 2017, this trend reverses as the thermal unit cost 
begins to rise relative to the hydro unit cost, and beyond 2021 hydro 
restores its status as the least-cost electricity technology.
Primarily, three features of  the baseline scenario drive this peculiar time 
path of  the hydro-thermal cost differential. First, fossil fuel import prices 
and particularly gas prices drop strongly over the period 2015–17, and 
entail a sharp drop in the thermal generation cost over this period. 
Second, the strong increase in demand for thermal electricity associated 
with the rise in the thermal share over the whole simulation horizon 
drives up the equilibrium rate of  return to capital in the thermal sector 
– i.e. the return on investments in thermal capacity must rise in order 
to attract the new capital required for the expansion of  the thermal 
sector. This effect raises the cost of  capital in the thermal sector. 
Figure 5 Electricity generation shares in baseline and lower-carbon scenario
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Source Authors’ simulation results.
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Third, as Ghana has an initial trade deficit with the rest of  the world 
and the foreign savings required to cover the trade deficit grow at a 
lower exogenous rate than Ghana’s real income and import demand, 
the real exchange rate depreciates slightly over the entire simulation 
interval. Thus, while fossil fuel prices remain constant beyond 2017 in 
foreign currency terms, they rise gradually from 2018 to 2025 from the 
perspective of  domestic firms and households due to the depreciation 
effect. The first effect dominates the time profile of  the hydro-thermal 
cost differential up to 2017, while the second and third effect become 
jointly dominant after 2018.
The small direct electricity cost reduction effect towards 2025 triggers 
only weak intersectoral spillover effects via input–output linkages and 
other general equilibrium repercussions. The equilibrium effects on the 
supply prices of  other sectors are generally tiny. The only noteworthy 
indirect price effect is the 0.8 per cent drop in the domestic natural gas 
supply price. This effect occurs since the thermal sector expands at a 
lower rate than in the baseline, and thus its demand for gas grows at a 
lower rate.
For the same reason, fossil fuel imports drop relative to the baseline. As 
in the case of  Kenya, the reduction in the fossil fuel import bill entails a 
mild real exchange rate appreciation effect, i.e. the additional ‘space’ in 
Ghana’s external balance-of-payments account created by the reduced 
fossil fuel import payments enables a simultaneous increase in the 
volume of  non-fuel imports and a reduction in the volume of  exports 
that must be shipped to the rest of  the world in order to pay for imports.
In an aggregate macroeconomic sense, the net welfare effect for Ghana 
associated with the low-carbon transition scenario considered here is 
unambiguously positive: using virtually the same total real resources 
as in the baseline, Ghana can simultaneously command a higher real 
volume of  imports and retain a higher share of  total domestic output as 
less of  this output is exported than in the baseline.
This positive welfare effect is reflected in a positive but very small increase 
in real GDP. The cumulative effect of  the tiny annual growth rate 
Figure 6 Ratio of average hydro to average thermal generation cost, 2015–2025
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Source Authors’ simulation results.
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increments reported in Figure 7 over the period 2021–25 entails that 
the level of  real GDP by 2025 is a negligible 0.025 per cent higher than 
in the baseline scenario. Part of  the reason for the small GDP effect is 
that between 2018 and 2020 the low-carbon transition initially raises the 
average price of  electricity (by about 1 per cent) due to the hump-shaped 
time profile of  the hydro-thermal cost differential discussed previously. A 
further reason is that the reduction in demand for domestic natural gas 
by the thermal sector leads to a small reduction in the primary resource 
extraction activity of  the domestic fossil fuel sector. In economic terms, 
this means a reduction in the supply of  a primary production factor which 
entails per se a negative effect on real GDP. However, this effect is likewise 
tiny: the 2025 supply of  domestic fossil fuel primary resources drops by 
1.8 per cent, while the baseline contribution of  this factor to GDP is about 
2 per cent – so the effect on real GDP is well below 0.05 per cent.
Figure 7 Annual growth rate of real GDP for Ghana by scenario (in per cent)
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Figure 8 Impact on factor returns in Ghana by scenario (percentage deviation of 
factor prices relative to CPI from baseline level 2025)
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Figures 8 and 9 report the effects on the functional distribution 
of  income and real factor income by household type for 2025. 
Unsurprisingly, the impacts are again tiny. As in the case of  Kenya, the 
distribution impact is slightly regressive in tendency as by 2025 capital 
and skilled labour gain slightly in relation to other factors.
5.4 Sensitivity of results to future fossil fuel prices
5.4.1 HFFP scenario
The world market crude oil price increase under the HFFP scenario 
incentivises a marked rise in Ghana’s crude oil export supply and the 
domestic fossil fuel extraction sector expands vis-à-vis the baseline. Due 
to the large thermal share in total electricity generation by 2025, the 
cost-push effect on the price of  electricity is strong (+38 per cent). The 
supply prices of  non-energy sectors with relatively high energy cost 
(direct fuel plus electricity) shares in total production costs including the 
chemical industry, heavy and light manufacturing, other mining, and 
transport services are likewise pushed up significantly, and the growth of  
these sectors slows down accordingly.
In the baseline scenario, Ghana remains a marginal net fossil fuel 
importer despite its crude oil exports, and thus the rise in international 
fossil fuel prices is an adverse terms-of-trade shock for the country. 
However, due to the additional crude oil export revenue growth in the 
HFFP scenario, the absolute size of  the annual net fossil fuel import bill 
relative to the baseline scenario becomes smaller over time, and thus 
towards 2025 Ghana needs to earn less non-fuel export revenue than in 
the baseline to pay for the net fossil fuel import bill. This is a noteworthy 
difference to the HFFP scenario for Kenya discussed in Section 4.4.
Figure 7 shows the effects on GDP growth. As in the case of  Kenya, GDP 
growth rates are hit strongly by the initially higher energy costs and then 
start to recover as international oil prices settle at the new higher level and 
the economy adapts to the shock. In contrast to Kenya, however, from 
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Figure 9 Impact on real household income in Ghana by scenario (percentage 
deviation from baseline level or HFFP level 2025)
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2023 onwards GDP growth rates start to overshoot the baseline rates. The 
reason for this effect is that the expansion of  the domestic fossil fuel sector 
is associated with a higher rate of  domestic natural resource extraction 
than in the baseline. By 2023, the impact of  this increase in the supply 
of  a primary production factor on total economy-wide value-added is 
sufficiently strong to dominate the growth-depressing effects of  higher 
energy prices on the annual growth rate. However, this effect is not strong 
enough to push the level of  GDP above the baseline path: by 2025, real 
GDP is still 3.2 per cent below baseline level.
It is important to note that the hump-shaped time profile of  the 
hydro-thermal cost differential (Figure 6) does not occur in the HFFP 
scenarios: since fossil fuel prices remain high over the entire 2015–25 
period, the hydro-thermal unit cost ratio remains below unity throughout.
5.4.2 HFFP lower-carbon scenario
Higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of  hydro vis-à-vis 
thermal power generation, and so the impact of  the transition towards 
a higher hydro share entails a stronger reduction of  the electricity than 
in the low-carbon scenario of  Section 5.3: by 2025, the electricity price 
is 6.2 per cent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario, whereas in 
the low-carbon scenario with low fossil fuel prices, the electricity price 
impact is only -1.1 per cent.
Moreover, since in contrast to the previous low-carbon scenario the hydro 
cost advantage now prevails over the entire 2018–25 period, the gradual 
downward shift in electricity prices begins right at the start of  the transition 
process in 2018, whereas in the low-carbon scenario with low fossil fuel 
prices the same transition entails an initial electricity price increase due to 
the hump-shaped time profile of  the hydro-thermal cost differential.
However, the reduction in demand for domestic natural gas by the 
thermal sector and the real appreciation effect due to the reduced net 
fossil fuel import bill again leads to a small reduction in the primary 
resource extraction activity of  the domestic fossil fuel sector. This effect 
entails per se a negative impact on real GDP. By 2022, this effect begins 
to slightly dominate the growth-enhancing effect of  lower electricity 
prices. The cumulative impact of  these miniscule effects on annual 
GDP growth rates remains small: by 2020, the level of  real GDP in 
the HFFP low-carbon scenario is 0.1 per cent higher and by 2025, 
0.11 per cent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario.
Thus, in contrast to the corresponding analysis for Kenya, the 
quantitative impact of  the lower-carbon transition in the electricity 
sector on macroeconomic growth in Ghana is not particularly sensitive 
to variations in the assumptions about international fossil fuel prices: 
both in the low-carbon scenario and the HFFP low-carbon scenario 
the impacts on real GDP remain negligibly small despite the qualitative 
differences across the two scenarios. Also in contrast to the findings for 
Kenya, higher fossil fuel prices do not enlarge but rather reduce the 
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beneficial impacts of  a transition from thermal to lower-cost renewable 
electricity generation in the case of  Ghana. The main reason for these 
differences is related to the endogenous changes in domestic fossil fuel 
resource extraction that occur in the case of  Ghana but not in the case 
of  Kenya. Impacts on the functional distribution of  income and the 
distribution by household quintile remain small (Figures 8 and 9).
6 Conclusions
The present study applies purpose-built dynamic CGE models for 
Ghana and Kenya with a disaggregated country-specific representation 
of  the power sector, to simulate the prospective medium-run growth 
and distributional implications associated with a shift towards a higher 
share of  renewables in the power mix, up to 2025.
In both countries, the share of  fossil fuel-based thermal electricity 
generation in the power mix will increase sharply over the next decade and 
beyond according to current national energy sector development plans.
Kenya has a considerable potential for a further expansion of  
geothermal electricity generation and existing estimates suggest 
a significant cost advantage of  geothermal over thermal power 
generation. In line with this assessment, the simulation analysis for 
Kenya considers a stylised low-carbon transition scenario in which 
the geothermal share in total domestic on-grid electricity generation 
increases along a steep linear schedule, so that the 2025 geothermal 
share is 24 percentage points higher than in the baseline scenario.
The higher share of  low-cost geothermal in the power mix reduces 
electricity prices and mildly stimulates economic growth. The associated 
reduction in the fossil fuel import bill triggers a moderate real exchange 
rate appreciation, which reduces the prices of  imports faced by 
domestic producers and households and entails a further economy-wide 
real income gain. The size of  these beneficial aggregate effects depends 
on the evolution of  international fossil fuel prices over the simulation 
horizon: under a low-carbon transition scenario with low world market 
fossil fuel prices, real GDP in 2025 is about 1.1 per cent higher than 
in the baseline scenario. In a low-carbon scenario with high fossil fuel 
import price scenario, real GDP in 2025 is more than 2 per cent higher 
than in the corresponding HFFP baseline scenario. All household 
groups gain, but urban and rural higher-income households gain 
relatively more than urban and rural low-income households, because 
skilled real wages and real returns to capital rise slightly more than 
unskilled wages and returns to land. Impacts on the sectoral structure 
of  production are generally small. In tendency, sectors with a higher 
baseline share of  electricity costs in total production cost expand relative 
to sectors with a low electricity cost share.
In comparison to Kenya, Ghana’s potential for an economically viable 
expansion of  renewable on-grid power generation is considerably 
smaller. Moreover, in contrast to Kenya, Ghana has an already active 
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domestic fossil fuel extraction sector and is planning to satisfy a 
significant share of  the fuel demand of  its expanding gas-fired thermal 
generation using domestic natural gas resources. The available levelised 
cost estimates suggest that in the case of  Ghana presently, hydro is the 
only renewable energy option with a clear cost advantage over gas-fired 
thermal generation, yet the potential for a further expansion of  hydro 
capacity is limited. In line with this assessment, the simulation analysis 
for Ghana considers a moderate lower-carbon transition scenario in 
which the hydro share in total generation by 2025 is seven percentage 
points higher than in the baseline scenario and the 2025 thermal share 
drops from 83 per cent to 76 per cent.
This moderate electricity sector transition shock generates only marginal 
impacts on macroeconomic growth. The presence of  a domestic fossil fuel 
extraction sector in Ghana changes the qualitative nature of  the dynamic 
adjustment to the transition shock in relation to the case of  Kenya. As 
in the analysis for Kenya, the partial shift to lower-cost renewable power 
generation reduces the cost of  electricity and this per se stimulates economic 
growth. However, the associated drop in demand for domestic natural gas 
by the electricity sector slightly dampens the growth of  domestic natural 
resource extraction, and this reduction in primary factor supply growth 
per se reduces real GDP growth. Thus, in the case of  Ghana, these two 
effects drag GDP in opposite directions and the net effect is miniscule. 
Similar to Kenya, the impacts on the sectoral structure of  domestic 
production are small and thus the effects on relative factor prices that 
determine the functional income distribution remain unremarkable.
The overarching general message suggested by the simulation results 
presented here is that in both countries it appears feasible to reduce 
the carbon content of  electricity generation significantly without 
adverse consequences for economic growth and without noteworthy 
distributional effects.
Notes
1 Sue Wing (2009) and Kemfert and Truong (2009) survey this 
literature. For a concise recent survey of  the small number of  CGE 
studies concerned with a low-carbon energy transition in developing 
countries, see Pueyo et al. (2015: 52–59).
2 See e.g. Robinson, Willenbockel and Strzepek (2012) for an earlier 
recursive-dynamic extension of  the standard model.
3 See e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2004), Böhringer, Löschel and 
Rutherford (2009), and Willenbockel and Hoa (2011). For further 
reference to the literature on energy-focused top-down CGE models, 
see Pueyo et al. (2015: Chapter 6).
4 Examples for the development and application of  such hybrid 
top-down bottom-up models include inter alia McFarland, Reilly 
and Herzog (2004), Böhringer and Löschel (2006), Sue Wing (2008), 
Böhringer and Rutherford (2008, 2013), Sassi et al. (2010), Boeters 
and Koornneef  (2011), Lanz and Rausch (2011), Okagawa et al. 
(2012), Proenca and St. Aubin (2013), and Fortes et al. (2013).
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5 In the recent low-carbon development literature, the deployment 
of  decentralised renewable energy systems is widely seen as a 
promising and economically viable approach to reducing energy 
poverty in remote rural areas (see Willenbockel 2015: 171–72 for 
further reference), and thus the incorporation of  such scenarios in 
future research appears desirable. However, assessing the scope for a 
cost-effective expansion of  stand-alone renewable energy generation as 
an alternative to centralised grid supply is a complex task and requires 
spatially explicit modelling, as exemplified by Deichmann et al. (2011) 
for Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya. For a study of  the evolution of  the 
solar home system market in Kenya see Byrne et al. (2014).
6 The raw data for the Ghana country bloc of  the GTAP database 
include a SAM for 2005 constructed by Breisinger, Thurlow and 
Duncan (2007) and the raw data for Kenya in GTAP include a 2001 
SAM developed at the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research 
and Analysis (KIPPRA) in collaboration with the International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a predecessor of  the latest 
available KIPPRA–IFPRI SAM for 2003 (Kiringai, Thurlow and 
Wanjala 2006). In the case of  Kenya, the GTAP input–output 
data have been triangulated with information from more recent 
unpublished supply-and-use tables (SUTs) provided by Dr Bernadette 
Wanjala (KIPPRA). Following minor revisions in the course of  this 
triangulation process, the SAM has been rebalanced using a variant 
of  the cross-entropy approach proposed by Robinson, Cattaneo and 
El-Said (2001). For Ghana, no recent SUT data are available.
7 See Willenbockel, Osiolo and Bawakyillenuo (2017) for further 
elaboration. See Peters and Hertel (2016a, 2016b) for a detailed 
discussion and comparison of  existing matrix-balancing algorithms 
commonly used in this context and further references to the related 
technical literature.
8 See Willenbockel (2015) for critical reflections on the recent literature 
concerned with pro-poor low-carbon development in this context.
9 http://costing.irena.org/technology-costs/power-generation/
hydropower.aspx (accessed December 2016).
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Design and Assessment of 
Renewable Electricity Auctions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Hugo Lucas,1 Pablo del Río2 and Mohamed Youba Sokona3
Abstract Auctions have recently been regarded as a useful alternative 
to other support schemes for setting the remuneration of renewable 
electricity (RES-E) worldwide. They have also been increasingly adopted in 
the sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region, mostly due to their promise to support 
the deployment of RES-E projects cost-effectively. The aim of this article is 
to identify the design elements of RES-E auctions in SSA and assess their 
pros and cons with respect to different criteria. The results show that the 
design elements adopted in the SSA auctions are similar to other countries, 
but some design elements are deemed very relevant in order to address 
specific constraints to RES-E investments in SSA countries, including 
pre-selection of sites, technology-specific (solar PV), and price-only 
auctions. However, the main distinctive feature of auctions in SSA is that 
they are part of a broader policy mix of support mechanisms aimed at 
de-risking and providing technical support.
Keywords: sub-Saharan Africa, renewable energy, auctions, PV, 
design elements, policy mix.
1 Introduction
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have experienced or are 
currently experiencing an energy crisis. Six-hundred million people 
in SSA lack access to electricity (Castellanos et al. 2015). With an 
electrification rate of  only 26 per cent (World Bank 2017), the region 
has 13 per cent of  the world’s population, but 48 per cent of  the share 
of  the global population without access to electricity. SSA is the only 
region in the world where the absolute number of  people living without 
electricity is increasing (IEA 2014: 30).
Some authors provide in-depth analyses of  the SSA electricity sector 
(see Castellanos et al. 2015; KPMG 2016; Quitzow et al. 2016; Eberhard 
et al. 2016; Climatescope 2016; IEA 2014). Several factors are behind 
the energy crisis, including high-demand growth, low installed capacity, 
non-cost recovering tariffs, low utilisation rate of  existing capacity, 
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ageing, insufficient, and poorly maintained power infrastructures 
leading to transmission and distribution losses, dominance of  one 
energy source (hydro), and negligible power trading across countries. 
Large investments are thus required to address this energy crisis.4
Electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) has the potential 
to mitigate the energy crisis since it is domestically available, it can 
be cost-competitive, and deployed much faster than fossil fuel-based 
power plants. It can trigger additional economic benefits and it is a core 
component for any low-carbon strategy, offering important environmental 
co-benefits, including improved local air quality (Quitzow et al. 2016).
However, non-hydro RES-E represents a tiny fraction of  SSA’s electricity 
mix. Renewables accounted for around 30 per cent of  SSA-installed 
capacity in power generation (about 31GW) in 2016. However, most 
of  this capacity is hydro-based (25 per cent, 25GW), with other RES 
accounting for only 5 per cent (6GW). Fossil fuels account for the largest 
share (68 per cent, 67GW), followed by nuclear (2 per cent, 1.9GW) 
(estimations based on IRENA 2017a and UNSD 2017).
Strong barriers to RES-E in SSA persist. A useful theoretical framework 
on the barriers to investments in RES-E in less developed regions, such 
as SSA, is provided by Pueyo et al. (2015). According to these authors, 
RES-E investments face three types of  constraints: economic/financial, 
regulatory/political and technical, which are more severe in developing 
countries (ibid.: 32). In particular, the economics of  renewable energy 
projects in developing countries are more challenging due to: (i) the 
capital-intensive nature of  RES-E projects, which amplifies funding 
cost differentials; (ii) the higher level of  perceived risk, which raises 
costs through the higher cost of  finance and the larger share of  equity 
in a project’s finance structure; (iii) the lack of  domestic debt-finance 
of  suitable maturity, and scarcity of  equity finance, particularly private 
equity; and (iv) low prices of  electricity that prevent cost-recovery 
(ibid.: 30). Several studies have identified the specific barriers to RES-E 
in SSA (The Economist 2016; Quitzow et al. 2016; Castellanos et al. 2015; 
Climatescope 2016). The required capital spending in the power sector 
is an unbearable financial burden for government budgets (Castellanos 
et al. 2015). But other (interrelated) barriers include higher capital 
costs than elsewhere due to higher risks (The Economist 2016), different 
types of  risks (construction and operation, foreign exchange and 
country risks), poor financial health of  utilities (Quitzow et al. 2016), 
off-taker risk (Eberhard et al. 2016), the structure of  the electricity sector 
(dominated by single, and often state-owned utilities responsible for a 
large share of  generation, transmission, and distribution) (Climatescope 
2016), technical limitations of  weak grids (The Economist 2016; Quitzow 
et al. 2016; Eberhard et al. 2016), artificially low tariffs, and the large 
amounts of  investments being required.
Different barriers could justify the adoption of  different policies (policy 
mix). Pueyo et al (2015) identify several policies to address the different 
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constraints to RES-E investments (economic/financial,  
regulatory/political, and technical). Focusing on the economic and 
financial barriers, administratively-set feed-in tariffs (FITs) and feed-in 
premiums (FIPs) are main alternatives to address those barriers. Under 
FITs, a total payment per MWh of  RES-E generated, paid in the form 
of  guaranteed prices and combined with a purchase obligation by 
the utilities is provided. Under FIPs, a payment per KWh on top of  
the electricity wholesale-market price is granted. FITs were adopted 
in a number of  SSA countries in the past, including Ghana, Kenya, 
South Africa, and Uganda. However, they only delivered very small 
investments in SSA (Kruger and Eberhard 2016; Eberhard et al. 2016). 
Some of  these countries (Ghana, South Africa, and Uganda), but also 
others in the SSA region have recently implemented auctions as a more 
appealing instrument than FITs, following the successful experience in 
South Africa and elsewhere. Auctions have also been implemented in 
Burkina Faso, Zambia, Namibia, Ethiopia, and Mauritius.
An auction is a process in which a good or several goods are offered 
up for bidding. In so-called procurement auctions, an auctioneer will 
buy the good (RES-E), from the bidder(s) offering the best bid, for 
example lowest support level (AURES 2017). The main differences with 
respect to FITs are: (i) auctions are more transparent in the setting of  
support levels; (ii) support is restricted to those being awarded in the 
auction; and (iii) FITs are an open window for a long period of  time. 
Project developers can apply for the FIT anytime whereas, in tenders, 
project developers can only apply when a call is open. Auctions are 
now implemented in 67 countries worldwide (up from six countries in 
2005) (IRENA 2017b). The attractiveness of  auctions lies in several 
advantages compared to administratively-set support. They mitigate the 
information asymmetry problem when setting remuneration levels; they 
are particularly suitable to control costs, expansion, and the technology 
mix; and they are more likely to lead to allocative efficiency (Haufe and 
Ehrhart 2015).
Auctions have increasingly been adopted due to their alleged 
advantages in terms of  efficiency in RES-E promotion. This is 
something particularly convenient in developing countries, where 
economic resources are more limited, given budget constraints (Spratt 
et al. 2016). A critical problem in these countries is the unavailability of  
finance. Financial markets tend to be immature and perceived risks are 
higher (Spratt et al. 2016: 7), which raises the cost of  finance.
Whether auctions will fulfil the expectations depends on the choice of  
design elements but also on their combination with other instruments 
(i.e. a policy mix). Therefore, the aim of  this article is to analyse recent 
experiences with RES-E auctions in SSA. The pros and cons of  their 
design elements are assessed, and an analysis of  the functioning of  those 
schemes with respect to different criteria is provided. Whereas previous 
contributions have analysed specific schemes, mostly the South African 
one (see e.g. Eberhard, Kolker and Leigland 2014; del Río 2016), but 
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Table 1 Main design elements in RES-E auctions
Design element Description
Volume
There are three main ways to set the volume auctioned: capacity (MW), generation (MWh) or 
budget (million ¤). 
Timing
The existence of regular rounds with a schedule is a critical design element. The alternative is 
stand-alone auctions, i.e. set at irregular intervals. 
Diversity
Diversity with respect to technologies, locations, actors, and sizes of the installations could be 
promoted in an auction by organising different auctions per alternative (e.g. technology-neutral 
vs technology-specific), by including minimum quota per alternative, by providing different 
remuneration levels for different alternatives, or by lowering pre-qualification requirements or 
penalties for specific categories (i.e. small actors).
Participating 
conditions: facilitation 
and requirements
Several elements may facilitate the participation in an auction, while others are rather 
requirements for this participation:
• Streamlining of administrative procedures
• Supporting dialogue with stakeholders and information provision (e.g. measurement of resource 
potentials)
• Pre-qualification requirements are required in order to participate in the bidding procedure 
and are adopted to prove the seriousness of bids. They can refer to specifications of the offered 
project (such as technical requirements, documentation requirements, and preliminary licences) 
or to the bidding party (providing evidence of the technical or financial capability of the bidding 
party). They also include economic guarantees (bid bonds).
• Local content rules refer to the requirement to use renewable energy equipment which is 
manufactured by local firms.
Support conditions: 
types and forms of 
remuneration
Remuneration in an auction can be provided for generation (MWh) or capacity (MW). 
Generation-based remuneration can be provided as full payment (FIT) or through a premium 
top-up on the market price (FIP).
Selection criteria
Price-only auctions are organised using only one criterion (the bid price). In multi-criteria auctions, 
the price is the main criterion among other criteria (e.g. local content rules, deliverability, impact 
on local R&D, industry and jobs, and environmental impacts).
Auction format
In a single-item auction there is a single product which is allocated to a single owner and the 
product cannot be split (e.g. 50MW of PV are allocated to a single bidder, to be deployed at a 
specific site). In a multi-item auction the auctioned product is split among different owners and 
bids are submitted for only part or the total auctioned amount (e.g. 50MW of PV are allocated to 
several bidders, to be deployed at a specific site or in different places).
Auction type
Under sealed-bid auctions, project developers simultaneously submit their bids with an undisclosed 
offer of the price at which the electricity would be sold. An auctioneer ranks and awards projects 
until the sum of the quantities offered covers the volume of energy being auctioned. Under 
the multi-round descending-clock auction, the auctioneer offers a price in an initial round, and 
developers bid with offers of the quantity they would be willing to provide at that price. The 
auctioneer then progressively lowers the offered price in successive rounds until the quantity in a 
bid matches the quantity to be procured. Hybrid models may use the descending-clock auction in 
a first phase and the sealed-bid auction in a second phase.
Pricing rules
Under uniform pricing, all winners receive the strike price set by the last bid needed to meet the 
quota (highest accepted bid) or the first bid that does not meet the quota (lowest rejected bid). 
Under the pay-as-bid (PAB) alternative, the strike price sets the amount of generation eligible for 
support and each winner receives his/her bid.
Price ceilings In order to limit the costs of support, the auctioneer can set a maximum bid price.
Realisation period Deadlines are set for building the projects which have been awarded contracts.
Penalties
Penalties can take different forms: they can forbid participation in successive auctions, reduce the 
level of support, reduce the length of the support period by the time of the delay, lead to the 
confiscation of bid bonds or result in penalty payments.
Source Authors’ own elaboration based on del Río et al. (2015a).
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also Uganda (e.g. Castalia LLC 2016) and Zambia (Lucas 2016), there 
is not a joint comparison of  different schemes in SSA, which are very 
recent. The pros and cons of  their design elements have not been 
studied. Those design elements have not been compared with auctions 
for RES-E worldwide. Finally, their functioning has not been assessed in 
a systematic manner, using different criteria.
Accordingly, this article is structured as follows. The next section provides 
the analytical framework for the analysis of  the choice of  design elements 
in RES-E auctions. Section 3 explains the methodology followed in the 
analysis of  those design elements in SSA countries. The analysis is carried 
out in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Analytical framework: components for the assessment of design 
elements in auctions for RES-E5
Before an auction is implemented to promote RES-E investments, 
governments must consider whether this is an appropriate mechanism, 
taking into account their energy policy priorities. An analysis of  the 
market should be carried out, including potential bidders, potential 
barriers to RES-E deployment, the situation of  the supply chain, grid 
infrastructures, and so forth. Then specific design elements can be 
chosen. These are highly context-specific and what works in one market 
is not necessarily applicable to another.
2.1 Design elements in auctions for RES
The most relevant design elements in RES-E auctions are described in 
Table 1 (see del Río et al. 2015a and del Río 2017a for further details).
Table 2 Description of the criteria and indicators
Criteria Description
Effectiveness ‘A priori effectiveness’: degree to which the volume 
offered is contracted. ‘Realisation rate effectiveness’: 
degree to which the volume contracted is actually 
built.
Static efficiency (direct and 
indirect costs)
Reaching the target at the lowest possible system 
generation costs (¤, ¤/MWh). An auction outcome 
is efficient if the bidders with the lowest generation 
costs are awarded. The relevant costs here include 
generation costs and transaction costs. Indirect costs 
(balancing, profile, and grid costs (¤, ¤/MWh)) should 
be included.
Impact on the local supply 
chain
This refers to impacts on the local supply chain.
Actor diversity The participation of small actors is actively 
encouraged. 
Source Adapted from del Río et al. (2015a).
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2.2 Assessment criteria
Defining ‘success’ in the choice of  design elements is certainly not a 
trivial issue. Assessment criteria are used for this purpose. Although 
effectiveness and (static) efficiency are the most common criteria used in 
the assessments, several contributions expand the set of  relevant criteria 
to include other aspects, such as dynamic efficiency, impact on the local 
supply chain, and actor diversity (see del Río et al. 2015a). However, 
an unambiguously preferred ranking of  criteria does not exist in the 
literature. Table 2 describes the criteria considered in this article.6
Static efficiency refers to the minimisation of  the (system) costs of  
RES-E generation, which can be disaggregated into direct and indirect 
costs. The former include installation, operation, and maintenance of  
renewable energy technologies. Direct generation costs refer in this 
article to allocative efficiency, to which the equi-marginality principle 
applies.7 Indirect costs refer to balancing, profile, and grid costs.8
2.3 Market, bidders and system effects
The links between specific design elements and criteria to assess those 
design elements are mediated by the effects on bidders and the market. 
Design elements affect the participation of  bidders in the auction 
by influencing the costs, risks, and expected benefits of  participation 
(bid levels with respect to generation costs). In general, the higher the 
costs, the higher the risks or the lower the expected benefits, the lower 
the number of  participants (del Río 2015). The lower the level of  
competition, the higher the bid prices and the lower the efficiency of  
the auction (Haufe and Ehrhart 2015). Effectiveness is affected by those 
design options with an impact on investors’ risks (negative influence), 
competition (negative influence, since a higher level of  competition 
induces more aggressive bidding and, eventually, underbidding and 
underbuilding), and bid levels (the higher these levels, the higher the 
realisation rate). The impact at bidders’ level translates into market 
effects, which include the number of  bidders in the auction, the 
diversity of  those bidders, and their market concentration. In turn, 
these aspects have consequences on the functioning of  the auction 
(assessed with the aforementioned criteria).
3 Method
The analysis of  the design elements in SSA auctions is based on country 
case studies. We have selected those countries which have implemented 
auctions for RES-E and where winning projects have been awarded 
contracts as of  1 February 2017. These include Zambia, Uganda, 
and Ghana. Zambia should be lauded for being one of  the first SSA 
countries to run a solar tender efficiently and effectively. The Uganda 
tender for solar is one of  the main pillars of  a comprehensive support 
framework for small-scale renewable energy deployment, the GET FiT 
programme, that converts the awarded FIP into a grant fully reimbursed 
after the first five years of  operation of  the project. Ghana was one of  
the first countries in SSA to introduce a Renewable Energy Act along 
with a FIT scheme that attracted the interest of  many developers looking 
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to develop up to 1.5GW of  RES-E-based power plants. However, 
given the low credit worthiness of  the off-taker and the inability of  
the government to provide a credit enhancement mechanism, only a 
20MWp solar PV plant was built under the FIT. In order to unlock 
the pipeline of  projects and select good projects at low prices, the 
government launched a first auction in 2015.9 The RES-E auctions 
analysed in SSA are based on PV. They aim to diversify the electricity 
generation mix, reducing the dependence on hydro and conventional 
electricity sources, in a context of  fast-growing populations, economies 
and, thus, electricity demand and considerable solar potentials in those 
countries. PV projects are deemed particularly suitable for auctions, 
given their maturity, standardised nature, and the likely high degree of  
international competition in PV compared to other RES-E technologies 
(e.g. biomass). The three countries have implemented their first and 
only auction for RES-E during 2014 and 2016. This is in contrast to 
South Africa, the country in the SSA region with the largest (seven-year) 
experience in the organisation of  RES-E auctions.
Table 3 Main socioeconomic and power sector data for the selected countries (2015)
Ghana Uganda Zambia
Nominal GDP (US$ billion) 36.2 21.9 16.2
GDP per capita (US$) 1,343 619 1,044
Real GDP annual growth (%) 3.4 5.4 3.1
Population (million) 27.4 39 16.2
Unemployment (% of labour 
force)
4.3 4.1 13.3
Ease of doing business within 
SSA (1: most friendly, 47: least 
friendly)
11 12 6
Electricity generation mix (%)
Hydro: 73
Oil: 20
Gas: 7
Hydro: 80
Oil: 14
Other 
renewables 
(biomass): 6
Hydro: 97
Oil: 3
Net installed capacity (GW) 3.1 0.9 1.9
Total electricity generation (TWh) 14.1 3.8 11.3
Transmission and distribution 
losses (%)
27.6 7 16.3
Electrification rate (%) 76 15 26
Per capita electricity 
consumption (KWh)
362.1 83.8 583.2
Source Based on data from KPMG (2016), IEA (2017).
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Table 4 Design elements in auctions for RES-E in selected SSA countries
Design element (category and 
subcategory)
Uganda Zambia Ghana Rest of the world*
Period and technological scope 11 months 
(January–
December 2014)
Small PV (< 5MW)
2016 PV 12 months 
(November 2015–
November 2016) 
PV
1 Volume Generation (GEN), 
budget (BUD) or 
capacity-based 
(CAP)
CAP (20MW) CAP (2x50MW) CAP (20MW) CAP: 21
BUD: 4
GEN: 4
2 Periodicity Schedule (Y/N) N N N Y: 10 N: 16
3 Diversity Technology-neutral 
(TN), multi-
technology (MT) 
and technology-
specific (TS)
TS (solar PV) TS (solar PV) TS (Solar PV) TS: 20
MT: 2
TN: 5
Geographically 
neutral (Y/N)
N; preferred zones 
for the location 
identified
N (site-specific) Y; the developer 
chooses the site 
in coordination 
with the off-taker 
(ECG)
Y: 17
N: 9
Actor neutral (Y/N) Y Y Y Y: 25 N: 1
Size neutral (Y/N) N Maximum 
project capacity 
5MW
N N Maximum 
project capacity 
20MW
Y: 10 N: 16
4 Participation 
conditions
Pre-qualification 
requirements
Previous 
experience, 
financial capability
Bids and 
performance 
bonds
Experience, 
expertise, and 
financial resources
Bid bonds
Technical 
requirements
Technical criterion: 
successful 
track record of 
developing PV 
projects
Financial criterion: 
submission of 
financial statement 
for at least 3 years; 
show positive 
value of equity and 
profits for each of 
the last 3 years
Variable
Local content rules 
(Y/N)
N N Y (minimum of 
20%)
Y: 11 N: 15
Information 
provision (Y/N)
Y N Y Y: 6 N: 20
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Table 4 Design elements in auctions for RES-E in selected SSA countries (cont.)
Design element (category and 
subcategory)
Uganda Zambia Ghana Rest of the world*
5 Support cost 
condition
Type of 
remuneration 
(capacity vs 
generation)
Generation Generation Generation GEN: 24
CAP: 3
Form of 
remuneration  
(FIT, sliding FIP, 
fixed FIP)
Sliding FIP 
(difference 
between winning 
bid prices and a FIT 
11 US cents/KWh)
FIT FIT FIT: 17
sFIP: 8
fFIP: 1
6 Selection 
criteria
Price-only vs 
multi-criteria
Multi-criteria
70% price
30% (technical, 
financial, 
environmental, and 
social parameters)
Price Price Price: 18
Multi-criteria: 8
7 Auction format Multi vs  
single-item
Multi Single (project-
specific)
Single-item Single: 6
Multi: 20
8 Auction type Static, dynamic, 
and hybrid
Static Static Static Static: 25
Dynamic: 0
Hybrid: 1
9 Pricing rules PAB vs uniform PAB PAB PAB PAB: 21
Uniform: 3
First-price: 3
10 Ceiling prices Ceiling prices (Y/N) Y N Y (ceiling price is 
the FIT)
Y: 19
N: 7
11 Realisation 
period
Deadlines for 
construction (years)
2 1 2 Variable
12 Penalties Contract 
termination, 
confiscation 
of bids, and 
performance 
bonds
Contract 
termination, bid 
bond withheld
Contract 
termination, 
confiscation 
of bids, and 
performance 
bonds
Variable
Source Authors’ own elaboration.  
*Number of countries applying each design element.
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The research consisted of  country fieldwork and desktop research. 
Secondary literature, official data, and documents were consulted. This 
was complemented with interviews with relevant stakeholders in the 
three countries. Table 3 compares the chosen countries on the basis 
of  selected socioeconomic and energy indicators. The three countries 
are similar in some respects (medium-size, low gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita levels, moderate GDP growth rates, and power 
mixes strongly based on hydro). However, they show some differences 
regarding some indicators. Unemployment is comparatively higher 
in Zambia. Transmission and distribution losses are relatively high in 
Zambia, and especially in Ghana, and much more modest in Uganda. 
Ghana has a high electrification rate, which is very low in both Zambia 
and Uganda. Finally, per capita electricity consumption is orders of  
magnitude lower in Uganda than in the other two countries.
4 Results
4.1 Design elements
Table 4 summarises and compares the design elements in the three 
countries. It also shows which design elements are more common in the 
rest of  the world (last column).10
A main feature of  the schemes in SSA is the strong involvement of  
international institutions and donors, which have provided funding 
and technical assistance. In Zambia, a main role has been played by 
the World Bank through the Scaling Solar programme. Scaling Solar 
provides advice to assess the right size and location for solar PV power 
plants in the country’s grid; simple and rapid tendering to ensure strong 
participation and competition from committed industry players; fully 
developed templates of  bankable project documents that can reduce 
negotiation time; concessional financing and insurance attached to the 
tender; delivering competitive bidding and ensuring rapid financial 
close; risk management; and credit enhancement products to lower 
financing costs and deliver power at lower tariffs.
In Uganda, external support was also provided to implement a 
tendering process, in this case through the GET FiT programme. 
GET FiT is supported by the governments of  Norway, the UK and 
Germany, the EU (through the EU Africa Infrastructure Fund) and the 
World Bank (GET FiT Uganda 2015). The main support instruments 
implemented within the GET FiT programme include: the GET FiT 
Premium Payment Mechanism (GFPPM),11 a standardised set of  legal 
documents (including bankable power purchasing agreements (PPAs), 
implementation agreements, and developer financing agreements for 
small independent power producers (IPPs)), World Bank International 
Development Association (IDA) Partial Risk Guarantee (PRG) Facility, 
the Technical Assistance (TA) Facility,12 an interconnection component 
and additional funds to build new interconnection infrastructure and 
refurbish existing infrastructure (Castalia LLC 2016). A unique feature 
of  the GFPPM in Uganda is that donor-funded premium payments are 
received up-front. The developer will receive the first 50 per cent, of  the 
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total 20 years’ premium payment amount, upon commercial operation. 
The remaining 50 per cent is paid in annual 10 per cent tranches over 
the first five years of  operation. For biomass and hydro projects, the 
GFPPM is administratively set. However, due to the rapid fall in the 
price of  PV, it was decided that, for PV projects, the premium should be 
the result of  an auction process.
In Ghana, the government received technical assistance from GIZ 
(German Society for International Cooperation), which implemented the 
programme ‘Capacity for a Successful Implementation of  the Renewable 
Energy Act in Ghana’ (C-SIREA) to design an auction scheme that would 
allocate at least cost the scarce resources that the country could spend on 
credit enhancement mechanisms. C-SIREA supported the government 
in defining the auction process and features, preparing standardised 
documents (including minimum technical requirements) and supporting 
the established tender committee along the different phases of  the process 
through the provision of  technical and transaction advisers.
Regarding specific design elements adopted in SSA countries, most of  
them are standard in other countries (Table 4), such as volume defined 
in capacity terms (instead of  generation or budget), and remuneration 
based on generation (rather than on capacity). The absence of  a 
schedule for auctions is common to other countries, which is somehow 
surprising, given the detrimental consequences of  auctions at irregular 
intervals or infrequent ones in terms of  underbidding, higher investor 
risks, and constraints to the development of  a robust supply chain (see 
del Río 2017a).
We would like to stress the relevance of  some design elements applied 
in order to address the constraints to investments faced by many SSA 
countries.
A main difference from other countries is the lack of  geographical 
neutrality, with the exception of  South Africa, where auctions are 
geographically neutral. Auctions in SSA are either site-specific (Uganda 
and Zambia) or the off-taker has an important role in the choice of  the 
site (the developer chooses the site in coordination with the off-taker 
in Ghana). Site-specific auctions optimise the integration of  variable 
RES-E into the grid and reduce the administrative burden for project 
developers. In Uganda, preferred zones for project location were 
identified.13 In Zambia, the two projects (50MW each) will be located 
in the Lusaka South Multi-Facility Economic Zone. The pre-selection 
of  sites is related to the lack of  assessments of  the stability of  the grid 
and the weak grids in these countries, which encourages the location 
of  projects close to the grid. Simplicity and transparency of  design is 
key to attract investors in a high-risk perceived environment, as in SSA 
countries. This is why several design element choices have been made: 
technology-specific (only PV, rather than technology-neutral), sealed-bid 
with PAB (rather than dynamic auctions or static auctions with uniform 
pricing), and price-only auctions (instead of  multi-criteria-based tenders).
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Technological specificity usually brings benefits in terms of  dynamic 
efficiency (if  the least mature technologies are promoted). In general, 
a problem with lower neutrality is market segmentation, which 
could lead to few bidders and low competition in a given contingent, 
higher bids (higher support costs), and higher generation costs (lower 
static efficiency). However, in the case of  SSA, technology neutrality 
is unlikely to lead to more participation and greater competition. 
The reason is that auctions in this region are particularly suitable 
for PV, and therefore PV is likely to concentrate most projects in a 
technology-neutral auction anyway. Auctions in the SSA countries 
analysed are for PV only. This is in contrast to the auctions in South 
Africa where, in addition to PV, wind, small hydro, and biomass are 
included, although they are also technology-specific. There are many 
PV project developers in these countries. According to one interviewee, 
this is probably due to the simplicity of  these projects compared to 
other renewable technologies, such as biomass or hydro, where there 
are barely any projects being developed. Solar PV projects can be 
implemented more quickly and lead times are thus reduced, which 
make them particularly suitable for an auction, and for SSA countries 
which need to have additional generation sources rapidly implemented 
in order to cover increasing electricity demand needs in a context of  
power capacity deficits. For those other technology alternatives, an 
administratively-set FIT may make more sense. Donors have pushed 
strongly for auctions being based on PV in SSA.
Regarding auction type, static auctions have been the choice. Sealed 
bids are simpler than dynamic ones, leading to lower participation 
costs (Maurer and Barroso 2011). Not revealing information during 
the auction process becomes an advantage of  sealed-bid auctions when 
competition is weak because bidders could use that information to 
coordinate their bidding, increasing the final price of  the auction. Static 
auctions are less vulnerable to implicit collusion than dynamic ones 
(Haufe and Ehrhart 2015). However, the winner’s curse, which occurs 
when bidders do not know their actual valuation for the good, is more 
likely under static auctions.
The pricing rule has been based on pay-as-bid in the three countries, 
and also in South Africa. It is also the most common choice worldwide. 
The uniform pricing rule (lowest rejected bid) has a main theoretical 
advantage: it is incentive compatible, for example there is no incentive 
for cost exaggeration and bidders bid their true cost. The reason is that 
with uniform pricing and lowest rejected bid, the bidders’ own prices 
do not influence the price they will be paid in case of  winning (Haufe 
and Ehrhart 2015; Kahn et al. 2001; Federico and Rahman 2003). 
However, uniform pricing leads to uncertainties regarding award prices 
for bidders in case of  winning. Furthermore, in practice, the uniform 
pricing rule creates a risk of  irrational behaviour (underbidding), 
underbuilding and, thus, ineffectiveness (see del Río 2017a). The 
support is not inflation-indexed in the three countries.
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Two of  the auctions in SSA are price-only auctions (Zambia and 
Ghana) whereas, in Uganda, a multi-criteria auction has been 
implemented, in which the price represents only 30 per cent of  the 
criteria and technical, financial, environmental, and social parameters 
account for the rest. Price-only auctions would result in the lowest 
bidders being awarded contracts, whereas selection of  the preferred 
bidder on criteria other than price allows for the achievement of  
multiple policy objectives (e.g. local employment, local environment, 
industrial development, etc.) (del Río, Wigan and Steinhilber 2015b). 
However, the least-cost bidders might not be selected in multi-criteria 
auctions, leading to a lower allocative efficiency and higher support 
costs. According to one interviewee, this was the case in Uganda, where 
donors decided to implement a multi-criteria analysis among other 
reasons to line up the selection with their own policy goals. In South 
Africa, the multi-criteria auctions led to some local benefits (see del Río 
2016 for an overview) and a greater acceptance of  the scheme, but at 
the cost of  higher complexity (Kruger and Eberhard 2016) and lower 
transparency.
Pre-qualification requirements and penalties are standard measures 
to ensure the seriousness of  bids and that winning projects are built. 
But, if  set too stringently, they may discourage the participation of  
actors by increasing the costs of  participation, leading to lower levels of  
competition and higher bid prices and policy costs. This is not the case 
in the three countries being analysed. According to one interviewee, 
the technical requirements in Ghana should have been more precise. 
They were set in very general terms, subject to the interpretation of  
participants on the required information which had to be submitted. 
In contrast to the lax requirements in Ghana, technical specifications 
may have been too strict in Uganda, setting narrow requirements 
for individual components, rather than for the quality of  the power 
produced.
Finally, one country has implemented local content requirements 
(Ghana), whereas the other two have not. Local content requirements 
are a common practice in many countries around the world, with 
nearly half  having adopted them. Their main advantage is the positive 
local socioeconomic impacts, as in Uganda, where local development 
opportunities in the rural regions have been encouraged (also due 
to the project size limit and the selected site). But they may restrict 
participation in the auction, leading to lower competition and higher 
bids. This design element is particularly unsuitable when there is 
not a local supply chain in the specific technologies being eligible to 
participate in the auction, because it would result in higher energy costs 
with very modest local benefits. According to one interviewee, the part 
of  the supply chain which could be local was identified in Ghana and 
the 20 per cent local content requirement was set accordingly. Local 
content requirements may be in conflict with access to reliable and 
cheap energy, which is a main priority in SSA countries.
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4.2 Assessing the success of auctions in SSA
4.2.1 Actor diversity
The auctions in SSA have attracted a considerable number of  actors. 
In Zambia, 48 solar power developers were attracted, of  which 11 
were qualified and seven submitted final proposals (IFC 2016). Two 
companies were awarded contracts, despite the fact that a bidder 
submitted the lowest bids for the two sites. This is so because the Scaling 
Solar tender does not allow awarding both sites to the same bidder, 
which increases actor diversity (at the expense of  higher support costs). 
In Uganda, 24 expressions of  interest were received and nine qualified 
developers were invited to submit technical and price bids. Seven 
developers submitted their bid packages in August 2014. There were 
two winning bidders (Meyer, Tenenbaum and Hosier 2015). In Ghana, 
the auction launched in November 2015 attracted 33 developers, 18 
of  which were pre-qualified to submit a bid. Five applicants submitted 
technical and financial proposals and one bidder was recommended for 
negotiation (Behrle 2017).
Regarding the types of  actors, mostly large, international investors 
have been attracted, although some local developers have participated 
(in Uganda). In Zambia, they were mainly large, well-established 
companies, with company domicile mostly in Europe. In Uganda, five 
of  the pre-qualified companies were international solar developers and 
four were local companies. The high presence of  local developers can be 
explained by the small maximum size of  the projects (5MW) that reduces 
attractiveness for the larger international developers (Castalia LLC 2016) 
and the pre-existence of  a FIT since 2007 that spurred local project 
developers. The winners of  the auctions in the three countries show a 
combination of  African and international well-established firms. In the 
case of  Zambia, there were two winners, both international actors, a 
large utility from Italy (ENEL) and a PV project developer (First Solar). 
In the case of  Uganda, there were two winners (Access Power MEA 
and Building Energy). Access Power is a Middle East and Africa (MEA) 
project developer, founded in 2012. Founded in 2010, Building Energy 
is one of  most prominent Italian’s independent renewable energy power 
producers. In Ghana, BioTherm Energy is Africa’s leading IPP. This 
African-born utility has been successful in securing over 250MW of  
PPAs on the African continent in seven different countries.
4.2.2 Policy effectiveness
Regarding a priori effectiveness, the results can be deemed quite 
satisfactory. In Uganda and Ghana, 20MW were auctioned and they were 
all awarded, whereas in Zambia, 100MW were auctioned for the two 
projects (50MW each), and 73MW were awarded (45MW and 28MW).
It is difficult to judge effectiveness in terms of  realisation rate at this 
stage, since the deadline for building the projects has not ended. 
However, there are signs that they will be built. In Zambia, the projects 
are scheduled to be completed in Q3 2017. The fact that the two 
winners are well-established international companies and the de-risking 
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under the Scaling Solar programme are cause for optimism. One of  
the 10MW grid-connected solar PV plants awarded in Uganda entered 
into operation on November 2016. The other (also 10MW) has started 
construction and is expected to enter into operation in Q3 2017 (GET 
FiT Uganda 2017). The premium payment (a top-up to the FIT) offered 
by GET FiT was likely necessary for all power plants supported by the 
programme. Integration into the electricity system is guaranteed since 
the sites are preselected based on their capability to evacuate the power 
from the projects. In addition, investments in transmission infrastructure 
represent another pillar of  GET FiT. In Ghana, it is too early to tell 
whether the 20MWp PV project awarded in November 2016 will be 
built. Policy effectiveness has been high in South Africa, both regarding 
the capacity being procured as well as the capacity expected to enter 
into operation (South African Government 2015).
The relatively low volumes auctioned in the three cases mean that they 
will contribute marginally to the countries’ power mixes. However, 
a second round is expected in both Zambia and Ghana. In Uganda, 
the Electricity Regulatory Authority (ERA) will promote an additional 
30MW of  solar PV (GET FiT Uganda 2015). According to one 
interviewee, one main advantage of  auctions with respect to FITs 
regarding effectiveness is that the sovereign guarantee to mitigate the 
off-taker risk (due to lack of  credibility of  the utility) provided by the 
government cannot be given to all projects applying for a FIT (due 
to scarce resources), and the auction allows the selection of  one or 
two projects, the best ones, to which the guarantee can be provided. 
Thus, bidders winning the auction know that they will receive such a 
guarantee, and investors’ risks are reduced accordingly. The fact that 
unsuccessful bidders have not complained is a sign that the processes 
were well developed and operated.
4.2.3 Static efficiency
Regarding the cost-effectiveness of  the schemes, the results are mixed. 
The Zambian auction has led to remarkable low prices (winning bids 
of  6.02 US cents/KWh and 7.84 US cents/KWh), which can be partly 
related to the low risks facilitated by the Scaling Solar programme. 
According to USAID (2016: 6), the concessional lending provided by 
the World Bank made these projects commercially viable. The fact 
that land is provided for free by the Zambian government and the 
denomination of  PPAs in dollars (which reduces currency risks for 
investors) has helped to further reduce costs. However, the pre-selection 
of  the site has been an issue in Zambia, with Eckhouse and Hirtenstein 
reporting criticisms by one of  the winners in the auction arguing that 
‘the location of  the project isn’t ideal… it’s not flat and has rocks that 
will need to be removed’ (2016). In addition, the sites are not in places 
with the highest level of  solar radiation in Zambia (del Río 2017b), but 
they are close to a new substation (Eckhouse and Hirtenstein 2016), 
which facilitates grid integration in a country with an underdeveloped 
grid. The first geographically-neutral wind auction in South Africa led 
to considerable challenges for grid connection and permit approvals for 
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the winning projects (Haffejee 2013), which suggests that the site was 
not optimal in terms of  transmission and land use and that site-specific 
auctions would have mitigated these problems.
In Uganda, the wining average price was 16.37 US cents/KWh, which 
was higher than in Zambia and South Africa. The smaller sizes of  the 
project (preventing economies of  scale), the creditworthiness of  the 
off-taker, being the first auction, and being a landlocked country are 
factors negatively affecting cost-effectiveness (Meyer et al. 2015). The 
deadline for obtaining title to land was particularly tight and turnover 
(revenue) requirements for the solar tender may have been too high 
(Castalia LLC 2016). Tender documents for the solar procurement 
identified preferred zones for the location of  the proposed plants. 
Finally, GET FiT’s technical specifications may have been too strict, 
setting narrow requirements for individual components, rather than for 
the quality of  power produced, preventing developers from choosing the 
least-cost option to meet requirements (Castalia LLC 2016).
In Ghana, the preferred bidder’s offer of  11.7 US cents/KWh is lower 
than the FIT of  about 18 US cents/KWh and between the prices in 
Uganda and Zambia. However, in Ghana, the bidders had a 20 per 
cent local content requirement and concessional lending was not 
provided, as in Zambia and Uganda.
One of  the reasons for the site-specificity of  auctions in SSA is the 
weaknesses of  grids. The limited grid infrastructure in SSA countries 
constrains the choice of  sites. Those with the best solar resources are 
not chosen and, thus, direct generation costs (and bid prices) are not 
minimised. The sites in Ghana and Zambia were selected according 
to grid integration studies, which were performed to identify the 
amount of  variable RES-E which could be fed at various substations, 
considering technical constraints and resource availability. Although 
the first auction was not site-specific in Uganda, the next round may 
be site-specific as the government was supported in developing a grid 
integration model for variable RES-E, which takes into consideration 
their technical constraints and economic benefit to the system. 
Site-specificity can be recommended in SSA given that, as stressed by 
two interviewees, it is quite complicated to obtain different types of  
permits in these countries (access to land and infrastructure, connection 
permit, and environmental impact assessment). Identification of  these 
sites by the government makes it easier for project developers to obtain 
those permits and they usually favour this design element.
4.2.4 Impact on the local supply chain
The technological diversity provided by the projects is high regarding 
the electricity generation sources in three countries (since there was 
no solar PV connected to the grid), but low in the sense that the only 
RES-E supported by the auction is solar PV. The impact on the local 
supply chains will likely be low, since they are non-existing in the three 
countries and most investors are not local ones. This might be a little 
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bit different in Ghana, where there was a 20MWp PV plant prior to the 
auction, and where the 20 per cent local content requirement and the 
fact that there will be several other rounds can be expected to positively 
impact the local supply chain.14
5 Discussion and conclusions
This article has analysed the design choices in the auctions in three 
SSA countries and has provided an initial assessment of  their outcomes. 
Several lessons can be extracted from the experience with auctions in 
the three countries analysed. Note, however, that the experiences are 
nonetheless very limited and difficult to translate into general principles.
The three cases suggest that auctions can be an effective and 
cost-efficient way to introduce non-hydro renewable energy sources in 
countries with little existing experience in these sources such as those 
in SSA, changing the perception that cheap renewable energy projects 
cannot be deployed in poor countries with weak institutions and high 
costs for conducting business. The simplicity of  PV projects makes 
the setting of  support through auctions (rather than administratively) 
an appropriate choice since competition is likely to be greater than in 
projects with longer lead times (e.g. biomass).
Auctions for RES-E support might be useful to address some of  the 
constraints to RES-E investments in SSA, including limited economic 
resources and weak grids. Their simplicity and transparency in setting 
remuneration levels may make it attractive for potential investors and 
policymakers alike. Their alleged advantage in terms of  allocating 
efficiently the limited financial support available to RES-E is something 
particularly convenient in SSA countries, where economic resources are 
more limited, given budget constraints. They allow for the selection of  
good projects by experienced developers and discourage lower quality 
projects to go ahead. They also allow to control for the quantity of  
RES-E capacity connected to the grid, which is useful for purposes of  
grid management, particularly in SSA countries, which have weak grids.
However, auctions are not a panacea. This article has shown that, at 
least for SSA countries, the success of  auctions depends on the choice 
of  design elements, but it also depends on the existence of  an ‘enabling 
environment’, which implies minimum institutional, regulatory, human, 
financial, and infrastructure capabilities. In particular, auctions need 
to be complemented by other instruments which directly reduce risks. 
Thus, auctions must be part of  a more comprehensive combination 
of  measures (policy mix) which extends over time and which addresses 
the barriers to RES-E deployment mentioned in Section 1. Auctions 
should be part of  a broader package of  measures aimed at de-risking 
and capacity building (need for technical assistance for the design and 
implementation of  the auction processes). The experiences in SSA 
suggest that, in the context of  those countries, the auction procedure 
should be combined with market-based de-risking mechanisms which 
directly reduce the financing costs and participation risks in order 
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to attract potential bidders, and have appropriate competition levels 
and lower bid prices. This has been the case in the Scaling Solar 
programme in Zambia and the GET FiT programme in Uganda, which 
are programmes with auctions being one among other instruments. 
External financial support in the form of  a package of  de-risking/credit 
enhancement mechanisms has proven useful in this regard.
International institutions, such as the World Bank, and foreign 
governments have played and can play a very relevant role in this 
context. In particular, the World Bank Scaling Solar programme has 
contributed to mitigate international banks’ concerns about political 
risk, reducing the costs of  capital and making these emerging markets 
more appealing to developers. GET FiT includes a donor-financed 
premium to supplement the Ugandan FIT in the first five years of  
the project lifetime and the World Bank’s PRG to mitigate the risk of  
default by the utility (Quitzow et al. 2016). The standardised PPAs and 
IAs (implementation agreements) offered by GET FiT reduced the time 
needed to finance closure and signature of  the PPA and were important 
for lenders, because they reduced the cost of  legal due diligence.
In addition to a PPA plus de-risking, the programmes have reinforced 
the institutional capabilities in those countries by providing technical 
support. Technical assistance was included in the three countries 
in order to develop human, regulatory, and institutional capacities, 
investments in technical capacities for the development of  the grid, 
and financial mechanisms to reduce the financial risks and increase the 
financing capacity. According to one interviewee, technical assistance 
is necessary in auctions for RES-E in SSA countries, given the lack 
of  experience in renewable energy technologies and in international 
tenders. It is particularly recommendable, given the capital intensity 
of  these technologies, in order to give investors more confidence, 
improving selection of  projects and, thus, reducing bid prices.
The governance structure is different across the experiences in the three 
countries. The GET FiT programme in Uganda has a broader scope in 
the sense that it has a multi-stakeholder governance structure, involving 
the ERA, governmental stakeholders, donors, and a number of  energy 
sector and infrastructure investment experts, which monitors progress and 
proposes measures to address relevant challenges (GET FiT Uganda 2014; 
Quitzow et al. 2016). In this sense, the Zambian case is more ‘supply-driven’ 
(the World Bank steered the process rather than empowering local 
institutions to do it), whereas the cases in Uganda and Ghana are more 
demand-driven, with a committee with many actors, including local ones, 
where the respective governments played a dominant role.
Even if  auctions are supplemental to other policy measures and tools, 
they can play an important role in supporting RES-E effectively and 
cost-effectively. Whether they can meet the expectations depends on 
the choice of  design elements. Most of  the design choices made in 
the SSA auctions are deemed standard and appropriate in order to 
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address the constraints to RES-E investment in these countries. These 
include alternatives that enhance the simplicity and transparency 
of  design, which are key aspects to attract investors in a high-risk 
perceived environment such as the one existing in SSA countries: 
technology-specific (PV), sealed-bid with PAB, and price-only auctions. 
Site-specific auctions address problems related to a weak grid and 
obtaining administrative permits, which can be particularly burdensome 
in SSA countries. The strong pre-qualification requirements help to 
avoid underbidding and improve the effectiveness of  the scheme.
Finally, the transparency of  the auction schemes in the three countries 
should be stressed. This attracts the participation of  bidders, which has 
a positive impact on competition and, thus, on bid prices. However, an 
underlying problem in the SSA auctions is the lack of  proper energy 
planning, for example documents which indicate how much capacity will 
be needed in the medium and long terms and which technologies would 
cover such capacity. This complicates the efficiency and effectiveness of  
tenders, given the lack of  long-term signals on future volumes. Therefore, 
a national energy planning exercise would increase confidence of  the 
project developers and help government to plan a schedule for the 
tenders. Currently, each country has only organised a stand-alone auction.
Notes
1 Faculty of  Environmental Studies, York University, Toronto, 
Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada, hlp@yorku.ca; GREA Innovacio 
Concurrent, INSPIRES Research Centre, Universitat de Lleida, Pere 
de Cabrera s/n, 25001 Lleida, Spain, hlp1@alumnes.udl.cat.
2 Institute for Public Policies and Goods, Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Madrid 28037, Spain,  
pablo.delrio@csic.es.
3 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 
ECREEE C.P. 288, Praia, Cape Verde, mohamed.sokona@giz.de.
4 According to The Economist (2016), Africa requires between US$60 
and US$90 billion annually to address its energy shortfall, roughly 
quadruple 2014 investment levels. The World Bank estimates that 
investments of  between US$120 billion and US$160 billion are 
required per annum in order to provide electricity access to the entire 
SSA region by 2030.
5 This section draws heavily on and summarises the findings of  the 
EU-funded Auctions for Renewable Energy Support (AURES) project. 
See del Río et al. (2015a, 2015b) and del Río (2015) for further details.
6 Full details on the description of  these criteria and how they were 
derived are provided in del Río et al. (2015a).
7 According to Tietenberg (2008:18), the least cost means of  achieving 
a target occurs when the marginal costs of  all possible means of  
achievement are equal.
8 Balancing costs occur due to deviations from schedule of  variable 
RES-E power plants, and the need for operating reserve and 
intraday adjustments in order to ensure system stability. Profile costs 
are mainly back-up costs, i.e. additional capacity of  dispatchable 
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technologies required due to the lower capacity credit of  
non-dispatchable RES-E. Grid costs are related to the reinforcement 
or extension of  transmission or distribution grids as well as 
congestion management, including re-dispatch required to manage 
situations of  high grid load (Breitschopf  and Held 2014).
9 South Africa was not included in the analysis for several reasons: 
(i) It is a very different country with respect to the others in 
fundamental aspects: economic structure and economic conditions, 
size, institutional capacities, etc. (ii) South Africa first implemented its 
auction scheme in 2011, i.e. it has a long-standing experience in RES 
auctions. This has likely resulted in policy learning over the years and 
improvements in the scheme. This is not the case in the other three 
SSA countries analysed. (iii) South Africa has been a well-researched 
country regarding RES auctions.
10 This last column is based on the analysis performed by the authors 
for 26 RES-E auction schemes from around the world.
11 The GET FiT premium gives small power producers FIP payments 
in addition to the national FIT. The costs for the already existing FIT 
are passed down to the consumers. However, the costs for the FIP 
payments are taken up by the donors. Small-scale biomass, hydro, 
bagasse, and solar PV plants can apply for the FIP payments.
12 This includes: enhancement of  skills for FIT tariff modelling, least 
cost development planning, solar PV tender, project due-diligence 
expertise, strategic communication, and negotiation.
13 These zones were defined after a review of  grid capacities, local loads, 
and solar radiation rates (Meyer et al. 2015). The tender documents 
also stated that projects had to be located no further than 3km from 
the grid and that all interconnection costs were to be borne by the 
bidder and included in tariff bids (Castalia LLC 2016).
14 In fact, two solar PV assembly lines have been inaugurated in Ghana 
(one of  which was part of  the winning consortium).
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Commercial-Scale Renewable 
Energy in South Africa and its 
Progress to Date*
Lucy Baker
Abstract While South Africa’s electricity sector is heavily coal-dependent,  
the country has recently become an attractive destination for commercial-scale 
renewable energy investment. This article examines ongoing developments 
and challenges to the country’s Renewable Energy Independent Power 
Producers’ Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP), from inception as a 
feed-in tariff in 2007, to its launch as a competitive bidding programme 
in 2011. The article discusses how the programme emerged out of a set 
of national conditions combined with international trends in renewable 
energy investment and technology development. The programme’s 
successes include progressive requirements for socioeconomic development. 
However, since 2016, South Africa’s renewable energy industry has faced 
complex challenges, including resistance by the electricity utility Eskom, 
itself embroiled within scandals of state capture and corruption, as 
well as the ability of Eskom’s transmission grid to integrate renewable 
energy generation. Subsequent delays to the programme have generated 
uncertainty for stakeholders and the future of the industry.
Keywords: renewable energy, electricity, South Africa, wind, solar PV, 
renewable energy procurement, Eskom.
1 Introduction
South Africa’s electricity sector is heavily coal-dependent, accounting for 
45 per cent of  the country’s carbon emissions.1 However, in recent years 
the country has become an attractive destination for commercial-scale 
renewable energy investment since the launch of  two key national 
developments in 2011: a procurement programme for utility-scale 
renewable energy, and a national electricity master plan which set a target 
for renewable energy to deliver 9 per cent of  supply by 2030. Though 
South Africa’s electricity sector is still dominated by the state-owned, 
largely coal-fired monopoly utility Eskom, renewable electricity generated 
by independent power producers (IPPs) now constitutes a small but 
significant contribution to the overall electricity mix.
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South Africa’s Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers’ 
Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP) and the Integrated Resource Plan 
for electricity (IRP) emerged after various failed attempts to liberalise 
the country’s electricity sector in the post-apartheid era (Baker 2017). 
The introduction of  RE IPPPP facilitated the generation of  electricity 
from both renewable energy sources and by IPPs for the first time, and 
has since attracted just over R200 billion2 in investment. RE IPPPP’s 
trajectory and that of  the industry it has generated have been influenced 
by a number of  developments at the international and national 
levels, including a dramatic decline in the cost of  renewable energy 
technologies, as a result of  which solar photovoltaic (PV) has become 
competitive with new build coal; enormous electricity tariff hikes in 
South Africa in recent years; and a decline in the country’s economic 
growth and related energy demand.
Yet despite RE IPPPP’s initial successes, a complexity of  political, 
economic, and technical challenges have led to delays which now 
threaten its future sustainability and have generated significant 
uncertainty for renewable energy investors and stakeholders. Revisions 
to the IRP are also severely delayed. As a result of  such challenges, 
South Africa has fallen in the rankings of  Ernst & Young’s renewable 
energy attractiveness index and now sits in 19th place, down from 11th 
in May 2016 (EY 2017).3 But as Africa’s first mover in renewable energy 
development, South Africa’s progress or lack thereof  will have inevitable 
lessons and spillovers for other countries on the continent where 
renewable energy activities are currently developing, including Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Namibia.
This article focuses on the commercial-scale, grid-connected renewable 
energy sector that has emerged out of  RE IPPPP thus far, for which the 
technologies permitted are: onshore wind, solar PV, concentrated solar 
power (CSP), small hydro, biomass, biogas, landfill gas, small hydro, 
and cogeneration (from agricultural waste). Of  this, 43 per cent is for 
wind and 42 per cent for solar PV. RE IPPPP must be differentiated 
from other private sector-led electricity generation activities ongoing in 
South Africa which go beyond the scope of  this article, and include a 
programme for IPPs from coal, gas, and cogeneration yet to be finalised 
(Baker and Burton, forthcoming), and a small but growing roof-top solar 
PV market (Korsten 2015).
The article’s structure is as follows: Section 2 situates RE IPPPP within 
the context of  the country’s electricity sector, including the state-owned 
monopoly Eskom. Section 3 discusses some of  the key policy developments 
that helped to pave the way for RE IPPPP, including the 1998 White Paper 
on Energy Policy, the 2003 Renewable Energy White Paper, and the IRP, 
the country’s first national planning document for electricity. As discussed, 
while the IRP paved the way for RE IPPPP, subsequent hold-ups in 
the revision of  this plan have undermined gains towards a transparent 
and participatory planning process. Section 4 goes on to examine the 
emergence of  RE IPPPP as a competitive bidding auction, despite original 
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plans for a feed-in tariff. This section includes some of  the impressive 
gains made as a result of  the programme’s progressive socioeconomic 
developments, in addition to emerging challenges as a result of  delays 
to the programme. Section 5 explores some of  the reasons behind these 
challenges including Eskom’s resistance to the programme and the 
ongoing crisis within the utility which have resulted in its investment 
downgrade. Section 6 concludes that renewable energy procurement in 
South Africa cannot be understood, or resolved, without engaging with the 
very complex political economy in which it is embedded.
2 South Africa’s electricity sector in context and the emergence of 
RE IPPPP
It is impossible to understand the emergence and development of  South 
Africa’s renewable energy procurement programme without examining 
the broader context of  the country’s national electricity sector, including 
the role of  the state-owned monopoly Eskom. With a nominal installed 
capacity of  42.8GW, of  which 85 per cent is coal-fired (Eskom 2016; see 
Figure 1), Eskom owns the transmission grid, generates approximately 
95 per cent of  the country’s electricity supply, and is responsible 
for 60 per cent of  distribution, with the remainder being sold by 
municipalities. Eskom is also the single buyer of  power. The utility has 
historically focused on large-scale centralised supply, building some of  
the world’s largest coal-fired power plants.
While coal will continue to play an important role in the electricity mix for 
some decades, Eskom’s historical dependence on South Africa’s abundant 
sources of  formerly low-cost coal is subject to change due to reasons that 
include national commitments to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
and significant shifts in the coal market (Burton and Winkler 2014). As 
discussed in Section 5, following over a decade of  periodic load-shedding,4 
Eskom is also undergoing a financial and political crisis and is front and 
centre of  a national scandal on state capture and corruption.
South Africa’s relative isolation under apartheid meant that the country 
avoided the global trend of  electricity sector liberalisation pushed by 
the World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral donors as part 
of  structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). While Eskom retained its monopoly as 
a state-owned utility, there are long-standing tensions and a spectrum of  
ideological differences in South Africa and its ruling party the African 
National Congress (ANC), between those advocating for state ownership 
of  the electricity sector at one end and those for liberalisation and market 
reform at the other. Eskom has long resisted the introduction of  IPPs and 
the creation of  an Independent Systems Operator for transmission as 
this would undermine its current monopoly control (Baker and Burton, 
forthcoming). As discussed in Section 3, such tensions are illustrated in 
the failure to fully implement measures put forward in the 1998 White 
Paper on Energy Policy which ultimately led to delays to the construction 
of  new generation capacity in the early 2000s. Current delays to 
RE IPPPP are arguably continued illustration of  such tensions.
104 | Baker Commercial-Scale Renewable Energy in South Africa and its Progress to Date
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
Source Eskom (2016: 128).
To put Eskom’s generation capacity into perspective, the 
commercial-scale renewable energy capacity that has emerged out of  
RE IPPPP accounted for approximately 2.9 per cent of  the country’s 
electricity supply in 2016 (CSIR 2017a). Under RE IPPPP, 92 projects 
constituting just over 6,300MW of  peak generating capacity have been 
approved under four bidding rounds and are now at various stages of  
development (IPPP Office 2017; see Table 2). By the first quarter of  
2017, 3,052MW of  electricity generation capacity from 56 IPP projects 
were connected to the national grid and all of  the projects approved 
under rounds one and two of  RE IPPPP were operational (IPPP 
Office 2017).
Alongside RE IPPPP as a programme for utility-scale projects, a small 
IPP programme was launched in 2013 for projects of  between 1MW 
and 5MW. This gives bidders the option to use equipment supplied by 
‘South African power generation equipment manufacturers, who may 
not have international certification,’5 unlike the main RE IPPPP which 
insists on internationally certified technologies.
Since mid-2015, electricity generated by solar PV and wind has 
become cost-competitive with that generated by Eskom’s new build 
coal-fired power plants, Medupi and Kusile. Such a development follows 
global trends which see solar PV and wind reaching grid parity with 
conventional sources of  energy generation (UNEP/BNEF 2015). Since 
the start of  RE IPPPP, the tariffs at which winning projects will sell their 
electricity to Eskom have dropped dramatically: the average solar PV 
tariff has decreased by 75 per cent, wind by 50 per cent, and CSP by 
43 per cent (see Table 1). RE IPPPP also accounts for one of  the largest 
investment streams into the country in recent years (Green Cape 2017). 
At the time of  writing, just over R200 billion6 for both debt and equity 
had been committed, of  which 24 per cent is foreign investment (IPPP 
Office 2017: 2).
Figure 1 Eskom’s nominal capacity in MW
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Yet despite such progress, and as discussed in further detail in Section 4, 
the more recent bidding rounds of  RE IPPPP have been beset by 
delays and uncertainty. Winning projects selected under round four 
were announced in April 2015, with a second announcement generally 
referred to as round 4.5, taking place in June 2015. But financial close 
for these projects which should have been reached by April 2016, 
has been stalled due to Eskom’s continued refusal to sign the power 
purchase agreements (PPAs). A fifth round, which was slated to be 
announced in 2016 has been put on hold with no clarity at the time 
of  writing. Under the small IPP programme, ten successful projects 
amounting to 49MW have been announced thus far but have also yet to 
reach financial close.
Table 1 Actual average tariffs, rounds 1–4 of RE IPPPP
Tariffs Round 1 
(Nov. 2011)
Round 2 
(March 2012)
Round 3 
(Aug. 2013)
Round 4 
(Nov. 2015)
Average 
percentage 
drop,  
Round 1–4
Wind R 1.52 R 1.19 R 0.87 R 0.62 50%
Solar PV R 3.65 R 2.18 R 1.17 R 0.62 75%
CSP R 3.55 R 3.32 R 3.11 R 2.02
Source Adapted from CSIR (2017a: 5).
Table 2 Project status under each bidding round of RE IPPPP rounds
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 3.5 
(CSP only)
Round 4/4.5 Round 5 Small IPP 
(project size 
1–5MW) 
Submission 
date
November 
2011
March 2012 August 2013 March 2014 August 2014 Should have 
taken place 
in mid-2016. 
Process now 
stalled
October 2013
Number 
of projects 
approved
28 projects 19 projects 17 projects 2 projects 26 projects N/A 10 projects
Contracted 
capacity
1,425MW 1,040MW 1,457MW 200MW 2,205MW 
procured but 
not signed
N/A 49MW 
procured but 
not signed
Date of 
financial close
November 
2012
May 2013 December 
2014
August 2016 Not yet  
signed
N/A Not yet signed
Operational Yes Yes 9 projects by 
March 2017
No N/A No
Source Compiled from DoE (2016), CSIR (2017a: 4), IPPP Office (2017).
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3 Key policy developments
A number of  national and international developments paved the way 
for the emergence of  what is now RE IPPPP. These include, firstly, 
national commitments to climate change mitigation following President 
Jacob Zuma’s pledge to reduce carbon emissions by 34 per cent by 
2020 and 42 per cent by 2025 below a business-as-usual trajectory 
at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) conference in 2009 (RSA 2015). Secondly, the 2008 
global financial crisis contributed to a slump in the renewable energy 
markets of  Europe and the US, which led developers and technology 
manufacturers to seek new opportunities elsewhere, including in South 
Africa. Thirdly, policy developments at the national level played a key 
role, including the 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy, the 2003 White 
Paper and the IRP, as is now discussed.
The 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy (DME 1998) set out the 
gradual liberalisation of  Eskom’s functions into separate generation, 
distribution, and transmission companies (Gaunt 2008). The subsequent 
Eskom Conversion Act of  2001 converted the utility from a statutory 
body to a public company which required that it pay tax and dividends 
for the first time. Eskom’s stakeholder-based electricity council was 
replaced by a board of  directors and the government, represented by 
the Minister of  Public Enterprises, was appointed as the utility’s sole 
shareholder. The White Paper was followed by a 2001 cabinet memo 
announcing that 30 per cent of  electricity supply would be generated by 
IPPs and a subsequent ruling that Eskom no longer be allowed to build 
new electricity generation.
Despite these initial steps, key aspects of  the 1998 White Paper were 
never implemented, including the creation of  a separate transmission 
company. Indeed, the Independent Systems and Market Operator Bill 
that would do this has been continually postponed to date. Significantly, 
between 1998 and 2003 no new generation was built, reasons for which 
include resistance from Eskom and the unions, lack of  capacity from 
the then Department of  Minerals and Energy, and a lack of  regulatory 
clarity that discouraged potential investors (Eberhard 2007; Baker et al. 
2015). By 2007, the country was faced with a falling electricity reserve 
margin and an imminent electricity crisis so in a volte-face, a cabinet 
memo approved that Eskom should be re-allowed to construct more 
power plants but that 30 per cent of  new generation should be built 
by IPPs. While the power sector reform envisaged by the White Paper 
was never completed, it still represents an early attempt to achieve what 
RE IPPPP ultimately managed to do.
A subsequent policy development was the Renewable Energy White 
Paper, published by the Department of  Minerals and Energy in 2003 
with support from Danish bilateral assistance. This paper set a target 
of  10,000GWh of  renewable energy contribution to final energy 
consumption by 2013, to be produced mainly from biomass, wind, 
solar, and small-scale hydro (DME 2003). Though the paper was 
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never formally adopted and the renewable energy commitment it 
proposed was minimal, it nonetheless provided a stimulus for the initial 
development of  a feed-in tariff, which was to have created a market 
mechanism in order to meet this target.
Some years later, the introduction of  the country’s first electricity 
planning document in May 2011, the IRP, set a renewable energy target 
of  17,800MW, which if  built would deliver 9 per cent of  electricity 
supply by 2030. The IRP is significant because it represents the first 
time that electricity planning has taken place in South Africa and while 
the plan’s negotiation was delayed and heavily contested, it was still 
considered something of  a breakthrough (Baker et al. 2015). Not least 
under apartheid there was no formal process for electricity planning 
and policymaking and no department dedicated to it either. Instead, this 
role was carried out by Eskom, which took all decisions for electricity 
new build. It was not until the Electricity Regulation Act, introduced in 
2006, that the necessary powers for the country’s Department of  Energy 
(DoE) (created in 2009 which took over the energy policy function 
from the former Department of  Minerals and Energy) to conduct an 
open planning process for electricity were established. Under the Act, 
responsibility was formally allocated to the energy minister to approve 
the construction of  new generation capacity and what the source of  
that capacity should be. Before an electricity generation project can be 
granted a licence by the country’s electricity regulator, it must align with 
the technological allocations set by the IRP. The IRP also claims to be 
consistent with a carbon emissions constraint of  275 million tonnes of  
carbon dioxide annually after 2024 (DoE 2011: 6).
However, subsequent revisions of  the IRP, in keeping with the requirement 
that the plan be updated every two years have stalled. A second revision 
was released in 2013 for public comment (DoE 2013) but was never 
formally adopted by the government. The main reason attributed to this 
was because the draft advised against the construction of  9.6GW of  new 
nuclear capacity included in the original plan. There are two main reasons 
for this advice: firstly, due to a decline in economic growth and reduced 
energy intensity in the economy, the 2013 draft projected a lower electricity 
demand up until 2030 and by implication a reduced requirement for the 
construction of  new capacity. Secondly, the draft questioned the high 
associated costs of  nuclear technology, stating that ‘the revised demand 
projections suggest that no new nuclear baseload capacity is required until 
after 2025 (and for lower demand not until at earliest 2035)’ (DoE 2013: 8). 
As further discussed in Section 5, the potential nuclear programme is being 
pushed by the presidency and some factions of  Eskom, and is an area of  
high political and economic controversy.
A second IRP draft was released in late 2016 for which a country-wide 
consultation process was held with a closing date for comments of  
early February 2017.7 Key concerns expressed by the renewable 
energy industry and civil society about this document are that it places 
constraints on the uptake of  renewable energy and assumes that 
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the prices of  renewable energy technologies are much higher than 
those reflected in the recent tariffs submitted under RE IPPPP (CSIR 
2017b). By mid-2017, at the time of  writing, the latest draft of  the IRP 
had yet to be finalised. As a result of  such delays, the only valid IRP 
document is now five years out of  date and based on assumptions that 
no longer apply. It has been argued that despite the gains that the first 
IRP represented in terms of  increased transparency in post-apartheid 
energy policymaking, the stalling of  both the 2013 and 2016 versions 
signals a return to highly secretive decision-making, characteristic of  
decision-making in energy under apartheid (Baker et al. 2015). Such 
uncertainty is but one of  various challenges facing the future of  the 
country’s renewable energy sector. Before exploring these challenges in 
greater depth, the emergence of  RE IPPPP is discussed in Section 4.
4 From REFIT to RE IPPPP
The original mechanism to stimulate South Africa’s utility-scale 
renewable energy sector was to have been in the form of  a feed-in 
tariff, referred to as REFIT, which was originally developed in 2007 
by individuals within the electricity regulatory division of  the national 
energy regulator, supported by others from within the Treasury, 
the Department of  Public Enterprises, and the Department of  
Environmental Affairs, in addition to bilateral technical assistance from 
Germany and Denmark (Baker 2017). One of  REFIT’s stated objectives 
was to create a market mechanism that would ‘kick start and stimulate 
the renewable energy industry in South Africa’ in order to meet the 
target of  10,000GWh of  renewable energy by 2013, as set out in the 
2003 Renewable Energy White Paper discussed in Section 3.
A feed-in tariff pays IPPs a fixed price for each unit of  renewable 
electricity that they sell to the grid, which is set at a higher rate than 
the retail price of  electricity generated from conventional resources. In 
comparison, under a competitive bidding system or auction, potential 
project developers bid for a renewable energy contract below a 
certain tariff cap. Because the latter system is more competitive, it has 
become the preferred global model of  renewable energy procurement 
(EY 2014). After a number of  years of  protracted negotiation, 
REFIT was scrapped unexpectedly in August 2011 and replaced by a 
competitive bidding system in the form of  RE IPPPP (Baker 2017).
Crucially, the launch of  RE IPPPP provided the much-needed certainty 
to investors, not least for its 20-year government-backed, local currency-
denominated PPA, which protects project developers from the risks 
posed by a fluctuating rand and from any potential failure of  Eskom 
to pay for the electricity generated. Under RE IPPPP, Eskom’s role 
is reduced to the designated buyer of  power, while project selection 
and evaluation is carried out by the IPP-unit. The IPP-unit was set 
up by National Treasury’s Public Private Partnership unit together 
with foreign technical consultants to deal specifically with RE IPPPP 
in light of  the DoE’s lack of  capacity to manage a renewable energy 
procurement programme (more recent developments in relation to 
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the IPP-unit are discussed in further detail in Section 5). RE IPPPP 
was internationally lauded for its high-quality regulatory framework, 
tough qualification criteria, and strong economic development and 
community ownership requirements, and subsequently created an 
investment climate that quickly became very popular with international 
renewable energy developers, technology suppliers, and engineering and 
construction companies.
A notable feature of  RE IPPPP is its progressive requirements for 
socioeconomic development which align closely with priorities outlined in 
various national plans and documents on growth and industrial policy such 
as the National Development Plan, the New Growth Path and the Green 
Economy Accord. Scoring of  bids is allocated 70 per cent on the tariff 
at which IPPs will sell electricity to Eskom and 30 per cent on economic 
development criteria, which includes factors such as job creation, 
local content requirements, participation of  historically disadvantaged 
individuals, rural development, community ownership, and skills 
development. The socioeconomic development criteria must be met before 
the price submission will be considered with successful bids being the ones 
that meet the requirements at the lowest price. Such requirements are 
particularly significant given South Africa’s high levels of  unemployment, 
socioeconomic, and racial inequality, and a national skills deficit.
RE IPPPP also requires that project companies, most of  which are 
special purpose vehicles set up for the exclusive purposes of  developing, 
operating, and owning the project, have a minimum of  40 per cent 
shareholding by national companies, of  which a minimum of  12 per 
cent to be held by black economic empowerment companies8 and a 
2.5 per cent shareholding by the local community within a 50km radius 
of  the project site.
Such requirements have resulted in some impressive gains. According to 
Green Cape (2017: 21), over 24,000 job years have been created from 
RE IPPPP, including in the phase of  project construction, and operation 
and maintenance of  numerous plants and equipment manufacturing. 
Community shareholders in projects approved under rounds one to 
four of  RE IPPPP are set to benefit from an income of  R29 billion9 
over the 20-year duration of  the projects. A number of  educational 
initiatives have also been set up for the creation of  ‘green technical 
skills’, including at various colleges across the country. For instance, 
the establishment of  the South African Renewable Energy Technology 
Centre (SARETEC) in the Western Cape offers internationally 
accredited courses for wind turbine and solar PV service technicians.
RE IPPPP’s local content requirements which require that a certain 
percentage of  project spend be dedicated to locally procured equipment, 
services, and skills have helped to facilitate the establishment of  a number 
of  manufacturing and assembly plants mainly for wind towers, solar PV 
panels and invertors. The bulk of  investment in this area has thus far gone 
to the Western Cape Province including the Atlantis Special Economic 
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Zone (Green Cape 2017: 36). Given that the local content percentage has 
increased with each round, by round three all wind towers should have 
been manufactured in-country. Studies for the potential of  the localisation 
of  wind solar PV, and CSP industries have been carried out by various 
different departments and/or donors and private sector institutions 
(DTI 2015; Ahlfeldt 2013; SASTELA 2013). This is in addition to the 
approval of  the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act in May 2014 which 
provides financial and other incentives for investment in renewable energy 
manufacturing (DTI 2013). The aim of  an SEZ is to keep as much of  
the value chain process in one place by supporting a larger manufacturer 
that would then allow small, medium and micro enterprises and smaller 
suppliers to input into the value chain through logistics, transport, and 
other services (Baker and Sovacool 2017).
However, despite the positive developments generated by local content 
requirements, delays to the programme discussed in further detail in 
Section 5 have had a knock-on effect on the manufacturing industry. For 
instance, in June 2017 the heavy manufacturing company DCD sold 
its share of  the R536 million DCD wind tower manufacturing plant 
to South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), which 
already owned a 20 per cent share, for a mere R1 (Allix 2017).10 The 
plant has also had to lay off employees. In the solar PV industry, two 
leading inverter manufacturers, Germany’s SMA and AEG, that both 
set up in South Africa in 2014 with the aim of  supplying to RE IPPPP 
projects, shut down in 2016, citing the programme’s delays as the main 
reason why (Hopson 2016). Others, including Trina Solar refrained from 
setting up a manufacturing plant in the first place (Creamer 2015).
A further contributing factor has been the manipulation of  local content 
requirements by some developers, particularly in the case of  solar PV in 
the first three rounds (Baker and Sovacool 2017). Because local content 
is measured in spend, some developers have met the requirements by 
purchasing non-module items such as civil works, grid connections, and 
inverters and importing their modules from abroad (Deign 2016), an act 
that violates the spirit of  the requirements, if  not the letter of. This has 
been exacerbated by the absence of  import duties on solar PV modules 
into South Africa, which tends to give the advantage to imported PV 
modules which are usually cheaper (Mulcahy 2012), despite the pressure 
that South African manufacturers have put on the DTI.
In terms of  ownership of  the country’s emerging renewable energy 
industry, there is also concern that RE IPPPP has privileged large 
international companies over national ones, reflecting the increasing 
global consolidation of  the renewable energy industry. Such companies, 
including global majors such as Mainstream Renewable Power, 
Enel Green Power, Abengoa, Acciona, and Scatec Solar, have had 
sufficient capital to withstand the various delays in the programme’s 
implementation and have been able to submit winning bids with very 
low prices in a process that has become increasingly competitive (Baker 
2015). Some of  the causes of  such delays are now discussed in Section 5.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’ 101–118 | 111
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
5 Key challenges for renewable energy in South Africa
Beyond the uncertainties in electricity planning discussed in Section 3, 
the stability and future development of  the country’s renewable energy 
industry is threatened by a number of  challenges. These include 
severe delays to the programme due to the refusal by Eskom to sign 
37 outstanding PPAs; the downgrading of  Eskom’s investment credit 
rating together with that of  the national economy in June 2017; 
management scandals and allegations of  corruption linked to Eskom, 
itself  part of  broader national political turmoil; and emerging evidence 
of  state capture in relation to the nuclear programme being pushed by 
Eskom and the Presidency (Bhorat et al. 2017).
One key obstacle to the rollout of  utility-scale renewable energy 
in South Africa is the cost of  upgrading the transmission grid and 
substations to absorb growing levels of  renewable generation. As 
RE IPPPP has progressed, grid constraints have become increasingly 
prevalent and there is now very limited capacity for project connection 
in areas with good wind and solar resources (Baker et al. 2015: 38). 
This is particularly the case in the Northern Cape Province where the 
majority of  solar PV and CSP projects are located. Under RE IPPPP, 
Eskom is required to cover the costs of  strengthening the transmission 
network and upgrading substations to connect projects, while IPPs pay 
to connect their projects to the grid. However, as Eskom is not involved 
in project selection, it has been unable to determine grid reinforcement 
needs until the winning projects have been announced and so has not 
been able to provide geographical incentives to IPPs. Consequently, it 
is likely that grid availability will be taken into account in future rounds 
when assessing bid submissions (Green Cape 2017: 27).
A further potential challenge to RE IPPPP is the announcement made 
in May 2017 by the DoE that the IPP-unit is to be incorporated into the 
country’s Central Energy Fund, a state-owned company that currently 
owns PetroSA and the Strategic Fuel Fund (Creamer 2017b). This 
move is significant and unexplained given that the IPP-unit has been 
highly respected as a high-quality, transparent, and secure professional 
body since being established in 2011, because as Eberhard, Kolker 
and Leigland suggest, it ‘did not start out with the level of  mistrust of  
private business that sometimes characterises other government agencies 
in South Africa’ (2014: 9). As discussed in Section 4, while the unit 
functions on behalf  of  the DoE, it sits outside of  formal departmental 
governmental structures. The incorporation of  the unit into the Central 
Energy Fund has been met with caution by industry, not least given the 
fund’s history of  poor governance (Paton 2017).
Most significantly, Eskom has refused to sign PPAs for 37 projects 
approved under RE IPPPP. While round five was to have been 
announced in 2016, by mid-2017 this was yet to happen and no capacity 
has been procured since 2015. Eskom’s resistance to RE IPPPP began to 
be felt in late 2015 when it announced that it would not provide budget 
quotes, which indicate the potential cost for a renewable energy project 
112 | Baker Commercial-Scale Renewable Energy in South Africa and its Progress to Date
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
to connect to the grid. The utility then announced in July 2016 that it 
would not sign any new PPAs with IPPs beyond those selected under 
the expedited round four of  RE IPPPP, and refused to sign a PPA for a 
CSP project approved under round three. Eskom’s refusal to sign PPAs 
is an act that goes beyond its mandate, given that it is the DoE’s role to 
make policy on energy under the 2006 Electricity Regulation Act. The 
move, which represents a clear attempt by the utility to challenge the 
procurement of  further independent power generation, was eventually 
condemned by the Treasury and the DoE in September 2016 (Creamer 
2016). However, nearly a year later the impasse endures, despite a pledge 
by Jacob Zuma in February 2017 in his ‘state of  the nation’ address that 
the PPAs would be signed in April 2017. The utility has not provided 
a formal reason as to why it has refused to sign the PPAs, though it has 
claimed firstly that it will make a loss on having to purchase energy from 
IPPs (SAREC 2017), and secondly that the country’s energy supply has 
stabilised since the most recent round of  load-shedding in 2014/15 and 
therefore additional capacity from renewable energy is unnecessary. In its 
2016 annual report, Eskom stated that the purchase of  electricity from 
IPPs accounts for 18 per cent of  primary energy but contributes only 
4 per cent of  the electricity generated (Eskom 2016: 91).
Such resistance by Eskom takes place within the context of  a long-term 
financial and supply-side crisis within the utility for reasons that are 
entrenched and complex (Baker et al. 2015). The latest symptoms of  
this crisis have resulted in periodic load-shedding since 2006 and led 
to unsustainably high levels of  debt, despite large state bail-outs and 
a loan from the World Bank as a ‘lender of  last resort’ in 2010 for the 
controversial Medupi coal-fired power plant. Eskom’s average electricity 
prices increased by approximately 200 per cent between 2008 and 
2016,11 and current tariff decisions are now the subject of  legal review 
(Baker and Burton, forthcoming). There have also been substantial 
cost overruns in the utility’s new build programme, including in the 
4.8GW Medupi and Kusile coal-fired power plants. For the time being, 
electricity supply has now stabilised, due to reasons that include the 
operationalisation of  the first unit of  the Medupi coal-fired plant; 
the introduction of  renewable energy from IPPs; and perhaps most 
significantly, a decline in economic growth and energy demand from the 
country’s energy-intensive industrial users in recent years.
However, Eskom is still very much in crisis and has been subject to 
repeated scandal over its management, and allegations of  corruption 
and state capture. Firstly, a corruption investigation is taking place into 
the contracts between Eskom’s power stations and their coal suppliers, in 
particular the irregular sale of  the Optimum coal mine (which supplies 
to the Arnot coal-fired power station) by mining giant Glencore to a 
company owned by the Indian Gupta family, which has been found 
to have increasing influence over President Jacob Zuma and his allies. 
Eskom has stated its refusal and/or inability to make information public 
regarding its coal supply contracts and volumes burned by each power 
station (Creamer 2017a). A high-profile investigation into state capture 
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by the country’s Public Protector, published in November 2016, heavily 
implicated the then chief  executive of  Eskom, Brian Molefe. Molefe 
swiftly resigned but in several highly controversial twists was then 
reappointed in early May 2017 and subsequently fired again by the end 
of  the month. In April 2017, Business Leadership South Africa called for 
Eskom to replace its board. In June, the Chairman of  Eskom resigned. 
Such developments contributed to the downgrading of  the country’s 
foreign currency debt to junk status in April 2017 by both S&P Global 
Ratings and Fitch Ratings (Bisseker 2017) while Eskom was subsequently 
downgraded to junk status by all three ratings agencies in June 2017.
Despite this, Eskom, backed by the presidency, seems set to pursue its 
plans for a 9,600MW, state-driven nuclear fleet against all odds: President 
Zuma’s unexpected cabinet shuffle in March 2017 removed finance 
minister Pravin Gordhan because of  his alleged opposition to the nuclear 
programme and installed a new energy minister believed to be in favour 
of  it. The revised nuclear determination of  December 2016 transferred 
nuclear procurement responsibilities from the DoE to Eskom and the 
South African Nuclear Energy Corporation. In a case brought by the 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) Earth Life South Africa and 
SAFCEI in late April 2017, the Western Cape High Court judged that 
the intergovernmental agreements on nuclear cooperation signed in 
2014 between South Africa and five countries were unconstitutional and 
unlawful, particularly in the case of  the agreement signed between Eskom 
and Russia’s state-owned nuclear company Rosatom (Ensor 2017). The 
court further judged that the two determinations released to allow for the 
nuclear procurement process were irrational, illegal, and unconstitutional 
(Creamer 2017b). Despite this ruling, the government has since 
announced that the nuclear procurement programme will start afresh. 
Given the centralised nature of  the technology, it would seem that nuclear 
power would serve to bolster the interests of  a monopoly-controlled 
electricity system whilst marginalising that of  renewable energy.
6 Conclusion
This article has provided an insight into some of  the challenges to what 
was until recently deemed to be a highly successful renewable energy 
programme. Such challenges include resistance to RE IPPPP by the 
country’s monopoly utility Eskom which has refused to sign outstanding 
PPAs; delays to the revision of  the IRP which would provide certainty on 
the allocation of  future electricity generation capacity; the downgrading 
of  both Eskom’s and the country’s investment rating; related allegations of  
state capture and corruption; attempts by the presidency to push through a 
large nuclear fleet; and uncertainty over the ability of  Eskom’s transmission 
grid to integrate increasing levels of  renewable energy generation.
As discussed, ownership and control over South Africa’s electricity 
generation, transmission, and distribution remains complex, contested, 
and political. Decision-making and changes within the country’s 
electricity sector are embedded within complex social, political, 
and economic forces and relationships. Faced with a financial and 
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supply-side crisis and now at junk investment rating, Eskom is now 
challenged by a small but significant programme for renewable energy 
independent power production. Yet due to the utility’s resistance, the 
future of  this programme is stalled, and the IRP that has played such 
a key role in opening possibilities for the development of  renewable 
energy generation is also on hold. Meanwhile, the uncertainty generated 
by Eskom’s crisis and the broader political scandals to which it is 
linked have discouraged potential investors. The rapid development of  
renewable energy markets elsewhere, for instance in Mexico, Argentina, 
Chile, and Morocco, are overtaking South Africa’s original successes.
In parallel, a contested and secretive process for the procurement of  
nuclear power looks subject to continue, despite legal rulings to the 
contrary. Such a programme, if  it goes ahead, would be procured 
and paid for by the state and in turn electricity consumers, but be 
constructed and supplied by a foreign company. What then do such 
developments represent for the future of  RE IPPPP, in addition to 
other structures of  the country’s electricity governance upon which the 
renewable energy programme depends?
While a number of  Eskom’s challenges are undoubtedly technical, 
particularly with regard to connecting growing levels of  renewable 
energy projects to the grid, recent developments highlight the extent to 
which the utility has been able to subvert the procurement of  renewable 
energy. Large-scale and successful deployment of  renewable energy 
threatens Eskom’s existing monopoly and the preferred technologies 
that serve to uphold it: coal and nuclear power. The introduction of  
nuclear power would strengthen Eskom’s monopoly stronghold and the 
paradigm of  large-scale, centralised, and state-owned supply.
The scenario examined here seems to present a dichotomy that pits a 
deeply entrenched, coal-fired, state-controlled monopoly utility at one 
end that seeks to develop nuclear in order to perpetuate its stronghold, 
against an emerging privately generated renewable energy industry 
on the other that is pushing for a shift in infrastructure towards an 
increasingly flexible electricity grid. While such a dichotomy may be 
simplistic, such dynamics illustrate long-standing national tensions as 
discussed in Section 2 over who should govern, generate, and control 
electricity. These tensions are compounded by significant and increasingly 
rapid innovations in the technologies that generate electricity. Indeed, the 
increase in generation from intermittent and variable resources such as 
wind and solar PV requires much greater flexibility of  grid management 
than South Africa’s current model can provide. This raises a key question 
with regard to the ownership and management of  the country’s electricity 
grid, with the continued failure to create an independent transmissions 
operator as a critical factor in this discussion.
Meanwhile, Eskom and related coalitions within the ruling party are 
now subject to increasing scrutiny as the networks of  state capture, 
in which institutions of  electricity governance are deeply embroiled, 
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start to unravel. Will this scrutiny provide the opportunity that the 
renewable energy industry needs to overcome the political, economic, 
and technical obstacles currently blocking its continued development 
and allow it to resume its previous successes in a way that prioritises the 
national interest?
Notes
*  The work for this article was supported by the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) grant number: EP/K011790/1 
(Research Centre on Innovation and Energy Demand) and the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) grant number: ES/N014138/1.
1 At 215.6Mt CO2 emissions in 2015 (Eskom 2016).
2 Approximately US$15.4 billion based on July 2017 exchange rates. 
Note that there are differing reports of  this investment, probably due 
to fluctuating exchange rates between the rand and the dollar. For 
instance, Eberhard and Kåberger (2016) state that US$19 billion was 
invested between 2010 and 2016.
3 Countries that have overtaken it include the middle-income 
economies of  Morocco, now in 14th place and Argentina in 12th.
4 Load-shedding refers to planned interruption of  the electricity supply 
in order to manage supply-side constraints.
5 www.ipp-smallprojects.co.za/.
6 Approximately US$15.4 billion based on July 2017 exchange rates.
7 www.sapvia.co.za/integrated-resource-plan-irp-consultation-
workshop-dates/.
8 Black economic empowerment refers to legislation introduced 
in the post-apartheid era to attempt to address socioeconomic 
marginalisation along racial lines.
9 Approximately US$2.2 billion at July 2017 exchange rates.
10 The wind tower manufacturing plant, which opened in 2014, was 
a joint initiative between the DCD Group, the IDC, and the Coega 
Development Corporation, which manages the Coega industrial 
development zone in which the plant is located.
11 Calculated from Eskom’s figures: www.eskom.co.za/CustomerCare/
TariffsAndCharges/Pages/Tariff_History.aspx.
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The Political Economy of Investment 
in Renewable Electricity in Kenya
Helen Hoka Osiolo, Ana Pueyo and James Gachanja
Abstract Kenya has been hailed as a successful sub-Saharan African country 
in attracting private investment for renewable energy. However, energy 
poverty remains very high, with connectivity rates lower than the average 
for sub-Saharan Africa and poor quality of supply for those connected. 
Several constraints persist to achieve universal access to clean and 
affordable electricity: high system costs, including a deficient transmission 
and distribution infrastructure; low rural demand and inadequate planning 
to meet it; and local opposition to large renewable infrastructure. This 
article considers the political economy of these constraints, explaining 
how they arose, which policies can address them and which actors back or 
oppose these policies. The overarching message is that a prominent state 
role is required to fund the network components of the electricity system 
and to reach the less profitable segments of society, namely the rural poor. 
However, this clashes with a dominant private sector-led narrative in the 
international development community.
Keywords: renewable energy, political economy, Kenya, electricity, 
sub‑Saharan Africa, investment, constraints.
1 Introduction
Kenya is one of  the African countries with the largest share of  
renewables in its generation mix. In 2015, renewables supplied over 
70 per cent of  electricity, mainly from hydropower and geothermal 
plants. Hydropower was the dominant source in the past, like in 
many other African countries, but the government sought to diversify 
supply to improve energy security. Geothermal was the preferred 
technology, because it could generate large quantities of  least‑cost 
base load electricity, which is the type of  electricity that is available 
all the time to meet minimum demand. To harness their vast 
geothermal resources located along the Rift Valley, Kenya put in place 
a long‑term geothermal development programme, largely supported 
by international donors through technical assistance and concessional 
finance. Kenya has subsequently become the largest producer of  
geothermal energy in Africa. Wind has also played an increasing role 
in the generation basket, and the country will soon boast the largest 
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wind power plant in Africa, with the 310MW Lake Turkana wind farm 
currently under construction.
Despite a good track record in attracting private investment for renewable 
energy generation, some problems still persist, which prevent the goal 
of  achieving universal access to clean, reliable, and affordable energy in 
Kenya. Connectivity rates remain lower than the sub‑Saharan African 
average, and reliability is low for those connected outside of  the cities, 
mainly as a result of  an insufficient transmission and distribution network.
Many constraints prevail to increase investment in renewable energy 
that improves access to affordable, clean, and reliable electricity 
in Kenya, but some are more important than others. In a separate 
publication (Pueyo et al. 2017), we applied the new Green Investment 
Diagnostics methodology to identify the most binding constraints that if  
tackled could deliver the biggest ‘bang for the buck’ of  the policymaker. 
We followed a systematic approach using a decision tree analysis 
drawing from the original growth diagnostics approach (Hausmann, 
Rodrik and Velasco 2004) and building evidence through the collection 
of  indicators and interviews with key stakeholders from the government, 
project developers, technical advisers, sectoral associations, and financial 
institutions. Three key constraints preventing further investment in 
renewables came up strongly from our analysis: low demand and 
inability to pay in rural areas; high system costs due to a lack of  
networking infrastructure and an inflexible generation mix; and serious 
problems of  social acceptance and access to land.
Identifying the most important constraints is essential, but not sufficient. 
To have their predicted effect, policies need to be implemented, and 
this is not a technical question, but a matter of  political economy. Our 
political economy analysis looks at the underlying interests behind 
each constraint, the most promising policies to address them, and the 
actors who may block or support suitable policies. For our analysis we 
interviewed ten key stakeholders from the Kenyan energy sector.1 We 
posed two questions: how did each of  our identified constraints come to 
be? And who is driving or opposing policies to address it? The political 
economy analysis of  constraints to RE investment required first a 
record of  the policies that exist, and the development of  an inventory of  
stakeholders or actors who have an influence on the targets and policies 
to improve the investment environment for renewable energy.
These are included in Section 2. Sections 3, 4, and 5 analyse each of  
the key constraints to investment in Kenya and the related policies that 
could solve them. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of  the actors 
that support or oppose the policies required and the political alliances 
that could solve the impasse.
2 Policy and stakeholder mapping for renewable energy in Kenya
The key policy documents for Kenya’s energy sector are the 
Sessional Paper No. 4 of  2004 (Government of  Kenya 2004) and the 
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Energy Act No. 12 of  2006. They set up the institutional framework 
of  the power sector after a process of  liberalisation that started in the 
mid‑1990s. These have been recently reviewed through the Energy 
Bill 2015, to align them to the national development strategy set out in 
Vision 2030 (Government of  Kenya 2007) and the new Constitution of  
2010, which established a devolved government system.
The 2006 Energy Act succeeded the Electric Power Act No. 11 of  
1997. It provided for the establishment of  a number of  unbundled 
organisations evolving from the previous centralised, vertically integrated 
state utility. The public utility Kengen jointly with private independent 
power producers (IPPs) would undertake generation, whereas the natural 
monopolies of  transmission and distribution would be separated into 
two state‑owned enterprises: the transmission company KETRACO 
and the distribution company Kenya Power. While KETRACO is fully 
owned by the Government of  Kenya, Kenya Power is listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange, with the government holding 50.1 per cent of  
shares. The 2006 Energy Act also established the Rural Electrification 
Agency (REA), the Geothermal Development Corporation (GDC), 
the independent regulator Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) and 
the Energy Tribunal that would hear appeals from decisions of  the 
ERC. The GDC is fully owned by the state, and carries geothermal 
exploration, drilling, and sale of  steam to generators. The REA 
implements the (subsidised) rural electrification programme. At the top 
of  this institutional framework, the Ministry of  Energy and Petroleum 
(MoEP) defines energy policy and is responsible for overall planning.
The Energy Bill 2015 considers new challenges and opportunities for 
the energy sector, arising from the discovery of  domestic fossil fuels 
and the political decentralisation of  the country. The new Energy 
Bill defines the distribution of  functions between national and county 
governments. Functions of  county governments include the development 
of  a county energy plan; the provision of  land and rights of  way for 
energy infrastructure; the facilitation of  energy demand by planning 
for industrial parks and other energy‑consuming activities; and the 
enforcement provisions for efficient use of  energy and its conservation.
Other policies and regulations relevant for the renewable energy sector 
include the Least Cost Power Development Plans (LCPDPs), the Feed‑in 
Tariff (FiT) policy and the Energy Local Content Regulations. The 
LCPDPs are prepared by the MoEP through inter‑ministerial and 
industry consultations and with support from international consultancies. 
They include electricity demand forecasts, an assessment of  energy 
resources, and expansion plans for generation and transmission capacity. 
They provide recommendations on a range of  investment options, 
mainly taking into account their cost through the life cycle of  projects, 
measured through the levelised cost of  electricity (LCOE).
The Government of  Kenya introduced feed-in tariffs in 2008 (revised in 
2010 and 2012) to promote private investment in renewable energy by 
122 | Osiolo et al. The Political Economy of Investment in Renewable Electricity in Kenya
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
providing a secure long‑term price and guaranteed access to the grid. 
The tariffs apply to grid-connected plants and are valid for a 20-year 
period from the beginning of  the power purchasing agreement (PPA), 
with approval of  the PPAs granted by the ERC. The FiT policy provides 
electricity purchase guarantees by the main power utility KPLC and 
includes all power generation categories.
The 2014 Energy Local Content Regulations require that companies 
operating in the energy sector submit a local content plan when 
applying for a licence. The local content plan would need to give first 
consideration to Kenyan services, products, and employees and commit 
to train Kenyans on the job. They also set minimum local content 
requirements for energy operations in the country, with levels increasing 
from the start of  the project to 75 per cent of  the duration of  the 
project to reach 80 per cent of  goods and services, 70–80 per cent of  
management and technical core staff, and 100 per cent of  other staff.
We now discuss the roles of  different stakeholders in the power sector. 
In addition to the national government stakeholders mentioned when 
describing the 2006 Energy Act, international governments, operating 
through their development agencies, play a significant role in Kenya’s 
power sector. Donors are responsible for funding a large share of  
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure and are able to 
influence energy policy through their technical advisers and the conditions 
set for concessional finance. The MoEP chairs a donor coordination 
group to define support priorities. Some examples of  contributions by 
donors to Kenya’s energy sector are as follows (Tierney et al. 2011):
 l The World Bank funded the Energy Sector Reform in 1997 and 
more recently the Kenya Electricity Expansion Project that includes 
projects in generation, transmission, and distribution.
 l Japan has funded several power generation plants, including 
hydropower, diesel generation, and geothermal.
 l France has funded transmission lines between Mombasa and Nairobi 
and grid extension in rural areas.
 l Germany has provided equipment for the Olkaria geothermal power 
plant.
 l Spain has funded a 430km transmission line for the Lake Turkana 
wind power plant, as well as rural electrification projects.
 l The United Kingdom (through the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation) funded a share of  the thermal Tsavo power plant 
and, lately through the Department for International Development 
(DFID), has provided funds for project preparation of  green 
mini‑grids and leveraging private investment.
 l The African Development Bank (AfDB) has funded a transmission 
system improvement project as well as regional interconnections with 
Uganda and Ethiopia.
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Table 1 Kenya renewable energy sector stakeholders map
Stakeholder/arenas International National Local/county
Government World Bank
African Development Bank 
(AfDB)
East Africa Power Pool (EAPP)
Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA)
Department for International 
Development of the UK (DFID)
Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA)
US Agency for International 
Development (USAID)
French Development Agency 
(AFD)
European Commission 
International Cooperation and 
Development (DG DEVCO)
Power Africa
European Investment Bank (EIB)
Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum (MoEP)
Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources (MoENR)
The National Treasury (TNT)
Ministry of Devolution and 
Planning (MoDP)
Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
(MoWI)
Rural Electrification Agency 
(REA)
Energy Regulatory Commission 
(ERC)
Kenya Investment Authority 
(KENINVEST)
County government
County ministries of energy
Business (both private 
and state-owned)
Commercial banks
Equity investors (i.e. Aldwych 
International)
International IPPs (i.e. Lake 
Turkana Wind Power, Thika, 
Rabai, Orpower, Tsavo)
Engineering, procurement, and 
construction (EPC) contractors
RE technology manufacturers
Private mini-grid developers 
(e.g. Powerhive, Powergen, 
SteamaCo)
Private sellers of solar home 
systems (SHS) (e.g. BBOX, 
M-KOPA)
KENGEN
KETRACO
GDC
Kenya Power
KEREA
KAM
KEPSA
Local equity investors
Local IPPs
Kenya Bankers’ Association
Civil society WWF
CAFOD
Practical Action
International universities
Nature Kenya
Consumer Federation of Kenya 
(COFEK)
National education institutions 
(e.g. Stanmore University, 
University of Nairobi)
Residential consumers
Agricultural cooperatives
Pastoral groups
Women’s groups
Youth groups
Source Authors’ own.
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The private sector is another important player in Kenya’s power 
sector. As of  May 2016, there were 11 IPPs in Kenya, including 
Iberafrica, Tsavo, OrPower 4, Rabai, Thika, Imenti, Power Technology 
Solutions, Gulf, Triumph, Mumias, and Aggreko (as emergency power 
producer). Collectively, they accounted for about one third of  the 
country’s installed capacity, predominantly from thermal but also from 
renewable sources: geothermal, small hydro and bagasse. Further IPP 
generation projects are in the pipeline, most notably in the wind sector. 
IPPs are dominated by foreign investors, due to a lack of  domestic 
equity for large infrastructure projects (Pueyo et al. 2017). At a smaller 
scale, several private companies operate in the off-grid market, either 
selling solar products (solar home systems or solar lanterns) or setting 
up mini‑grids. Kenya is in fact the African country with the largest 
number of  solar home systems installed as well as the largest number of  
enterprises providing ‘pay‑as‑you‑go’ solar power (REN21 2016).
The local private sector in the renewable energy sector is represented by 
the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), the Kenya Association of  
Manufacturers (KAM), and the Kenya Renewable Energy Association 
(KEREA). Whereas KEREA mainly represents the small‑scale solar 
industry, KEPSA and KAM represent a broader range of  larger and 
more powerful businesses. Contradictions arise in these groups between 
businesses involved in the RE generation sector, seeking higher tariffs for 
renewable energy, and businesses as electricity consumers putting pressure 
on the government to further reduce electricity prices (Newell et al. 2014).
The Kenyan electricity system is skewed towards industrial and urban 
consumers. Large commercial and industrial customers represent 
54 per cent of  the national electricity sales but only 0.1 per cent of  the 
total connections. On the other side, domestic consumers represent 90 per 
cent of  the connections but only 25 per cent of  the sales of  electricity. 
Geographically, 52 per cent of  electricity sales are in the Nairobi area 
(Kenya Power 2014). Industrial and urban consumers are therefore the most 
powerful actors in pressuring the government to keep electricity tariffs low.
Finally, civil society is highly influential in Kenya and is considered 
one of  ‘Africa’s bravest and most vocal’, contributing for example 
to facilitating justice and peaceful coexistence after the 2007–08 
post‑election violence (Allison 2016). Numerous non‑governmental 
organisations (NGOs) operate in the country, pursuing environmental 
protection and poverty reduction. National and international 
universities are also involved in the renewable energy (RE) sector as 
developers of  off-grid generation projects. All these stakeholders are 
presented in Table 1, classified according to their sector (public, private, 
civil society) and geographic reach (national, international, local).
3 Low rural demand and inappropriate planning
3.1 Constraints
In this section, we look more in depth at one of  the key constraints to 
further investment in renewables in Kenya identified in Pueyo et al. (2017). 
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It refers to low rural demand and an inadequate rural electrification 
model that favours grid extension and large centralised generation.
Low levels of  demand are due to high poverty rates (higher than the average 
in sub‑Saharan Africa) and a lack of  productive uses. According to data from 
a private company operating mini‑grids in the country, the average monthly 
electricity consumption of  their rural consumers is just 5KWh, compared 
to more than 200KWh in Nairobi. Most households do not have sufficient 
disposable income to acquire modern electrical appliances and use electricity 
for basic lighting and powering radios and TVs.2
The political origins of  rural poverty draw on one side from 
marginalisation, or skewed allocation of  resources for development. In 
Kenya, the regions with political representation in government tend to 
draw more economic benefits as they are prioritised for development plans. 
Development efforts have been concentrated in the past in the capital cities 
and a number of  larger towns following closely the Mombasa–Kisumu 
railway network and its branches. Kenya’s grid extension map is a clear 
pointer of  how resources have been allocated historically. On the other 
side, Kenya’s rural lands are generally unproductive, with some 80 per 
cent of  the territory considered arid or semi‑arid and few mineral deposits 
(Barnett 2016). Traditionally, these unproductive regions have been treated 
with less priority by the political class.
The political preference for a rural electrification model based on 
centralised power generation and grid extension arises as Kenyan 
politicians do not consider decentralised solar power as ‘total 
electricity’,3 due to its lower capacity as compared to grid power. Several 
rural household surveys in Africa also show a higher willingness to pay 
for grid electricity than for off-grid solutions, even when consumption 
levels are low (Peters and Sievert 2016). Accordingly, the current 
president has supported wholeheartedly the development of  large‑scale 
geothermal power, as it can provide baseload power at very low costs. 
This allocation of  priorities has displaced funds for other renewable 
energy technologies, especially as donors seek to be aligned with the 
country’s development strategy.
Customers served by Kenya Power through the grid or mini‑grids 
benefit from cross-subsidies for consumption tariffs, but must still pay 
a high fee to cover the costs of  connection. This keeps connection 
rates low even for those households within reach of  the grid (Lee et al. 
2016). Grid extension to rural areas that are not able to pay for it places 
a heavy financial burden on Kenya’s distribution utility and creates 
tension between the goals of  universal access to electricity and financial 
sustainability of  the power supply system.
Private off-grid alternatives providing solar home systems or solar 
lanterns through pay‑as‑you‑go business models have been very 
successful in addressing upfront capital barriers. In this case, power 
suppliers also become financiers of  the final consumers through a model 
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in which they pay for the capital cost of  systems and customers pay back 
in instalments. Access to working capital is then essential for suppliers, 
but it is expensive and hard to get in risky markets, which inevitably 
increases the price for final consumers.
Solar mini‑grids with higher installed capacities allow a wider diversity 
of  electricity uses, comparable to those provided by the national grid. 
However, when they are not subsidised, they are considered too expensive 
for most of  the rural population and can only target relatively wealthy 
households and commercial establishments (Carbon Africa et al. 2015). 
Besides, they confront the risk of  being crowded out by the cheaper tariffs 
of  the national grid if  it reaches a village before mini‑grid operators 
are able to get a return on their investment. There has been a lot of  
uncertainty about when the grid would be expected to arrive to different 
regions in Kenya and what would be the fate of  private mini‑grids.
3.2 Policies to address low demand constraints
Three policies could contribute to address the mismatch between low 
electricity demand in rural areas and a rural electrification model 
based on grid extension, which requires a minimum consumption to be 
financially sustainable:
1 Increasing rural demand through integrated development 
programmes that enhance the productive potential of  rural areas;
2 Adapting supply alternatives to the low rural demand through 
integrated planning of  grid extension and off-grid solutions;
3 Increasing the ability to pay of  poor rural consumers through subsidies.
First, we discuss development programmes to increase demand for 
electricity ahead or in parallel to electrification. The imbalance 
between urban and rural areas has long been recognised in Kenya. 
The development plan of  1965–70 targeted sectoral development in 
rural areas to address this problem. However, redistribution goals were 
not realised as interventions targeted the areas with the best productive 
potential. The more recent Vision 2030 is currently implementing 
Medium Term Plan II (2013 to 2017) in order to deliver accelerated 
and inclusive economic growth, higher living standards, better 
education and health care, increased job creation especially for the 
youth, commercialised agriculture, an improved manufacturing sector, 
and more diversified exports (Government of  Kenya 2007).
Secondly, on integrated planning, the current generation and 
transmission master plan (2015–35) highlights the importance of  off-grid 
electrification in rural areas to supplement the national grid while 
progressing towards universal electrification (Lahmeyer International 
2016). Several donor initiatives also point at the increasing importance 
of  mini-grids for electrification, such as the proposed World Bank Kenya 
Off-Grid Solar Access for Underserved Communities, or DFID’s green 
mini‑grids facility. The MoEP has commissioned a study to inform 
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mini‑grid regulations and business models for the private sector. This 
study develops a clear framework for the obligations of  Kenya Power 
when the grid reaches a village with a private mini‑grid.4 The ministry 
is also developing a national electrification strategy where geo-spatial 
mapping will be used to inform areas, resources, and strategies for 
electrification by grid, mini-grid, and any other distributed energy. An 
additional trend towards planning from the bottom‑up comes from the 
2015 Energy Bill that requires each county to draw up its energy plan. 
This will require closer collaboration between national and county 
governments, as well as capacity building at the county level. However, 
some stakeholders are critical of  the benefits of  devolution for energy 
planning, citing that it creates a new layer of  transaction costs for 
investors and can further delay projects due to competition for political 
power between Members of  Parliament (MPs) and county governments.5
Thirdly, on the introduction of  subsidies for poor consumers, there are 
three types of  subsidies commonly used to address the electrification 
gap: subsidies to cover capital costs of  grid extension or off-grid systems; 
subsidies to cover connection costs; and cross-subsidies, where lower tariffs 
for some particular types of  consumers are financed by increasing charges 
to other customers or regions (World Bank 2010). Kenya is currently using 
all three types. The capital costs of  grid extension are usually financed 
with donor grants or concessional loans. Several programmes are in 
place to cover or finance the connection costs of  the poor. For example, 
the Last Mile Connectivity project, jointly funded by the World Bank, 
subsidises connections for households within reach of  the grid, mainly 
in urban slums. Kenya Power also provides credit to potential customers 
who require financing to pay for their connection fees. Cross-subsidies 
are in place through a lifeline tariff for low consumption households of  
up to 50KWh per month, and a uniform tariff policy through which 
urban consumers effectively subsidise the more expensive to reach rural 
consumers. However, given the very low rural electrification rate, the 
scale of  this transfer is very low. Cross‑subsidies have in fact proved to be 
very effective in financing rural electrification in middle-income countries 
that had reached a critical mass of  urban connections. However, in much 
of  sub‑Saharan Africa, and Kenya in particular, providing rural access 
through cross‑subsidies would involve highly contested price increases for 
urban and industrial consumers.
Donors are increasingly supporting the idea of  a market‑led, unsubsidised 
market for solar photovoltaic (PV) and this seems corroborated by the 
success of  the Kenyan solar PV market. However, this ‘unsubsidised’ 
market has relied heavily on donor support to provide seed capital for 
private entrepreneurs, to enable learning and to create markets (Ockwell 
and Byrne 2016). This private sector‑led narrative has ‘ironically been a 
powerful tool to attract resources from donors to subsidise development 
that has supported the activities of  private sector actors’ (ibid.: 73).
We find, therefore, that both the subsidies-led and market-led approaches 
for the provision of  electricity to the poor in Kenya depend heavily on 
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donor support. However, the dominance of  one model over the other 
results in a very different distribution of  benefits. Subsidy-based approaches 
confer more power to the national utility and hence are prone to lobbying 
and rent-seeking. Profit-driven approaches could give opportunities for 
certain actors to gain excessive rents at the expense of  the poorest. This is 
already the case in Kenya, where some rural consumers can pay ten times 
the national tariff for electricity supplied by private mini-grids (Pueyo 2015).
4 High system costs
4.1 Constraints
The second constraint we look at in more detail refers to high system 
costs, due to transmission and distribution infrastructure needs and to 
the balancing costs of  intermittent renewables. Kenya has long suffered 
from a weak power transmission and distribution infrastructure, due to 
insufficient investments in upgrading the system (Sessional Paper 4 on 
Energy 2004, Government of  Kenya 2004). A large share of  system 
losses, outages, and voltage fluctuations are due to the poor state of  
the distribution network (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013). Besides, Kenya’s 
electrical network faces new challenges, including the long distance 
between some renewable energy generation resources and demand 
centres; the goal of  universal electrification; and the growing share of  
intermittent generation, mainly from wind power plants (Lahmeyer 
International 2016). All these are likely to increase costs for final 
consumers.
We discuss firstly the need to invest in transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. The responsibility for developing the national grid 
lies with the government. Investment needs are detailed in a 20‑year 
Power Generation and Distribution Master Plan, which is periodically 
updated. The power evacuation plans are informed by the Least Cost 
Power Development Plan (LCPDP) which defines the generation 
projects using a long‑term trajectory.
After years of  neglect, Kenya’s grid is currently undergoing a major 
expansion, driven by demand growth and the increasing importance 
of  energy for international donors. Funding for new transmission 
and distribution capacity comes from three sources: retained earnings 
of  the transmission and distribution utilities; the national budget; 
and long‑term loans at concessional rates, mainly from international 
development banks.
Transmission and distribution charges are calculated and approved by 
the ERC on the basis of  performance targets (2004 Sessional Paper 
on Energy, Government of  Kenya 2004). However, most transmission 
projects utilise treasury and external funding, with only one transmission 
line funded internally by KETRACO.6 The government’s funding of  
transmission projects usually focus on local costs, such as the acquisition 
of  wayleaves (right of  way for transmission lines), land for substations, 
and consultancy costs, whereas external partners fund infrastructure 
costs. The national budget has traditionally marginalised investments in 
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the country’s electricity network, as opposed to other, more visible items 
in the infrastructure budget line, mainly roads.7 However, the grid is 
receiving increased internal and external political support. For example, 
the African Development Bank (AfDB), the French Development 
Agency (AFD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are behind 
the Last Mile Connectivity Project. The World Bank has financed 
an informal settlements electrification programme and the Kenya 
Electricity Modernisation Project (jointly with AFD), that improved the 
efficiency of  the distribution network. Other donors, particularly the 
UK, are increasingly focusing their support on private sector-led off-grid 
alternatives.
The second element increasing system costs is the increased penetration 
of  variable renewables, mainly wind. However, another article in this 
IDS Bulletin, by Edwards, Dent and Wade, demonstrates that the large 
wind projects currently being built in Kenya are likely to contribute 
significantly to generation adequacy of  the system, thanks to the 
complementarity between the wind resource and demand, and between 
wind and hydro resources. In any case, large‑scale, remote intermittent 
renewable generation can carry significant risks for the country, as 
exemplified by the 310MW Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) plant. 
Two particular clauses in the PPA signed in August 2014 between the 
project owners and the off-taker, Kenya Power,8 place a strong burden 
on the Kenyan counterparty. First, a monthly fine to be paid to the 
owners of  the project in case transmission lines are not completed in 
time (Standard Digital 2017). Second, a ‘take‑or‑pay’ clause committing 
Kenya Power to purchase all the power generated by the wind power 
plant. This is problematic because wind power may be generated at 
times when demand in Kenya is low (e.g. at night) and when there 
is not enough transmission capacity. To honour this clause, Kenya 
Power has ring‑fenced an account funded through higher power bills 
for consumers. This account, managed by the Treasury and the ERC, 
is considered crucial for maintaining Kenya’s profile as a renewable 
investment destination (Business Daily 2017).
The transmission line for the LTWP is now years late, after severe 
delays to ensure wayleaves and financial problems of  the EPC 
contractor (ESI Africa 2017). The government therefore faces the 
prospect of  having to pay a large fine to the project owners. Whereas 
PPAs aim at placing the risk on the counterparty more able to deal with 
it, it is questionable that a country with high levels of  poverty and very 
low electrification rates should transfer to consumers the cost of  a risky 
private investment decision.
4.2 Policies to address high system costs
Several policies and measures could address the system constraints 
previously identified:
 l Prioritise transmission and distribution infrastructure in the national 
budget, to address chronic underinvestment;
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 l Consider transmission and distribution (T&D) risks in new RE 
contracts, to limit the exposure of  the national utility to these risks;
 l Introduce flexibility in the system, to address the intermittency of  
wind and solar generation;
 l Increase capabilities to manage the increasing shares of  intermittent 
generation in the system.
The first measure proposed involves prioritising transmission and 
distribution infrastructure over other infrastructure‑related projects. 
Our interview with a representative from KETRACO reveals that 
the background of  key officials at the MoEP has an influence on 
the types of  energy infrastructure that get prioritised. For example, 
the appointment of  a Principal Secretary (PS) at the MoEP with 
an engineering background has played a part in recent increased 
investments in the transmission grid as compared to the previous PS, 
who was an economist.9 KETRACO assesses the grid reinforcements 
that are required and prepares a concept note channelled via the 
MoEP for cabinet approval, after which development funding is sought 
alongside treasury funding. The PS then acts as the gatekeeper for all 
investment demands of  the state energy agencies.10
The second measure proposed requires that the selection of  sites for the 
location of  renewable energy generation takes into account the risks 
related to T&D infrastructure. For example, transmission charges to 
generators should be location-specific, instead of  the typical uniform 
rate to all network users. Locational transmission charges send the right 
economic signals to the market players, enabling the market to operate 
properly with respect to losses and possible grid connection as well as 
in the long term, encouraging future players to choose their locations 
accordingly. Nodal prices, defined as the price paid or received for the 
energy consumed or generated by a growth in demand, are commonly 
used in South American countries with long transmission distances such 
as Chile, Argentina, and Peru. Single pricing is the most commonly used 
approach in the world, but it is inefficient when the location of  power 
generation plants has a significant impact on network costs, like in the case 
of  renewable megaprojects located far from demand (Pérez‑Arriaga 2013).
The government could also de‑risk sites before power generation 
plants are procured, by building transmission lines before the plants 
are built. In this case, a centralised generation and transmission 
plan would define the optimal siting of  generation plants taking 
into account the transmission costs. The selected sites would then 
be opened to public tender or renewable energy auctions, once the 
transmission infrastructure is in place. This would delay cost recovery 
for transmission infrastructure, which could be addressed through grace 
periods in the financing conditions of  external donors. Some additional 
policies could be used to incentivise investors to site at convenient places 
from the transmission network viewpoint.
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The third measure involves introducing further flexibility to the Kenyan 
system by, for example, increasing reserve capacity from hydro, gas, 
medium speed diesel, or flexible interconnections with neighbouring 
countries. A flexible interconnection with Ethiopia providing access 
to their large hydropower generation would be a low‑cost, low‑carbon 
option to provide flexibility to the Kenyan system. However, dependence 
on electricity generated in another country has political implications, 
‘providing one country with political power over another, involving 
countries in each other’s internal affairs, creating opportunities for 
corruption, creating political costs in protecting the line, and creating 
political costs in the process of  tariff rationalisation’ (Barnett 2014: 19).
The final measure proposed involves capacity building for the system 
operator to be able to balance a system with a high penetration of  
renewables. Some programmes are in place to deal with this, such as 
Power Africa’s Grid Management Support Programme (GMSP).11 
The government has also agreed on local content regulations for 
energy projects to enhance local capabilities. However, a key element 
is learning‑by‑doing, which requires time and the gradual building 
of  renewable energy capacity. The sudden increase in intermittent 
generation from nearly negligible to around 15 per cent of  capacity with 
the LTWP project will make this hard for the Kenyan system operator.
5 Social acceptance and access to land
5.1 Constraints
We finally focus on social acceptance issues, as they have proved to be the 
most important stumbling block for several renewable energy projects. For 
example, Olkaria geothermal plants faced court cases and had to disburse 
significant amounts in resettlement programmes for the local population. 
Kinangop wind power plant, which would have been the first private 
wind power plant using FiT had to be abandoned after local protests 
caused serious disruptions. The LTWP has also faced a court case about 
illegal land acquisition and has experienced significant delays due to the 
difficulty in obtaining wayleaves for a transmission line. The delay may be 
costly for the Kenyan government, as it is liable to compensate developers 
for the power they cannot sell once the plant is ready to start operations.
Social acceptance is intrinsically related to access to land, as the local 
population contests the right of  private and government developers 
to use the land where they live or work. Issues of  compensation and 
consultation are further complicated when the current users of  the 
land do not hold formal titles, as is often the case in Kenya. The lack of  
clarity over land rights also creates the possibility of  rent‑seeking from 
local communities seeking compensation for land not used by them.
Previous research suggests that communities are more favourable to 
projects when they are given full information about their costs and 
benefits, when benefit-sharing mechanisms are in place, and when 
they are involved in consultation and decision‑making (Wüstenhagen, 
Wolsink and Bürer 2007).
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Our research in Kenya shows that the underlying causes for the 
problems of  social acceptance and access to land are:
 l Lack of  clarity about land value, land property rights, and the land 
acquisition process;
 l Imbalance between the costs and benefits for local communities 
(where infrastructure is located), urban residents (getting the service), 
and investors (profiting from it);
 l Lack of  clarity about consultation and compensation processes;
 l Interference of  local politicians seeking political or financial gain 
from the projects.
We discuss each of  these causes in more detail, starting with access to 
land. There are three land ownership categories in Kenya: private land, 
public land, and community land.12 Community land poses the greatest 
challenge for land acquisition, because it is not clear who holds rights 
over it. Public land on the other hand is not readily available and is 
often governed under conservation and environmental legislation that 
limits its development. There are also limitations to purchase private 
land, as foreign companies are not allowed to buy agricultural land in 
Kenya. Private investors can get around this limitation by forming a joint 
company with locals, but this introduces additional risks.13 Generally, 
purchasing land is much harder than gaining the right to use the land for 
a defined purpose and timeframe through a leasing contract.14
The process of  accessing land is mainly guided by the Constitution 
and the Land Act 2012. After the new 2010 Constitution, the devolved 
government holds public land in trust on behalf  of  the residents, and 
the national utilities have to apply to the National Land Commission 
for approval of  valuation of  land as quoted in the Land Act 2012. Such 
valuation is advertised for any public objections and if  protested, may lead 
the process into re‑valuation.15 By introducing a new layer of  government 
for land acquisition transactions, the Constitution has increased transaction 
costs and timeframes for project development and implementation.16 An 
additional problem related to land acquisition comes from the lack of  
protection against speculation with land prices. When landowners and 
communities realise that the land is sought for use in electricity generation, 
prices escalate. Middlemen and political brokers insist on negotiating the 
price with land buyers and can use a number of  tactics to increase the 
price, such as encouraging locals to settle in the proposed sites before or 
even after the transaction is completed, and demanding compensation.17 
Land cartels are also a known phenomenon, where landowners collude to 
increase prices for wayleaves and generation project sites.18
The second issue is the imbalance between the costs for local 
communities where infrastructures are placed and the benefits for the 
population getting electricity. Project developers may put in place social 
responsibility programmes including schools, new houses, or other social 
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services, or also give monetary compensation, but demands from local 
communities often exceed what project developers are ready to offer.19 
Another source of  grievance is the arrival of  outsiders to work on the 
projects and the lack of  jobs for the local population. In this respect, 
project developers claim that locals lack the necessary qualifications to 
carry out the job to an acceptable standard.20
The third issue is the lack of  clear consultation and compensation 
guidelines. Project developers find it difficult to engage meaningfully 
with communities. They often struggle to differentiate legitimate 
from illegitimate demands for compensation and there has been no 
guidance on the acceptable level of  this compensation. Speculation, 
encroachment, and settlement on lands demarcated for energy projects 
can sharply increase the cost of  compensation for land since the 
origination of  the project.21 Several interviewees indicated that early 
consultations with local project stakeholders are a key element of  
success. When local communities and politicians are given the chance 
to provide inputs to the design of  the project they are more likely to 
accept it later on. The LTWP provides an example of  successful early 
consultation with environmentalists and the local population, which 
led to a change of  location from close to Lake Turkana to Marsabit, to 
minimise damage to local birds.22 On the other hand, environmentalists 
were not successful in deterring geothermal exploration around Hells 
Gate National Park, host to globally endangered species.
The final issue is the involvement of  local politicians for political or 
financial gain from RE projects. The 2010 Constitution has introduced 
a new layer of  political competition, and many expectations from 
locals about what the county administration can achieve for them. 
For example, with devolution came expectations that counties would 
get free electricity for their citizens.23 The county administration can 
demand this, as well as jobs or shares in RE companies, and influence 
the acceptability of  a project by locals if  these are not granted.24 The 
fate of  Kinangop reflects the consequences of  partnering with the 
‘wrong’ politicians. In this case, project developers partnered with 
an ex‑MP, who was a competitor of  the local MP. Fearing that the 
success of  the project would be a political gain for his competitor, 
the local MP mobilised community members to demonstrate against 
the project. Fake claims were spread about the project, including 
links between wind energy and infertility and unbearable noise levels. 
Demands for compensation and protests escalated until the project had 
to be abandoned. Kinangop is now seeking compensation from the 
government for the costs it incurred in project preparation.
5.2 Policies to address social opposition
The four constraints described previously can be addressed through four 
types of  policies. First, land use policies that clarify who holds property 
rights for the land and who can purchase it; second, clear consultation 
and compensation guidelines that reduce uncertainty for both investors 
and communities; third, active participation of  communities in 
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management processes; and finally, anti-corruption measures to limit 
the opportunities for politicians to gain personally from projects.
Firstly, Kenya has traditionally operated without a clearly defined land 
use policy, with many uncoordinated institutions and pieces of  legislation 
dealing with land use management. The government is currently 
developing a draft national land use policy that sets a common framework 
for the optimal utilisation of  land resources, taking into account the goals 
of  productivity and sustainability. Additionally, to reduce uncertainty 
around communal land, the recent Community Land Act 2016 provides 
for recognition and protection of  community land rights. It requires 
that community lands are mapped, planned, and registered, making it 
simple for communities to apply for formal land titles without having to 
register as a legal entity. It also sets that all members of  the community 
are allowed to benefit from it and that decision-making power with regard 
to the land is vested in a community assembly. County governments will 
hold in trust all unregistered community land on behalf  of  the respective 
communities. There are, however, two key challenges with this legislation: 
first, the low quorum required for decision-making in communities could 
be abused by elites and marginalise a large section of  those communities. 
Second, the law is not clear on how to fairly allocate rights over land used 
by several communities.
Secondly, progress is also being made with regard to clearer consultation 
guidelines. County public participation guidelines initiated by the 
Ministry of  Devolution and Planning inform public participation 
practice in county governments, in line with the County Government 
Act 2012. They set the approach to actively engage the public in 
policymaking, planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring, and 
evaluation. However, these do not contemplate consultations by private 
investors. Private investors often follow international standards of  social 
consultation that require free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) from 
indigenous communities. The most widely followed standards are set 
by the International Financial Corporation (IFC) and the Equator 
Principles25 and are required by multilateral development banks and 
export credit agencies as a precondition for funding.
Two recent policies aim at providing further clarity on compensation 
and land prices. The Amended 2016 Land Act introduces a bill that sets 
a cap on compensations required for the use of  land for public purposes 
and limits the power held by property owners in this respect. The 
amendment also prohibits unlawful occupation of  private, community, 
or public land and sets a procedure for eviction. On the other hand, 
the National Land Value Index (amendment) Bill 2016 seeks to create 
a national reference point for land values, which would help the 
government, investors, and landowners negotiate compensation and 
resist speculation. The bill also proposes that once land is officially taken 
and funds committed by the National Land Commission, development 
cannot be stopped by any court. Landowners can receive a monetary 
compensation, land swaps, or government bonds in return.
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The previously mentioned local content regulations seek further 
community involvement, requiring that energy projects employ and train 
national Kenyans. However, there are no requirements that beneficiaries 
are from the local communities where the projects are located.
In spite of  these recent developments, Kenya still lacks an explicit 
policy framework that details benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSMs) and 
community participation in management processes, both considered 
essential in the literature on the social acceptance of  renewables 
(Hammami, Chtourou and Triki 2015). Compensation for communities 
should be based on independent analyses showing the distribution of  
costs and benefits among the different interest groups. Some frequently 
used BSMs include sharing revenues with the local community, creating 
local jobs, preferential electricity tariffs, building roads, or investing in 
other public services such as schools or health centres. Some of  these 
activities are carried ad hoc by energy projects, but without following 
a systematic approach. On the other hand, community participation 
needs to take place from the project conception and all the way through 
its operation, using transparent and participatory processes (ibid.; Shinke 
and Klawitter 2015).
6 Discussion: the politics of removing constraints to investment in 
renewable energy
Kenya has been hailed as one of  the most successful African countries 
in attracting renewable energy investment. However, many barriers 
persist that endanger the goal of  universal access to clean, reliable, 
and affordable energy by 2030. Three particular constraints stand out: 
the inadequacy of  generation, transmission, and distribution planning 
practices for the low rural demand; the high system costs; and strong 
social opposition to large‑scale infrastructure, including renewable 
energy. The first two problems are shared in many other African 
countries and the last one is particularly acute in Kenya. This article 
has tried to better understand the factors that underlie these three 
constraints by looking at how they emerged, and what are the policies 
that can address them. In this section, we discuss the actors that could 
drive or oppose the implementation of  these policies and we conclude 
by underscoring the role of  the state.
At the heart of  Kenya’s problems there is a large pool of  unmet needs 
and competition for scarce resources dominated by the ruling elite. As 
noted in Ng’ethe, Katumanga and Williams, ‘[T]he elite have generally 
opposed pro‑poor change where this threatens their interests and 
sources of  patronage’ (2004: 4). However, ‘[I]n the past, reforms have 
usually occurred when the elite has come under sustained pressure from 
interest groups’ (as cited in Barnett 2016: session 5, page 3). Whereas 
the supply of  electricity has traditionally focused on large industrial 
customers and the urban population, increased pressure to provide 
access for all is now coming jointly from the international development 
community and the local devolved government. International donors 
provide finance and technical assistance, while local governments seek 
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to provide basic services to their population and can contribute to the 
social acceptance of  infrastructure projects. Between these two actors 
there are two powerful national institutions acting as gatekeepers for the 
allocation of  funding priorities: the National Treasury and the MoEP.
International development institutions seek poverty eradication and 
increasing convergence with the welfare levels of  developed countries, 
while keeping developing countries’ debt under control. They increasingly 
follow a private sector‑led narrative, where funds are provided strategically 
to mobilise a larger share of  private finance (Pueyo, Orraca and 
Godfrey‑Woods 2015). There is still a general perception of  state‑owned 
enterprises as being inefficient and corrupt, whereas private entrepreneurs 
represent efficiency through their profit-seeking behaviour and 
competition. Under this profit-driven approach, natural monopolies such 
as the network components of  the electricity system, and non-profitable 
segments such as rural electrification often fall between the cracks.
The National Treasury and the MoEP of  Kenya are driven by a 
growth imperative. They support investment in least‑cost generation 
and increased energy efficiency, as these contribute to the ambitious 
economic growth targets set up in the Vision 2030 strategy. The 
least-cost narrative is very much influenced by large industry, which is 
the main electricity consumer.
The devolved governments, on the other hand, seek to transfer 
central funds to their localities, to improve development outcomes of  
their often‑neglected communities. They are likely to oppose large 
infrastructure projects geared towards urban areas when their counties 
bear the costs but reap none of  the benefits. Civil society seeks equal 
access to energy services, and compensation for the economic, social, or 
environmental costs of  large infrastructure located in their native land.
The different interests of  these actors can align in some specific policies. 
For example, policies to increase the productivity of  rural areas heavily 
dependent on agriculture could increase rural incomes and therefore 
the ability to pay for electricity connections and consumption. At 
the same time, energy interventions could contribute to increase 
rural productivity through, for example, irrigation systems, and 
the mechanisation of  agriculture, the development of  agricultural 
processing, and other non‑farm activities. A larger rural demand would 
improve the financial viability of  public grid extension programmes or 
private mini‑grids and reduce the cost per unit of  electricity for all rural 
consumers. Such an approach requires close collaboration between 
energy planners making decisions about the most appropriate energy 
supply technology, and rural development planners influencing the size 
and composition of  the rural demand. The dialogue between supply 
and demand should reflect on bottom-up rural electrification plans 
that take into account the location of  customers and their current and 
prospective demand on the basis of  realistic development opportunities. 
Kenya is taking steps in that direction through the increased role of  the 
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devolved government in energy planning and new rural electrification 
planning initiatives using geographic information.
In other cases, actors’ interests clash; for example, when final consumers 
are asked to pay for the risks taken by private developers (like the 
LTWP) or for the cost of  rural electrification through new items in 
their electricity bill. In the first case, support follows the narrative that 
Kenya needs to maintain its status as a desirable destination for private 
sector investment by keeping risks low for investors. The second case 
follows an energy justice narrative, where the poorer should not be 
made to pay more for basic services than the wealthier, even if  they 
are more expensive to reach. The interests of  local communities and 
large industrial and urban consumers also clash when large renewable 
energy infrastructure located in rural areas feeds power directly to the 
transmission system heading to Nairobi.
The international development community is trying to make the 
narratives of  energy justice and private sector‑led development 
converge through the promotion of  private mini‑grids. For example, 
the DFID‑funded Green Mini‑Grid Facility (GMF) was announced in 
March 2017 to provide investment grants and technical assistance to 
leverage private investment in mini‑grids in Kenya. It is certainly an 
attractive narrative that private entrepreneurs could target the poorest 
populations by offering them an affordable service that they are able to 
pay for. However, the prices that these mini‑grids can achieve are still 
significantly higher than those paid by those connected to the national 
grid and are only affordable to a small share of  the rural population 
(Carbon Africa et al. 2015). The cost of  finance faced by small 
entrepreneurs is also much higher than that enjoyed by state‑owned 
enterprises, and economies of  scale will not materialise without 
common standards for grid compatibility of  mini‑grids.
To conclude, Kenya’s goal of  sustainable electricity for all requires a set 
of  actors with conflicting interests to align their position. Donors’ pressure 
towards decentralised, private sector-led electrification needs to align with 
the national government’s preference towards large‑scale, centralised 
generation, as this could generate the funds required to cross‑subsidise 
poor and remote consumers. The dichotomy between private versus 
public-led electrification also needs to be solved. Private developers selling 
to the grid require access to the network elements of  the system. On the 
other hand, private off-grid supply could be easily crowded out by the 
national grid offering electricity at a fraction of  the price.
A fine balance is hence required to maintain the remarkable (and recent) 
financial sustainability of  the Kenyan power sector. The independence 
of  the regulator and the national distribution company are key to achieve 
this. The state and international donors have a crucial role in allocating 
funds to members of  society less able to afford the full cost of  electricity 
and to the natural monopolies of  transmission and distribution. Public 
actors should also support structural transformation, increasing the 
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productivity of  the agricultural sector until rural areas are able to pay for 
the full cost of  electrification. While demand remains low in rural areas, 
the private sector will keep focusing on the most profitable segments 
of  the market, whether large‑scale generation to supply industry and 
urban households connected to the grid, or small‑scale solutions for rural 
consumers that can pay for them. Even if  technological progress has 
improved affordability of  small-scale solar solutions for an increasing 
number of  rural consumers, public subsidies still have an important role 
to play for universal access to become a reality in Kenya.
Notes
1 Including two representatives from private off-grid generation 
developers (Powergen and Powerhive); the national transmission 
utility (KETRACO); one donor (Power Africa); civil society (Nature 
Kenya, Strathmore University); the energy regulator ERC; the 
Ministry of  Land; an independent power producer (IPP) (Kenya Tea 
Development Authority – Power); and the National Environment 
Management Authority.
2 Interview with Powerhive, 2016.
3 Interview with ERC, 2016.
4 www.eca‑uk.com/2017/01/04/kenya‑mini‑grid‑regulatory‑
framework‑development/.
5 Interviews with donor representative and with Ministry of  Planning, 
2016.
6 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
7 Interview with Power Africa, 2016.
8 The off-taker is the counterparty in the PPA purchasing all the power 
from the plant.
9 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
10 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
11 Interview with Power Africa, 2016.
12 Interview with the Ministry of  Planning, 2016.
13 Interview with Powerhive, 2016.
14 Interview with the Ministry of  Planning, 2016.
15 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
16 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
17 Interview with Powerhive, 2016. This problem was also detailed 
in interviews with an international EPC contractor as detailed in 
Pueyo et al. (2017).
18 Interview with Energy Regulatory Commission, 2016.
19 Interview with National Environmental Management Agency, 2016.
20 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
21 Interviews with ERC and KETRACO, 2016.
22 Interview with Nature Kenya, 2016.
23 Interview with KETRACO, 2016.
24 Interview with ERC, 2016.
25 The Equator Principles are a risk management framework adopted 
by financial institutions to assess and manage the environmental and 
social risks of  projects. See www.equator‑principles.com.
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The Political Economy of Renewable 
Energy Investment in Ghana
Simon Bawakyillenuo*1
Abstract The high level of fossil fuel consumption globally is wreaking havoc 
on the global climate through the emissions of greenhouse gases. Against this 
backdrop, there have been calls from national and international stakeholders 
for a transition towards renewable energy (RE). However, the investment and 
adoption of renewable energy technologies especially, in developing countries 
have been woefully inadequate. Even though various policy and legislative 
instruments in support of RE development abound in Ghana, the contribution 
of RE to the energy generation mix is notably insignificant, due to constraints 
that limit high investment. Using the Political Economy Analysis (PEA) 
approach, this article examines the deficiencies in these policy strategies, and 
unravels the complexity as well as the alignments of interests of stakeholders 
regarding policies that could provide a more favourable investment in 
renewables in Ghana. The article recommends that Ghana’s leaders champion 
those policies with the highest support across all stakeholders.
Keywords: political economy, renewable energy, binding constraints, 
Ghana, low investment, abundant policies.
1 Introduction
Provisions for renewable energy (RE) development have featured in the 
energy policy regimes of  Ghana for some time now. The just‑ended 
national Medium‑Term Development Policy – Ghana Shared Growth and 
Development Agenda Two (GSGDA II) – talks about the need to increase 
the proportion of  RE in the energy supply mix, particularly solar, wind, 
mini‑hydro, and waste‑to‑energy (NDPC 2014). The current energy policy 
of  the country also sets a policy target of  10 per cent contribution of  RE to 
the country’s energy generation mix by 2020 (MoE 2010). In addition, there 
is the Renewable Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832), which gives legislative backing 
to the promotion and development of  renewable energy technologies (RETs). 
The feed-in tariff (FiT), mini-grid infrastructure systems development and the 
RE Fund are provisions in the RE Act (Act 832) that demonstrate Ghana’s 
quest to diversify its energy sources to take account of  RE.
Notwithstanding the existence of  these various policies and legislative 
instruments in support of  RE development in Ghana, the contribution 
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of  RE sources to the country’s energy generation mix is abysmal. 
At present, the share of  RE in the power generation mix is about 
0.1 per cent (Energy Commission of  Ghana 2015) and with less 
than four years left, the 10 per cent share target is unlikely to be met 
by 2020. Paradoxically, Ghana is signatory to several international 
agreements, including the post‑2015 United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals that aim at tackling climate change and variability 
through environmentally sustainable development pathways such as 
the enhancement of  RETs. In practice, however, the development 
trajectories being pursued are unsustainable and not in sync with these 
goals (UNEP 2013, 2015). Presently, about 56.5 per cent of  installed 
electricity generation capacity in Ghana is fossil fuel‑based thermal, 
generating about 49 per cent of  total electricity (Energy Commission 
of  Ghana 2016). What is more, the government envisions increasing 
thermal power generation to about 80 per cent in the next decade.2 
This raises a question regarding which pathways could lead to the 
development of  the RE niche within the existing energy regime 
(Power et al. 2016).
This article aims to unravel the complexity of  stakeholders’ alignments 
and interests with regard to policies to support RE investment in 
Ghana. Moreover, this article contributes to expanding the literature on 
the understudied political economy of  energy transitions (Power et al. 
2016 citing Goldthau and Sovacool 2012), especially in a developing 
country like Ghana.
The article is structured into seven sections. Following this introductory 
section is Section 2, which reviews literature on the political economy of  
RE investment. Section 3 discusses the historical policy and institutional 
regimes of  Ghana’s energy sector. Section 4 details the Political 
Economy Analysis (PEA) methodological perspectives underpinning 
this article and how the binding constraints on RE investment in 
Ghana were identified, as well as the mapping of  promising policies 
with potential to address these constraints. Discussions and analyses of  
the obstructing factors of  the key policies and initiatives fundamental 
to RE investment are encapsulated in Section 5. Section 6 covers the 
intervention policies, while Section 7 provides the conclusion.
2 The political economy of renewable energy investment – a review
Until the twenty-first century, fossil fuel sources dominated global 
energy supply and consumption. They accounted for about 80 per 
cent of  the world’s total primary energy supply and 64 per cent of  
electricity generation in 1999 (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). In recent 
times, however, there are increasing calls for a paradigm shift towards 
RE generation (ibid.). These calls are aimed at ensuring the mitigation 
of  greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuel consumption. 
Nonetheless, the adoption of  RETs is met with stiff opposition, mainly 
from high-profile fossil fuel energy players, who obstruct the process 
and subsequently promote their interest (Barnett, Stockbridge and 
Kingsmill 2016). Additionally, the uncertainty related to who bears the 
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cost of  the transition to clean energy landscapes, especially in developing 
countries, further obstructs the process (Newell and Mulvaney 2013).
A complete understanding of  the reasons behind such opposition is 
crucial for the successful development of  RE since that will help provide 
sustainable solutions to the root causes reinforcing the low investment 
in a developing country such as Ghana. A PEA approach provides 
the necessary scope to unearth such reasons that fuel opposition from 
stakeholders to investment in RE. Newell et al. (2014) observe that 
a political economy analysis creates the pathway to get beneath the 
formal structures in a bid to discover the underlying interests, incentives, 
and institutions that foster or frustrate change. It could also help to 
consolidate the interests of  all energy players in order to facilitate 
the paradigm shift of  accelerating the rate of  development of  RETs. 
According to Arndt (1983), the political economy (PE) concept has 
a broad range of  applications and offers in-depth analysis of  what 
an ordinary study may not be able to tease out. For instance, a PE 
application to an organisation could enhance a better understanding 
of  the interaction between sets of  major economic and sociopolitical 
forces that affect collective behaviour and performances within such 
an organisation (Achrol, Reve and Stern 1983). In the energy sector, its 
application aids in the understanding of  the complexity surrounding 
clean energy transitional issues – justice, injustice, losers, and winners 
(Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Baker, Newell and Phillips 2014; Power 
et al. 2016). According to Isoaho, Goritz and Schulz (2016), the recent 
application of  PEA in energy‑related issues such as RE development is 
due to the fact that socio‑technical literature failed to address adequately 
the complexity and dynamics of  clean energy development. A PEA 
should therefore identify all forms of:
competing ideas, interests, values and preferences; where specific 
groups and interests struggle over the control, production, use and 
distribution of  resources; where conflict is negotiated; where bargains 
are struck; and where formal and informal political settlements, 
alliances and coalitions are made and broken (Hudson and Leftwich 
2014: 6, cited in Barnett 2014).
Unequivocally, the use of  PEA should help to understand why socially 
and economically, desirable plans and policies are regarded as being 
difficult to be implemented by policymakers (Barnett et al. 2016).
Khan (2011), using a PEA approach, studied the situation under which a 
ruling government or a coalition in the power sector will promote clean 
energy development. He documents that a change towards clean energy 
transition is most likely to happen if  governments or ruling coalitions 
face pressure from powerful groups in society who either are negatively 
affected by current non-renewable energy sources or stand to benefit from 
clean energy promotion. In the study by Tsebelis (2002), which focuses on 
India, PEA underpins the analysis on the extent to which RE sources can 
be developed to their fullest capacity in the country. The study concludes 
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that, in order to bring RE development into the policy arena, stakeholders 
with vested interests and veto powers – such as the mining companies, 
and the coal power producers – are critical to breaking strong oppositions 
to RE development. Other works (Newell and Mulvaney 2013), however, 
reiterate the need to be mindful of  the justice dimension of  ‘clean energy’ 
or low‑carbon transition amid the quest for success.
In related studies, Fattouh and El-Katiri (2015) and Oda and Tsujita 
(2010) also applied PEA to study factors that prevent governments and 
energy players from implementing certain economic and environmental 
policies. Citizenry agitations for fair share of  natural resources (oils 
and fossil resources and grid extension) and the fear of  losing elections 
by political actors emerged strongly as factors accounting for the 
non‑implementation of  such policies. The Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region lends clear evidence to this, in which the 
incessant protests and agitations waged by the citizenry for social equity 
and fair sharing of  national resources have compelled governments to 
subsidise fossil fuel energy sources (Fattouh and El-Katiri 2015). In Asia, 
Commander (2012) observes similar occurrences, as political unrest 
and protests forced governments to keep prices of  petrol and diesel 
substantively lower than international prices between 2008 and 2010. 
Such agitations from citizens and the fear of  losing political power have 
the effect of  influencing governments and policymakers to overlook 
viable RE development policies. Oda and Tsujita (2010) argue that 
these protests and political unrest are more common in jurisdictions that 
lack democratic institutions. Brown and Mobarak (2009) further argue 
that countries without democratic political systems and institutional 
structures often use energy allocations and subsidies as tools for political 
advantage. Supporting this view, Scott and Seth (2013) submit that 
often, in non‑democratic states, electricity distribution favours industries 
rather than residential areas, which becomes a source of  the protest. 
Such motives and actions greatly affect the development of  RE.
Gupta and Köhlin (2006) note that there is an opportunity cost of  
failing to sell energy at actual market prices, and as such, revenue can 
be used by government in diverse ways including the reduction of  
budget deficit and the size of  the public debt; and increasing investment 
expenditure in cheaper, clean, and environmentally friendly energy 
technologies which can generate several socioeconomic benefits. 
According to Sdralevich et al. (2014), although these policies seek to 
promote social equity, in reality they actually benefit people within 
the middle and upper classes. Indicative of  the above literature is the 
increasing economic and environmental costs of  fossil fuel faced by 
many developing economies, yet RE sources in these economies remain 
significantly underdeveloped through inadequate investments.
3 Policy and institutional regimes of Ghana’s energy sector
Electricity generation in Ghana can broadly be classified into three 
main phases: ‘before the Akosombo era’ (1914 to 1966), the ‘Hydro 
Years’ (1966 to mid‑1980s) and the ‘Thermal Complementation Years’ 
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(from mid‑1980s to present) (ISSER 2005). The pre‑Akosombo era had 
small‑scale electricity generation from diesel‑powered generators. These 
were owned by individuals, institutions, and towns that could afford 
them. The first public power plant was established in 1914 in Sekondi 
and was used to power the operations and activities of  the then Gold 
Coast Railway Administration (GCRA) (ibid.). In 1922, small‑scale 
public electricity was established and operated by the then public works 
department (PWD) to electrify major towns in Ghana. It covered the 
Accra township and later in 1926, coverage was extended to Koforidua. 
Between 1927 and 1932, the PWD undertook a restricted evening supply 
arrangement system to Kumasi, Swedru, Tamale, and Cape Coast 
townships (ibid.). During this era, determination of  power generation was 
carried out solely by Ghana’s colonial leaders, some public institutions 
(such as PWD and GCRA), and individuals who were financially sound 
to own and operate generator sets. Issues of  climate change and RE 
development were non‑existent in the objectives of  energy generation as 
they were not subjects of  utmost concern at the time.
Energy security and to some extent RE development, however, became 
more relevant in the ‘Hydro Years’ of  power generation in Ghana. 
The desire to develop Ghana’s huge bauxite reserves as part of  having 
integrated the bauxite and aluminium industries marked the beginning 
of  the hydro years (ibid.). This era saw a much more organised power 
sector, as Cabinet passed the Volta River Development Act 1961 
(Act 46) for the establishment of  the Volta River Authority (VRA). The 
VRA was mandated to foresee the construction of  the Akosombo dam, 
its power station as well as the generation of  electricity (ibid.). In 1967, 
a law (NLCD 125) was passed for the establishment of  the Electricity 
Corporation of  Ghana (ECG). This enhanced the setting up of  vibrant 
institutions to oversee adequate production of  energy that fed industries 
and businesses, and subsequently offered job opportunities in diverse 
forms. Energy security emerged as an important element under this era 
because other initiatives were introduced to develop more hydro sites 
in addition to the Akosombo Power Plant (Edjekumhene, Amadu and 
Brew‑Hammond 2001). Unlike the pre‑hydro years, this era marked the 
beginning of  modern electricity generation in Ghana and did involve 
the participation of  several stakeholders.
The thermal complementary phase of  Ghana’s power sector was highly 
driven by energy security issues and little about the development of  
other competitive energy resources. Climate change mitigation issues 
were of  little concern as evidence shows that the development of  the 
power sector within this era propelled the increase in the country’s 
carbon footprint. According to Opam and Turkson (2000), this era 
was necessitated by the adverse effect of  the prolonged drought that 
occurred between 1982 and 1984 in the country. On the basis of  the 
drought, the generation potentials of  the existing two hydro power 
plants (Akosombo and Kpong) were affected as the available water was 
far below the minimum operating level (ibid.). The shortage in electricity 
supply amid the growing energy demand sector necessitated the major 
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reformation of  the power sector. Thus, in 1985, the Government of  
Ghana commissioned the ‘Ghana Generation Planning Study’ (GGPS) 
to help identify alternative energy sources that will aid in reducing the 
vulnerability of  the hydro power systems (ISSER 2005). The study 
recommended thermal as part of  Ghana’s energy mix.
Lack of  competitiveness and private sector participation, coupled 
with the poor financial performance of  Ghana’s power sector, drove 
its reformation in the 1990s. According to Opam and Turkson (2000), 
such factors made Ghana’s traditional financiers (e.g. the World Bank) 
reluctant in providing extra financial resources to support the thermal 
complementary phase of  the power sector. The GGPS of  the VRA 
estimated over US$1.5bn as the amount that was needed to finance 
infrastructure development at the electricity sector of  Ghana (ISSER 
2005). This came at the time when the World Bank was unwilling 
to finance non-performing energy sectors in Africa unless issues of  
transparency, regulation, importation of  services, commercialisation and 
corporatisation, commitment lending, and private investment were met 
by energy sectors (Amoako-Tuffor and Asamoah 2015). However, the 
motives for undertaking this reform were not only limited to the financial 
challenges confronting the sector. According to Opam, UN ECOSOC 
and UN ECA (1995), issues of  productivity losses of  the overall economy 
as a result of  the ineffective operation of  the then power sector, coupled 
with rapid power interruptions and high cost associated with back‑ups, 
necessitated the reform. Overwhelming debt burdens, supply‑side 
preferences, and under‑utilised energy conservation practices were other 
factors that influenced the decision to reform Ghana’s power sector 
(ibid.). Increasing efficiency of  asset utilisation, and making necessary 
policies and institutional changes that will ensure economic equity were 
other supplementary motives for initiating the reform (Sustainable 
Energy Regulation and Policymaking for Africa, n.d.).
The Government of  Ghana, upon agreeing to the terms and 
requirements of  the World Bank, contracted SYNEX Consulting 
Engineers of  Chile to provide policy directions that could ensure 
competition and engagement of  private investors (Edjekumhene et al. 
2001; Amoako-Tuffor and Asamoah 2015). In 1994, the firm proposed 
a new power market with policy directions that aimed at meeting the 
requirements of  the World Bank. Some of  the policy recommendations 
by the firm were free entry of  private investors on the power generation 
side as well as decentralisation of  the distribution arm of  the sector; 
establishment of  an Economic Load Dispatch Centre that will be 
responsible for planning the operation of  the system so as to minimise 
operating costs; and the existence of  different distributors with each 
operating in a defined concession area (SYNEX Consulting Engineers 
1994, cited in Edjekumhene et al. 2001).
Following these policy recommendations, the government issued a 
statement on ‘Power Sector Policy’ to serve as a framework that meets 
the regulatory and transparency requirements of  the World Bank. 
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This statement also proposed the formation of  the Power Sector 
Reform Committee (PSRC) to oversee the design and implementation 
of  the reform (Opam and Turkson 2000; Edjekumhene et al. 2001). 
Obligations such as the assignment of  mandates for power generation, 
transmission and distribution, promoting a competitive power market, a 
regulatory framework for price and tariff revision, and establishment of  
an institutional framework, rested on the shoulders of  the PSRC (ibid.). 
The PSRC proposed a ‘four‑point Action Plan’ to the government of  
Ghana in 1997 (Edjekumhene et al. 2001):
 l Introduction of  new legislation to establish a new body to replace 
the then existing National Energy Board (NEB) which will introduce 
explicit regulations, rules of  practice, and standards of  performance 
for governing the power sector;
 l Introduction of  ‘open access’ in the power sector to ensure healthy 
competition;
 l Engineering all stated‑owned private utilities into ‘strategic 
business units’ that can help improve accountability and financial 
management through public–private partnerships and joint ventures;
 l Introduction of  guidelines and procedures for transparency in tariff 
settings.
Arguably, the past institutional and policy regimes of  the energy sector 
of  Ghana from the pre‑hydro era to the early 2000s buttressed the 
dominant existing hydro and thermal energy infrastructural niches in 
the country. Indeed, it has been argued that the energy infrastructures in 
most parts of  the global South are connected to historical antecedents 
in the socioeconomic and political realms, and hence, their development 
is shaped by various path dependencies (Power et al. 2016). Moreover, 
the enthusiasm and contestations exuded by the two dominant political 
parties (the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress) 
in the wake of  the discovery of  oil in 2007 (Phillips, Hailwood 
and Brooks 2016), and the subsequent improved gas infrastructure 
development compared to the weak RE infrastructure development, 
vindicate the existing infrastructural dominance of  thermal‑led energy.
4 Methodology
The methodology used for this study is informed by the Political 
Economy Analysis of  Climate Change Policies (PEACH) Methodology 
by Schmitz (2012) and the PEA framework by Barnett et al. (2016). 
The PEACH methodology focuses on answering the central question: 
who drives/obstructs certain policies? According to Schmitz (2012), an 
application of  the PEA in climate change issues should be able to bring 
out relevant sector players who by their actions and policy priorities 
promote or obstruct such initiatives. Accordingly, a PEA should be 
capable of  setting out the key challenges of  which the study intends 
to investigate, such as ‘Who drives/obstructs climate change policies 
in the rising powers?’ (ibid.: 1). It examines the complexities (actors, 
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institutions, and motivations) and is based on identifying the various 
stakeholders involved, including their diverse priorities. This, therefore, 
demands the mapping of  identified stakeholders in a power priority 
matrix according to their direct and indirect influence on policymaking 
and implementation, and analysing their competing narratives. Using 
narratives from in‑depth interviews of  sector players, the PEA analysis 
through the PEACH lens embodies four parts: mapping stakeholders 
according to priority; discussions on the proponents and opponents of  
policies; mapping the level of  influence of  stakeholders on such policies; 
and identification of  coalitions for change (Schmitz 2012).
On the other hand, the PEA framework developed by Barnett et al. 
(2016) to understand the issues of  poor performance of  Africa’s 
power sector despite several years of  donor support, encompasses a 
four-stage process: problem identification; diagnosis; prognosis; and 
interventions (Table 1). The problem identification stage is in synchrony 
with Schmitz’s (2012) position of  ‘setting out the key challenge’ from 
the onset. The methodology for this current study is, therefore, a 
hybrid of  the PEACH methodology (ibid.) and Barnett et al.’s (2016) 
PEA framework – an adoption of  elements from both approaches 
that are deemed pertinent to establishing an understanding of  the 
subject matter. Thus, key elements including problem identification 
(already captured in Section 1 as low investment in the renewable 
energy sector in Ghana); diagnosis (identification of  binding constraints 
to renewable energy investments); prognosis (mapping of  promising 
policies); mapping of  stakeholders to ascertain the varied narratives; 
and identification of  alternative interventions, constitute the analytical 
framework for this study.
The identification of  the binding constraints to investment in renewable 
energy investment in Ghana was carried out by a previous study by 
Pueyo et al. (2017). Using a framework drawing from growth diagnostics 
(Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco 2004), that research accumulated 
evidence through the analysis of  indicators and interviews to rank 
constraints in Ghana according to their importance, or ‘binding’ 
character. The evidence accumulated in Ghana pointed at constraints 
preventing sufficient returns to investment at an acceptable risk and 
Table 1 PEA framework
1 Problem identification For example, poor performance in the power sector 
2 Diagnosis 
What features of the political economy generate and 
contribute to the persistence of the problem? 
3 Prognosis 
Given the diagnosis, what is the potential for change, and 
what are the mostly likely pathways of change? 
4 Interventions 
How can particular actors help to shift the pattern of 
incentives in a manner that promotes desirable change?
Source Barnett et al. (2016).
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also at constraints limiting the availability of  adequate finance for 
RE investment. The four factors damaging the risk-return profile 
of  investment relate to an unreliable off-taker, poor regulation, 
macroeconomic imbalances, and corruption. On the other hand, scarce 
domestic finance and high returns expectations for short-term loans are 
behind the insufficient supply of  finance (Pueyo et al. 2017).
This article goes beyond the identification of  key constraints to analyse 
the political economy of  their solutions. High-profile representatives 
of  31 organisations,3 belonging to private and public sectors; civil 
society organisations; academia; the utilities; and research thinktanks 
that have key interest, as well as playing significant roles in the energy 
landscapes and regimes development in the country, were sampled 
randomly after all relevant stakeholders were mapped, for both the 
administration of  in‑depth interviews and questionnaires from June to 
October 2016. Drawing on the data from the in‑depth interviews, three 
binding constraints to RE investment in Ghana were unearthed through 
prioritisation by interviewees: off-taker risk; inadequate power sector 
regulation; and lack of  access to appropriate finance. Similarly, relevant 
potential policies that could have been used to help unlock these binding 
constraints, but did not, were mapped through a review of  various 
literature sources and the in‑depth interviews (Table 2).
The next section explores the alignment of  Ghanaian stakeholders 
with respect to the potential policies that could solve the constraints to 
investment in RE.
Table 2 Binding constraints on RE investment in Ghana and potential policies
Binding constraint Policy
Off-taker risk
Privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector 
Improved management of ECG including revenue collection 
(especially revenue from debtors – government and others) 
Promotion of efficient technical practices within the 
distribution arm of the power sector through privatisation
Establishment of a competitive off-taker market in the 
power sector 
Inadequate power 
sector regulation
Establishment of a full-time high-level independent power 
producer (IPP) facilitator in the power sector
Establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff 
pricing system
Full implementation of the RE Act (Act 832) and its 
enshrined subsidiary instruments (net-metering, mini-grid 
systems, and the RE Fund and levies)
Lack of access to 
appropriate finance
Establishment of RE financial instruments within domestic 
banks by government with lower interest rates
Source Author’s compilation from literature sources and in-depth interviews.
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5 Analysis and discussion
Having identified policies that could have been used to address the 
binding constraints to RE investment in Ghana, the analysis and 
discussion focus on why such policies have been ineffectual in the past. 
The proponents and opponents of  these policies are teased out from the 
in‑depth interview scripts. Our interviews were not able to gauge the 
extent of  the power of  each of  the stakeholders to achieve their goals 
when these conflict with those of  other stakeholders.
5.1 Off-taker risk constraint
The non-existence of  a credible off-taker in Ghana’s power sector 
remains a key disincentive to investment in energy and especially in 
renewables as this typically has higher upfront costs. The inability of  the 
present off-taker (ECG) to maintain a credible and resounding financial 
balance sheet as a result of  low electricity prices and bottlenecks with 
revenue collection underscores investment risks. Narratives from 
stakeholders underpinning why the credit‑unworthiness of  the present 
off-taker dissuades investors from investing in Ghana’s power sector 
resonate with findings by African Energy (2014).
An important constraint is that the off-taker is not financially credible. They 
are unable to pay their bills. (A senior officer at Renewable Energy 
Promotion, Energy Commission of  Ghana)4
We can’t call ECG a credible off-taker. So now, it is a major bottleneck… who 
would buy the power I’m generating and can pay at the end of  the month? Most 
of  the people who have got PPAs [power purchasing agreements] from 
ECG are asking for further guarantees because of  their notorious track record of  
being unable to pay. (A senior officer at KITE)
The policies counting with the highest support in our interviews 
included the privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the power sector and 
the improved management of  the national distribution company.
5.1.1 Privatisation of the revenue arm of the power sector
One of  the key policy interventions that could help to unlock the 
off-taker risk in the power sector is the privatisation of  the revenue 
arm of  the power sector. This policy has been strongly supported by 
donors, and particularly by the United State’s Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. A private, competitive retail market would be solely driven 
by the objective of  profit maximisation. Accordingly, it would not be 
subject to political interference demanding, for example, lower tariffs, or 
exemption from paying their bills for public administration consumers. 
Such private retailers would also be more likely to implement innovative 
monitoring and metering systems resulting in higher revenue collection, 
the narrative goes (Eberhard et al. 2008).
Several counter‑narratives oppose the privatisation approach, mainly 
the fear of  tariff escalation; ideological perspectives of  ECG as a 
national identity; and job uncertainty.
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According to Hall, Lobina and Motte (2005), initiatives towards 
privatisation of  essential national assets such as the energy sector are 
never without oppositions for the fear of  price increment. Privatisation 
in most cases widens the affordability gap, increasing the population 
who cannot afford services that used to be provided by the public 
institutions (ibid.). Hall et al. (2005) and Nellis (2003), dwelling on the 
negative implications associated with privatisation, note that it increases 
the cost of  living, deepening poverty. Such fears by citizenry have 
negative effects on governance due to the ‘patron–client relationship’ 
practices in developing countries in which there is a trade market for 
cost of  electricity and votes (Barnett et al. 2016). Narratives from the 
in‑depth interviews indeed attest to the fact that the fear of  increase in 
tariff has been pursued by various stakeholders over time to block the 
implementation of  this intervention as this one shows:
I think the stakeholders that are kicking against this are basically the final consumers 
who in effect have witnessed tremendous increase in electricity tariffs. The fact is 
you are bringing a third party, which we see will be more efficient and more effective. 
The fact too, however, is that we also have information about the cost of  electricity 
being higher than how much we are paying and it means that a third party who is 
coming in with a business motive or private motive will need to break even or make 
profit for that matter through high cost of  electricity tariffs. So, consumers would then 
try to fight against those things. (A senior officer at KASA-Ghana)
Second, the belief  that ECG is a national asset and should stay as such 
also emerged strongly as a reason against privatisation. According 
to this narrative, the government has no moral right to either sell or 
give out ECG’s function to a foreign private entity since that will be 
tantamount to weakening the country’s sovereignty.
Looking at what is happening and the attempt by government through MiDA 
to give ECG to a company to manage as a concession for 25 years, it’s on a 
large scale and taking it from the hands of  Ghanaians to a foreign company. 
(A senior officer at KASA-Ghana)
Ownership should be Ghanaian. It should be listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange so 
that every Ghanaian will be a shareholder. In that way, it will still be for Ghanaians 
but it will mean government cannot take out anything from the ECG.5 (Chief  
policy analyst, Ghana Institute for Public Policy Options (GIPPO))
Concerns about job security and the possible creation of  jobs for only 
a few elites are the third most frequent arguments against the policy 
instrument of  privatising the revenue arm of  ECG. While assurance 
has been given in the MiDA Compact II deal, emphasising that no 
ECG worker would be laid off in the first five years6 of  the concession, 
opponents of  the initiative, including ECG workers, are not entirely 
convinced about the provision, since they are unsure of  their retentions 
after the first five years. This uncertainty has triggered a series of  strike 
actions7 by ECG workers against government. Birdsall and Nellis (2003) 
observe that privatisation unfairly disenfranchises workers.
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They [ECG workers] have legitimate concerns because they are afraid of  job 
securities and are not sure what the private entity would do. (A senior officer at 
ACEP)
I think it’s really job security, first of  all. Maybe pride a little bit, but job security 
and mistrust of  whoever is coming in, that they are simply coming to make money 
on top of  their labour. (A senior officer at Solar Light Ghana)
5.1.2 Improved management of ECG
As an alternative to privatisation, the improved management of  ECG 
would result in a more efficient revenue collection from debtors – 
government and others. Authors (Hall et al. 2005; Barnett et al. 2016) 
argue that the privatisation of  the energy sector in Africa would not 
be necessary if  there were mechanisms in place to avoid governments’ 
interferences. The inability of  Ghana’s power sector off-taker to 
function effectively is attributable to long-standing interferences by 
various governments. Unsurprisingly, the government itself  is identified 
as the main obstruction for the improved management of  ECG.
I will say that the reason why some people are kicking against it [privatisation] 
is because they feel that government is the cause of  the problem so don’t blame it on 
ECG. Government owes ECG so much and they feel if  government can put in place 
measures to curtail this, then ECG can operate efficiently. (A senior officer at 
Renewable Energy Promotion, Energy Commission of  Ghana)
But we do know that what has crippled the ECG is not that we don’t have 
people with brains to deliver but it has been the interference of  government to 
just cripple them and the solution is to either make them independent or to give it 
to a private entity to handle, which also brings the independence that is required. 
(A senior officer at ACEP)
It has been argued that Ghana’s government seems powerless to resist 
external pressures requiring privatisation as a precondition for financial 
assistance, mainly through the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
Compact II. Hence, its inability to support the initiative of  improved 
management of  ECG. For instance, Mehrotra and Delamonica 
(2005) observe that in most privatisation initiatives in developing 
countries, donor partners and international organisations strongly push 
governments to accept the deals, with a lot of  them being done behind 
the scene without proper consultation.
When something is coming from outside Ghana we are going to push back 
easily, good or not. So, what would have been nice is for us to recognise that 
the way we run these parastatals over the years has been wrong. So we need a 
government that is mature enough to step out and say no. (A senior officer at 
Solar Light Ghana)
Another critical intervention to unlock the off-taker binding constraint 
is the provision of  guarantees for power producers in Ghana. However, 
the government cannot commit to high levels of  debt and a lack of  
financial resources.
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5.2 Inadequate power sector regulation constraint
Effective regulation of  the power sector with incentivised strategies 
tailored towards RE development are paramount to boosting investment 
in RE sources. All over the world, different countries are formulating 
and implementing such policies on RE, to enhance energy security 
and climate change mitigation drives. Although Ghana’s power sector 
regulatory regime aims at diversifying energy portfolios in order to 
enhance the green economy, it is still fraught with challenges that 
undermine RE investors’ confidence. Three policy interventions that 
could have addressed the inadequate regulatory constraint in Ghana, had 
an RE agenda been attended to seriously, were unearthed: establishment 
of  a full‑time level facilitator in the power sector; establishment of  
a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system; and full 
implementation of  the RE Act (Act 832) and its subsidiary instruments.
Regarding the setting up of  a full‑time level facilitator in the power sector, 
opposers have argued that it is unnecessary and will only bring about extra 
cost, since current practices in the power sector already take account of  
that. Concerning the setting up of  a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff 
pricing system, opposers have gone against it on the basis that electricity 
prices will increase; and secondly, electricity is regarded as a public good. 
The lack of  full implementation of  the RE Act (Act 832) is attributable 
to the non‑incentivisation approach to RE development in Ghana; RE 
is not considered as an immediate priority by policymakers compared to 
thermal energy and lack of  political will. The following narratives give 
credence to the weaknesses of  the regulatory environment as a result of  
the energy regimes and infrastructure niches supported by state:
We have the key issue as being the Renewable Energy Act, which says that the 
tariffs cannot be changed before 10 years. But then for investment like this, we are 
looking at a lifespan of  20 to 30 years. So if  an investor is only guaranteed for 
10 years then what happens to the 10 or 20 years left? So, these are some of  the 
issues that hold back some of  these investors. (A senior officer at ECG)
The truth of  the matter is that when it comes to the renewables, the approach 
has always been different even in matured democracies and matured countries 
like the UK and the US. There were incentive mechanisms through the FiT with 
the obligation to pay. We cannot do otherwise because our scenario is even more 
complicated. (A senior officer at KITE)
You have one arm of  government or ministry promoting a green agenda and the other 
doing something that contradicts it. Ghana signed up to the Sustainable Energy for 
All initiative and our president chaired a session in the UN on sustainable energy, 
but we are talking about coal. So there is a disconnection between various government 
agencies leading on policies on energy and environmental sustainability. (A senior 
officer at KITE)
I don’t even think the minister [former minister of  power] ever thought of  
the renewable option whenever as a credible option. His thoughts were all about 
how to get fuel and thermal plants running, whereas you don’t need fuel for 
renewables. (A senior officer, ACEP)
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5.3 Lack of access to appropriate finance
Financial instruments remain essential ingredients for the development 
of  RE. It is therefore not surprising that governments and policymakers 
in developed countries create economic and financial incentives to 
facilitate the development of  renewable energy technologies. According 
to Painuly (2001), credit subsidy was introduced in Denmark to finance 
RE development for a ten-year period. Other financial instruments 
such as tax exemptions, credit facilities, and third-party financing 
mechanisms are also introduced in other jurisdictions in developed 
economies to boost RE investment (IEA Renewable Energy Working 
Party 2002).
A fundamental factor sustaining the lack of  appropriate finance 
in Ghana, which in turn affects RE investment is the low financial 
portfolios of  domestic banks. Despite its positive effect on RE 
development, current financial portfolios of  domestic banks cannot 
make the policy implementable. The high risk of  doing business 
coupled with the low portfolios of  domestic banks makes it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to access loans. This affects the pricing of  electricity from 
RE sources, which also affects consumers’ willingness to appreciate the 
usefulness of  the technology, as it is perceived to be expensive relative to 
other technologies.
The technology is still a bit expensive and you need to get a good feed-in tariff 
before you can make good business. Unfortunately, we also don’t have flexible 
financing schemes. We still have to deal with the same commercial banks and 
they don’t understand the investment aspect in the renewables. They are still doing 
short-term loans with 30 per cent to 35 per cent interest rates. (A senior officer 
at KITE)
6 Emerging interventions for change
Our interviews8 revealed institutional patterns of  support or opposition 
as well as alternative policies that could gather more support than those 
opposed. However, the article could not establish clear‑cut coalitions for 
or against policies due to insufficient information on how stakeholders 
exert power differently. The majority of  these stakeholders have not 
evolved from the mere expression of  support for or opposition to the 
policies, to building coalitions, and exertion of  different influences 
to bring about these changes. In the view of  a key stakeholder: 
‘Networking and advocacy for RE development by civil society 
organisations and allied groups have been weak in Ghana’ (a senior 
officer, ACEP). The graphs included in this section depict the group of  
stakeholders that support (upper part) and those that oppose (lower part) 
the potential policies that could boost RE development in the country. 
The policy proposed is presented under the horizontal axis and the 
dominant suggested alternative is presented in the centre.
The privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the power sector policy 
received high‑level support from the majority of  the institutions, with 
only PUWU, GII, TUC, and Solar Light opposing this policy (Figure 1). 
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Various alternative policies have been proposed by these stakeholders 
as being capable of  addressing the off-taker risk constraint. However, 
only stakeholders from GIPC, MiDA and IGC, who support the policy, 
and PUWU and Solar Light Company, who oppose the policy, have 
proposed a common alternative policy intervention. This alternative 
policy intervention to the privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the 
power sector entails guaranteeing the independence of  ECG, including 
government non‑interference, since it will facilitate the expansion of  the 
prepaid billing system to maximise revenue collection.
Similar to the privatisation of  the revenue arm of  the power sector 
policy, the improvement in the management of  ECG is widely 
accepted by a majority of  the interviewed stakeholders (Figure 2) as 
an important solution to the off-taker constraint. Only AGI, PEF, 
and the KfW Development Bank oppose this policy, considering 
it insufficient to improve the creditworthiness of  the off-taker. The 
proposed alternative policy option is a prepaid metering system and 
independence of  the ECG.
While all but one (Solar Light Company, Ghana) gave maximum 
endorsement to the establishment of  a competitive off-taker market in 
the power sector, PURC, MiDA, UT Bank, TUC, PEF, and Solar Light 
were of  the view that the creation of  a good regulatory environment, 
with independent regulators and independent distribution and retailing 
could achieve similar results (Figure 3).
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Figure 1 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to privatisation of the revenue arm
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Figure 2 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to improved management of ECG policy
Figure 3 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to the establishment of competitive off-taker market policy
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Remove/reduce taxes on RET equipment for  
commercial and household use
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Figure 4 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to the establishment of a reliable and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system
Figure 5 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to full implementation of the Renewable Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832) policy
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The majority of  the stakeholders support the establishment of  a reliable 
and transparent full-cost tariff pricing system devoid of  government 
intervention to overcome the faulty power sector regulatory constraint 
(Figure 4). The opposing stakeholders did not propose an alternative 
policy. The dominance of  the supporting group, however, shows that 
many stakeholders want this policy to be implemented.
There is total support for the full implementation of  the Renewable 
Energy Act, 2011 (Act 832) by all institutions interviewed. This is 
considered by all the institutions as a means to overcome the faulty 
power sector regulatory constraint. Nevertheless, MiDA and IGC were 
of  the view that reducing or removing taxes on RET equipment is 
equally imperative (Figure 5).
The establishment of  RE financial instruments within domestic banks 
with lower interest rates is a potential policy that could overcome the 
binding constraint on access to appropriate finance. All the institutions 
except GII and PEF are in support of  this policy (Figure 6). Solar Light 
Company and the KfW Development Bank, however, proposed external 
fund sourcing as an alternative means to improving access to finance 
for RE projects. Clearly, there is not a mutually proposed alternative 
policy by the opposing and supporting stakeholders. The dominance of  
the supporting group, however, shows that many stakeholders want the 
establishment of  RE financial instruments within domestic banks with 
lower interest rates to be implemented.
External fund sourcing through loans, grants and climate change funds
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Figure 6 Stakeholders’ support or opposition to RE financial instruments
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7 Conclusion
The discussion in this article has underscored the critical role political 
economy dynamics have played as part of  the elements influencing 
the underinvestment within the RE landscape in Ghana. While several 
factors may constrain investment in the sector, previous research using the 
Green Investment Diagnostics framework and further in‑depth interviews 
with key stakeholders unearthed three binding constraints: off-taker 
risks, inadequate power regulation, and lack of  access to appropriate 
finance. The permanence of  these binding constraints is caused by 
dominant institutional, regulatory, and policy regimes on energy in the 
country, which are more fossil fuel inclined. While several policies or 
strategies could enhance RE in the country, inertia from the country’s 
leadership coupled with the weaknesses of  advocates, have precluded 
implementation. Ghana’s political leaders should champion those RE 
policies that already attract overwhelming support from stakeholders for 
renewables to have a chance in a fossil fuel‑dominated paradigm.
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Dates of  interviews were: 10 June 2016; 19 July 2016; 20 July 2016; 
22 July 2016; 12 August 2016; 19 August 2016; 8 September 2016; 
9 September 2016.
5 www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Tarzan‑disagrees‑
with‑ECG‑workers‑over‑privatization‑465173 (accessed 15 August 2016).
6 ‘For the first five years we are telling whoever comes as a 
concessionaire that you cannot reduce the level of  employment 
within ECG. It is a way of  guaranteeing people’s jobs at least for the 
next five years’ (Chief  executive officer, Millennium Development 
Authority).
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7 www.africanews.com/2016/01/20/ghana‑labour‑groups‑protest‑
increase‑in‑utility‑and‑taxes/ (accessed 15 August 2016).
8 The definitions of  the acronyms for these organisations are as follows: 
AGI – Association of  Ghana Industries; GIPC – Ghana Investment 
Promotion Council; GII – Ghana Integrity Initiative; IGC – 
International Growth Centre; IGGS – Institute of  Green Growth 
Solutions; KASA – Kasa Initiative Ghana; KITE – Kumasi Institute 
of  Technology and Environment; MiDA – Millennium Development 
Authority; PEF – Private Enterprise Federation; PURC –Public 
Utilities Regulatory Commission of  Ghana; PUWU – Public Utilities 
Workers Union; Solar Light – Solar Light Ghana; TUC – Trade 
Union Congress; UT Bank – UT Bank Ghana Ltd.
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The Political Economy of Aid for 
Power Sector Reform
Neil McCulloch, Esméralda Sindou and John Ward1
Abstract Recent literature on the effectiveness of donor programmes 
points to the importance of understanding the political context within 
which reforms are taking place. The characteristics of the power sector 
make reform intensely political in almost all countries and donor projects 
have sometimes failed because of an inability to navigate the local politics 
of reform. This article reviews what is known about how donors have taken 
politics into account in designing and implementing power sector reform 
programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. It illustrates the challenges which 
donors have faced with reference to a case study of donor attempts to 
support power sector reform in Tanzania. The article draws on documentary 
evidence from major donors as well as a set of qualitative interviews with 
experienced project supervisors to provide a set of lessons for donors about 
how to incorporate political context into the design and implementation of 
power sector projects.
Keywords: political economy, aid, power sector reform, electricity, 
Tanzania, donors.
1 Introduction
There has been a resurgence of  interest in recent years, amongst both 
practitioners and the academic community, in the political economy 
of  donor engagement in reform processes (Carothers and de Gramont 
2013). A series of  studies has suggested that projects that take a flexible 
and adaptive approach to reform have been more successful. For 
example, Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock (2012) and Andrews (2014) 
have argued that programmes should focus on problem-solving through 
an iterative process; whilst Pritchett, Samji and Hammer (2013) have 
argued that projects should ‘crawl the design space’ for solutions. 
Similarly, Booth (2015) argues for the need to ‘think and work politically’, 
whilst Levy (2014) provides a theoretical framework for how reform can 
‘work with the grain’ of  the domestic political reality. There is also a 
growing literature of  comparative case studies (e.g. Booth and Unsworth 
2014) that argues that aid programmes which are flexible, long-term 
and locally owned are likely to be much more effective in achieving 
sustainable change than more traditional ‘linear’ programmes.
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Donors have been paying attention to this literature and are increasingly 
recognising that an appreciation of  the politics of  the sectors and 
countries in which they are operating is essential for successful and 
sustainable reform. One of  the consequences of  this work has been 
considerably greater interest and uptake by donors in ‘political economy 
analysis’ (PEA) (Fritz, Levy and Ort 2014). Many donors now routinely 
conduct a PEA as part of  the preparation of  a project and some embed 
regular sectoral or issue-based PEAs into the operation of  projects. 
Some have gone even further – for example, the Department for 
International Development (DFID) has sent several hundred of  its staff 
on a training course about politics and institutions in order to try to 
change the mindset of  technical staff about the importance of  political 
considerations in projects. What is less clear is the extent to which such 
analysis is translating into different designs and different approaches to 
the implementation of  projects. A recent review of  DFID experience 
suggested that, whilst PEAs have been mainstreamed in many areas, this 
has resulted in relatively little change in the types of  projects that are 
actually implemented (Piron et al. 2016). 
This article examines how donors have tried to take political context 
into account in their support of  reform efforts in one particular area 
and region – power sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa. In most 
countries, power systems are centralised, mainly based on a national 
grid, and although electricity is part of  the development narrative of  
most countries, it tends to be controlled by a domestic elite, and is a 
significant source of  rents. Thus, although there is politics associated 
with reform in all sectors, the characteristics of  the power sector make 
accounting for political considerations particularly important. 
There is already a literature on the political economy of  power sector 
reform. Numerous papers have looked at the politics of  reform 
(see Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) and Eberhard et al. (2016) for 
descriptions of  reform in sub-Saharan Africa; Dubash and Rajan (2001) 
and Tongia (2006) describe the political economy of  reform in India; 
Victor and Heller (2006) describe the politics of  reform in five major 
developing economies; Scott and Seth (2013) provide a literature 
review of  reform of  electricity distribution in developing countries; 
Kojima, Bacon and Trimble (2014) review the literature on reform of  
power sector subsidies). However, this literature focuses on the political 
economy of  the reform process within individual countries, where the 
main actors are government, business, and voters.
By contrast, rather little has been written about the role of  donors 
and the extent to which they have taken knowledge about the politics 
of  reform into account in the design and implementation of  their 
programmes in Africa. Our research questions are: to what extent have 
donors analysed the underlying political constraints that they face? 
Have donors significantly shifted the nature of  the power sector reform 
programmes which they implement as a result of  a better understanding 
of  the political context? Are they taking on board the lessons from 
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recent research on ‘thinking and working politically’ and, if  so, how? 
Are there general lessons that can be learned about what sorts of  
approaches to power sector reform are more, or less, successful and how 
this varies by context? 
This article reviews the existing studies – both published and, where 
available, donor evaluations – looking at how donors have navigated 
the political economy of  power sector reform. It complements this by 
collecting documentation on power sector reform projects implemented 
by the major donors in Tanzania over the last decade or so. This is 
supplemented with qualitative analysis based on a set of  interviews 
with experienced donor officials responsible for the implementation 
of  power sector reform projects. We conclude with a summary of  the 
lessons, from the literature and our case study, about how donors might 
respond more effectively to the political challenges associated with 
power sector reform.
2 Methodology
Our methodology has three components.
First, we examine the literature about the political economy of  aid 
in the power sector (including reviews conducted by donors such as 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Emerging Markets (2004); Besant-Jones 
(2006); and Deloitte (2015)). We limit the scope of  this review to 
studies that have examined the role of  donors in power sector reform 
in developing countries and how they have designed and implemented 
such programmes in the prevailing political context in the countries of  
operation. Thus, we do not review all studies on the political economy 
of  power sector reform, but focus on synthesising available literature on 
how this has influenced donor programming in sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular. 
Second, we have attempted to obtain information and documentation 
about the power sector reform projects supported by donors over the 
last decade (or longer where appropriate) in Tanzania. Tanzania was 
chosen because of  the length and intensity of  donor engagement in 
power sector reform, providing a literature and experience to draw on. 
The documentation for these projects was then used to answer a set 
of  questions including: how political considerations were taken into 
account in the design of  the project; how challenges and blockages 
were handled during the course of  implementation; what the overall 
performance of  the project was; and what lessons were learned in terms 
of  project design and implementation.
Third, we conducted a series of  qualitative interviews with experienced 
project supervisors from the major donors who were supporting power 
sector reform for Tanzania. This was in order to obtain their views 
about the critical success factors for power sector reform projects and, 
specifically, how projects have attempted to take into account the politics 
of  sector reform.2
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3 A brief history of donor engagement in power sector reform
Although donors have been involved in supporting power sector 
investments since the 1950s, the nature of  development partner 
involvement in power sector reform in developing countries is rooted 
in the transformations that affected the sector in Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in the 
1980s. During that time, a combination of  political, financial, and 
technical factors triggered power sector reforms in the UK, Chile, and 
Norway (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). These countries’ experiences 
appeared to demonstrate the benefits of  such reforms, which were 
then followed by several other industrialised and some developing 
nations from the early 1990s. Since then, power sector reform has 
been advocated by the development community, including the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank 
of  Reconstruction and Development, as well as other international 
agencies, such as the World Energy Council (Bacon and Besant-Jones 
2002). Thus, donors have played a major role as the architects of  
reforms in the power sector, and have often attempted to initiate reform 
through the provision of  technical assistance and capacity-building 
programmes in developing countries (Wamukonya 2003; Dornan 2014). 
At first, most development partners typically implemented a somewhat 
uniform approach to power sector reform. The approach taken in 
OECD countries crystallised into a ‘standard’ or ‘textbook’ approach 
to restructuring the sector, which aimed at fully unbundling and 
liberalising the power sector following a logical sequence of  distinct 
steps: corporatisation, commercialisation, legislation, regulation, 
restructuring, privatisation, and competition (Gratwick and Eberhard 
2008; Joskow 2006; Littlechild 2006; Hunt 2002). 
The development community promoted power sector reform out of  
a belief  that the standard ‘model’ would enable the transformation of  
poorly performing energy systems in developing countries, promoting 
growth and improving access for poor populations. It was felt that the 
recommended structure and regulation of  the sector would benefit 
consumers by allowing their participation in the market and by ensuring 
consumer protection (United States Government Accountability Office 
2005). In the words of  one former senior donor official from a major 
multilateral donor, ‘there was, in the early 1990s, a strong belief  that 
one size did actually fit all.’
However, the application of  the ‘standard model’ of  reform in 
developing countries yielded rather modest results, as it faced significant 
political barriers (Besant-Jones 2006; Choynowski 2004). The consensus 
in the literature is that the standard model failed for three main reasons. 
First, it often failed to take account of  the vastly different circumstances 
prevailing in developing countries from those in the OECD countries 
where it was first implemented. For example, the textbook model 
for power sector reform did not make sense in many small African 
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countries, where the necessary degree of  competition in the generation 
segment cannot be obtained due to the small size of  the power system 
and insufficient generation capacity (Barnett 2014). 
Second, the model struggled to map out a feasible pathway for reform. 
As Victor and Heller summarise, ‘[T]he standard textbook for reform 
focuses on the end point, namely an unbundled, privately owned and 
competitive power sector, not on the steps that governments need to 
take towards that end’ (2006: 21). In practice, governments tried a wide 
variety of  approaches to reach the end point, not all of  which were 
successful (Chikuni et al. 2011).
Third, and perhaps most important, many reform attempts failed to 
understand or, at least, to take account of, the underlying political 
constraints facing decision-makers. In almost all countries, reform of  
the power sector is an extremely sensitive area. Electricity is part of  
the development vision of  all countries and therefore brings significant 
political benefits to leaders who can control the price of  and access to a 
key developmental service. Economies of  scale mean that large financial 
flows are involved in procuring power production, transmission, 
and distribution systems. The centralised nature of  the technology 
concentrates control in the hands of  relatively few powerful individuals.3 
As a result, the location of  transmission and distribution lines can be 
driven by electoral considerations, power may be rationed to influence 
voters, and power generation may fluctuate with the election cycle 
(Tripp 2012; de Mesquita and Smith 2009). Utilities have historically 
been used to serve the broader patronage system and became large 
employers (Barnett 2014). As reforms often emphasise restructuring 
utilities, they have faced strong resistance from labour unions (Eberhard 
2004; Dubash and Rajan 2001). Reforms also encouraged cost-reflective 
pricing, but the associated price increases have resulted in popular 
uprisings in several countries including Argentina, India, Indonesia, 
Ghana, and South Africa (Dubash and Rajan 2001).4 
Thus, rather than the ‘standard model’, the reforms of  the last two decades 
have generated a wide variety of  ‘hybrid’ structures (see Eberhard et al. 
(2016); Trimble et al. (2016) for a recent classification of  different systems 
in Africa). In each case, these reflect the outcome of  a complex and 
context-specific contestation both between domestic actors (utilities, 
independent power producers, regulators, finance ministries, energy 
ministries, and political leaders) and between domestic and international 
actors (independent power producers, donors, and other financiers).
Donors responded to the challenges of  implementation in different 
ways. Some development partners had considerably more leverage than 
others due to the scale of  the resources which they were providing. The 
literature points to examples, predominantly from the 1990s, where 
countries were effectively forced to implement the reforms suggested 
by donors because of  the conditions included in loan packages 
(Wamukonya 2003; Lefevre and Todoc 2000).
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There is also evidence that pressure to implement the recommended 
reforms was strengthened by coordination amongst donors. The 
World Bank, for example, refused to fund more capital investments 
until specific reforms had been implemented and most other donors 
would only support programmes that the Bank had approved 
(Barnett 2014). 
Some donors also responded by attempting to insulate reforms from 
politics. For example, Bouille, Dubrovsky and Maurer (2002) describe 
how in Argentina, a small group of  politically powerful bureaucrats, 
supported by multilateral agencies, designed the reforms without 
engaging with other relevant public agencies or civil society. However, 
this opaque process created political opposition and resulted in a lack of  
ownership of  the reforms by key stakeholders. 
By the early 2000s, the donor community was conscious of  the difficulties 
being encountered in the implementation of  power sector reform in 
developing countries. The World Bank commissioned a major review 
of  its power sector operations which has been extremely influential in 
shaping the approach taken by most development partners over the last 
decade (Besant-Jones 2006). It concluded that ‘the most important lesson 
from reforming power markets in developing countries is that “cookbook” 
solutions for reforming their power markets are ruled out by the extensive 
range of  economic and institutional endowments of  these countries’ 
(ibid.: 1).
The consequence of  this reappraisal was the abandonment of  the 
‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. The World Bank issued new Operational 
Guidance to its staff (World Bank 2004), which emphasised context 
specificity and the importance of  the political dimensions of  reform. 
In particular, a stronger focus was put on identifying ‘stakeholders with 
the incentive and influence to press for improved performance’ and 
‘top-level political decision makers’, who will be able to champion the 
reform process (Fritz et al. 2014: 134; Levy 2007).
The last decade has therefore seen a considerable amount of  
experimentation by development partners and closer attention to 
understanding the political context. But donors still face considerable 
challenges in navigating the complex politics of  power sector reform 
and it is not clear whether the deeper understanding of  context has 
yet translated into donors undertaking different interventions in the 
countries that they support. Thompson and Bazilian (2014) assert that 
donor-funded technical assistance and capacity-building activities still 
avoid ‘the fundamental political issue of  who wields political power and 
how that power is wielded’. And Naqvi (2016), in examining the role of  
development actors in power sector reform in Pakistan, highlights how 
awareness of  the complex political problems associated with reform 
is not sufficient to avoid them, pointing to a higher order of  structural 
obstacles within development partners that remain unaddressed.
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To understand these obstacles further and assess how donors have 
addressed them, the next section examines reforms in Tanzania and the 
role of  development partners in the process.
4 Power sector reform in Tanzania
4.1 The Tanzanian reform experience
The Tanzanian power sector is dominated by a state-owned and 
vertically integrated utility, the Tanzania Electricity Supply Company 
(TANESCO), which has been struggling financially for many years. Its 
precarious financial situation has led to chronic underinvestment in the 
sector, from both public and private investors, which in turn resulted in 
significant underperformance for decades, both in terms of  quality of  
supply and coverage. The lack of  reliable electricity supply has been 
identified as one of  the three major constraints to growth in the country 
(Partnership for Growth 2011). 
Reforms began in the 1990s, when the country’s structural adjustment 
programme supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank, was expanded to the power sector through the 
inclusion of  sector-specific conditions in general budget support. 
Restructuring and privatisation were deemed the solution to 
TANESCO’s financial deficits and the generation segment was opened 
to independent power producers (Ghanadan and Eberhard 2007). 
In the mid-1990s, reflecting the expectations that the private sector 
would fill the investment gap in the generation segment, donors mostly 
withdrew their direct support to the development of  power projects. 
Unfortunately, the relatively rapid reduction in donor funding for power 
supply and technical investments worsened the investment gap in the 
sector, as private capital failed to pick up. 
Despite the changes associated with the reforms, neither TANESCO’s 
financial situation nor the quality of  supply improved. This led to the 
management of  TANESCO being outsourced to a private company 
from 2002 until the end of  2006. The management contract placed an 
overwhelming emphasis on increasing the utility’s short-term revenues, 
which may have deterred long-term investments. The results of  this 
were also unconvincing – whilst commercial performance improved, 
there was little improvement in service quality or transmission and 
distribution losses. In 2005, the newly elected government terminated 
the management contract at the end of  2006 and de-specified 
TANESCO for privatisation. 
Consequently, between 1997 and 2006, the utility suffered from a critical 
lack of  investments, in its workforce, systems, and infrastructure, reflecting 
the view that long-term investments would not benefit the government or 
the managing entity, as TANESCO was expected to be privatised. The 
‘generation gap’ left in TANESCO by the lack of  recruitment in the last 
decade is still a major concern for the utility. The utility also requires a 
technological turnaround and related capacity building, as its systems 
have not kept speed with the revolution in industry-specific technologies.
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Notwithstanding the difficulties in reforming TANESCO, the 2000s 
saw significant changes in the legal, regulatory, and institutional 
environment. The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority 
(EWURA) Act was passed in 2001 (although it only came into being 
in 2006). On paper, the institutional structure and governance of  the 
sector is excellent, as the legislation guarantees the autonomy of  the 
regulator and the participation of  the public. However, in practice, 
the Ministry of  Energy and Minerals can exercise political pressure 
and intervenes on regulatory issues, in particular, tariff setting. Other 
changes included the creation of  a Rural Electrification Agency in 2005, 
to focus on extending access. And in 2008 an Electricity Act was passed 
that encourages private participation in the sector. 
Whilst these legislative and institutional changes might signal a 
renewed commitment for creating a conducive environment for 
private investments (Kapika and Eberhard 2013), the deals struck 
with private investors have not always been transparent, which has 
heightened suspicion about private sector investments. For example, the 
lack of  planning in the sector, combined with severe droughts, forced 
TANESCO to resort to emergency power producers in 2006 and 2011. 
The absence of  competitive and transparent tendering resulted in one of  
the largest scandals in the country’s history (Kapika and Eberhard 2013) 
and put TANESCO on the verge of  bankruptcy, as the negotiated cost 
of  electricity with emergency power producers significantly exceeded 
the tariff. This experience demonstrates that strong negotiation skills 
and an in-depth knowledge of  competitive procurement in the utility are 
paramount to enable private sector participation in the long term.
In 2013, the Government of  Tanzania, through ‘Big Results Now’, 
a programme aimed at fast-tracking projects of  national importance 
in key sectors of  the economy, including energy, promised a reform 
of  the sector (Government of  Tanzania 2013) including unbundling, 
commercialisation, and sale. This has been followed by a new Roadmap 
which was approved by the Cabinet in 2015. However, the latter was 
funded by the African Development Bank and was undertaken by a 
Western consultancy company. Its recommendations bear a strong 
resemblance to the ‘standard model’, promising to unbundle and 
liberalise the power sector by 2025. The election of  President Magufuli 
in 2015 led to the dismantling of  the Big Results Now programme. In 
January 2017, the managing director of  TANESCO was removed and 
a tariff increase was reversed; more recently, the director-general of  the 
regulator was suspended. Both moves point to the continued influence 
of  political considerations in the management of  the power sector. 
4.2 The role of donors 
Traditionally, the dominant approach to influencing power sector 
reform in Tanzania has been through general budget support. 
Combined commitments from donors were substantial and represented 
a potentially influential tool, since some donors have made the 
disbursement of  their loans conditional on the adoption of  reforms. 
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Since the Busan Partnership agreement on development cooperation in 
December 2011, ‘a lot of  donors were going for low-hanging fruits’ to 
yield measurable ‘results’ quickly, ‘instead of  thinking of  the long term,’ 
according to one interviewee.5 Also, despite some willingness amongst 
donors to develop a common Performance Assessment Framework to 
measure the effectiveness of  aid, there has been a lack of  alignment 
between the framework and the conditions of  disbursement of  further 
loans. This was due to both the complexity of  the results framework and 
competing donor interests and approaches. 
Coordination is also made more difficult by the large number of  
development partners working in Tanzania; and this is reinforced by the 
limited ability of  the Tanzanian government to coordinate them. In an 
attempt to address this, donors have formed the Energy Development 
Partners’ Group, intended as a sector-wide platform for dialogue 
with government. However, as each country’s presence in Tanzania is 
founded on bilateral diplomatic relationships, the government has no 
incentive to deal with development partners as a united block of  donors. 
Commercial interests have not been absent from the considerations of  
bilateral donors when promoting reforms. In the words of  one senior 
donor official6 from a major bilateral donor, the ‘dialogue with the 
main sector stakeholders started very good, and development partners 
managed to affect them in many many areas, until a number of  
development partners wanted to promote their interests more than that 
of  the Tanzanians. Then the relationship became difficult.’ This has 
undermined trust between the government and donors, since it is not 
always clear to the government that the approach being promoted is in 
the long-term interest of  Tanzania. 
Furthermore, some development partners have a particular ideological 
position about unbundling and liberalisation, despite the limited 
number of  actors in the sector, which makes it difficult to achieve 
enough competition in the market, and the lack of  high-level expertise 
necessary to manage the independent system operator required. In 
other cases, the relatively rapid rotation of  staff in donor agencies can 
mean that there is an insufficient understanding of  the country’s politics 
combined with a lack of  skill in supervising and monitoring reform 
recommendations produced by independent consultants to ensure that 
they are consistent with the local context. This might also be amplified 
by the fact that consultants are often contracted by donors, with limited 
inputs from the government, and, in turn, frequently recycle the 
standard model with relatively little modification for country context.
The experience of  donor engagements in Tanzania exemplifies some of  
the key challenges faced by external actors in promoting power sector 
reform. Frequent changes in government policy and attitude towards 
reform, combined with a mistrust of  the motives of  foreign partners 
and an historical antipathy towards the private sector make it hard for 
development partners to support a reform process. For their part, a lack 
174 | McCulloch et al. The Political Economy of Aid for Power Sector Reform
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
of  serious analysis of  the underlying political constraints, combined with 
rapid turnover of  donor officials, has resulted in a reliance on a standard 
model of  reform with seemingly little attempt to tailor this to Tanzania’s 
context. The result has been de jure reforms which satisfy the donors and 
release funding, but little de facto reform in the way in which the sector 
operates. However, the efforts of  specific individuals to build trusting 
relationships with key government counterparts and tailor interventions 
accordingly have yielded important practical reforms in some areas.
5 Lessons learned
Our analysis of  the academic literature and documentation from donor 
projects, along with our interviews with donor officials suggest some 
general lessons for policymakers, both in development partners and 
developing country governments.
5.1 Analysing the underlying politics of change in a country is valuable – 
but only if used 
One of  the surprising findings that emerged from our interviews was 
the absence of  any significant formal analysis of  the political context, 
in which reforms were being undertaken. Reforms were viewed as 
technical with the result that the only analysis undertaken prior to the 
implementation of  projects were assessments of  the different technical 
aspects of  the project, rather than assessment of  the wider political 
context and the incentives facing the various stakeholders.7 Even where 
assessments are done, there seems to be little connection between 
the theoretical assessments provided by political economy analysis 
and operational programmes implemented on the ground (Levy and 
Palale (2014) provide an exception for Zambia). There is also a tension 
between those that believe that developing a deep understanding of  the 
local political context is essential to success and others who believe that 
remaining politically ‘neutral’ requires focusing only on technical aspects.
Notwithstanding this, almost all donor officials interviewed displayed a 
detailed understanding of  the political context in which they operated, 
with many arguing that success depended far more on intensive 
engagement with counterparts in government than any formal analysis 
of  the context. As one respondent put it, ‘[H]aving key staff and 
development partners work intensively and over a long period of  time 
[with the government] is important.’8 However, the instruments at 
their disposal, the pressure to disburse, and the processes with which 
they had to comply seemed to, at best, discourage taking a slower and 
more reflective approach to engagement. For all donors, it appears 
to be difficult to not pursue reform, even if  there is evidence that the 
particular pathway being proposed is unlikely to be successful.
Indeed, most projects provide an optimistic view about what will be 
achieved and only mention political interference as a potential risk to 
implementation. This is despite the fact most donor officials accepted 
that political interference in the power sector was a near certainty, 
and that many previous projects had cost two or three times as much 
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as originally anticipated and taken two or three times longer than 
originally planned. It is not entirely clear why development partners are 
driven to pursue reforms; this may relate to the ‘mental model’ adopted 
by the donor (see Section 5.4), or to the belief  that funds are only likely 
to be effective if  reforms take place. However, it would appear that the 
internal approval processes for such projects may sometimes discourage 
honesty about the practical political challenges that they entail.
There would also appear to be a reluctance to apply such analysis ex post 
as well. With the exception of  the World Bank, no other development 
partner had readily available project completion reports for power sector 
projects (including those supporting policy reforms) and virtually no 
donors appear to have assessed in a systematic fashion the political factors 
that determined success or failure. There would appear to be a strong 
case for more systematic ex post evaluation of  power sector projects.
5.2 Flexibility is important – but there are reasons why it is difficult
Much of  the recent mantra about project design is that donor 
programmes (in all sectors) should be flexible and adaptive (Andrews et al. 
2012). Indeed, some of  the successes reflect the ability for development 
partners to act in a flexible and opportunistic way. Flexibility also allows 
donors to shift focus to take account of  changes in government and key 
personnel in counterparts, as well as enabling implementing partners to 
experiment with alternative approaches to solving problems.9
However, respondents also pointed to significant structural and 
procedural reasons as to why flexibility is difficult. For example, 
USAID receives funding from Congress that is allocated by sector 
and by country, inhibiting the flexibility to shift resources from less 
effective to more effective areas. Internal structures can also matter – 
complex reforms often require multidisciplinary approaches, but donor 
staff are often arranged by sector and discipline, making building a 
multidisciplinary team difficult. Different types of  donors can also 
work with different counterparts. Bilateral donors generally have the 
capability to work with a range of  counterparts in developing countries, 
including sometimes, the private sector and civil society and to work 
through contractors. Multilateral organisations, by contrast, are 
typically constrained to work through government which can restrict 
the nature of  programmes that they can operate. This is a particular 
problem in the power sector, where projects often must work through 
the Ministry of  Energy, even where political influence by the ministry is 
a key constraint in progressing reform.
Flexibility is particularly difficult when it comes to stopping ongoing 
initiatives. Once approved, the obligation on donor officials and 
implementers is to make a success of  a project. This provides strong 
incentives to continue activities, even when external, often politically 
induced, changes have made the chances of  success slim. Conversely, 
officials have greater flexibility to add components to programmes, with 
the result that programmes evolve by growth rather than by re-allocation.
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Flexible programmes are also perceived to be more difficult to evaluate. 
Building a good relationship may be key to achieving reform, but is 
hard to assess in a results matrix. Flexible programmes typically consist 
of  multiple initiatives which are not known in advance, making it much 
harder to design a monitoring and evaluation framework for such 
programmes.10 
Donor programmes are evolving to address some of  the challenges 
created by flexible programming, but difficulties remain. For example, 
some of  the recent programmes designed by DFID in other sectors 
have deliberately built-in flexibility to allow a response to changing 
and emerging needs of  the host country government. This may be 
easier in larger programmes, especially those backed by a long-standing 
relationship between donors and host country governments. At the 
same time, the monitoring and evaluation can be facilitated by retaining 
a clear sense of  the overall outcomes that the donor programme is 
seeking to effect. But the stakeholders interviewed for this case study 
suggested that, despite some progress towards more flexible programme 
design, the structural and procedural constraints outlined previously 
remain a significant barrier to more flexible and politically informed 
ways of  working.
5.3 Dialogue, trust, and personal relationships are of critical importance 
for reform
Perhaps the most consistent message from our interviews related to 
the critical importance of  dialogue, trust, and personal relationships 
with key decision-makers. Again, this is true for all sectors, not just 
the power sector11 – but the long-term nature and sunk costs of  power 
sector reforms make the issue of  particular salience. Respondents 
often attributed programme failures to a lack of  trust between the 
government and donors. Almost every instance of  successful reform was 
related to the construction of  an effective working relationship through 
intensive and repeated interaction, often over a long period of  time. 
A number of  respondents pointed to the need to understand the nature 
of  the constraints facing policymakers and the need to ‘listen more and 
lecture less’. One respondent argued that loan conditionality was only 
effective when the conditions were suggested by the government as a 
mechanism to help them to handle domestic resistance. Overall, there 
was a consensus that ‘there is no substitute for an experienced and 
credible [donor] staff member who has the trust and confidence of  the 
key decision-maker.’12
Notwithstanding the almost universal support for the importance of  
building trust, there was a sense from some respondents that donor 
structures and training are making this more difficult than before. Some 
officials highlighted the burden of  process compliance taking time that 
might otherwise be spent engaging key stakeholders. Some related the 
bureaucratic burden to risk aversion associated with (donor country) 
domestic political concerns; others pointed to the results agenda as a 
source of  additional administrative work to ‘prove’ that aid is working. 
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A number of  respondents suggested that the frequent rotation of  
donor staff undermines the ability to build long-term relationships with 
key government counterparts and noted the difficulty of  maintaining 
institutional memory as well as a good understanding of  the country’s 
recent history. For example, one official suggested that the reticence of  
Tanzanian officials to pursue certain types of  reform was rooted in the 
experience of  reform attempts in the early 1990s; failing to understand 
this might result in pursuing reform models which, although technically 
sound, were politically unfeasible.
5.4 Mental models matter
As noted in the literature review, the application of  the standard model 
for power sector reform has not generally been successful in developing 
countries. Notwithstanding the growing body of  evidence supporting this, 
the core elements of  the standard model – unbundling, commercialisation, 
privatisation, competition – still appear to hold sway in the thinking, both 
of  development partners and some government officials. However, some 
senior donor officials argue that this view is mistaken, firstly because the 
standard model was rarely actually implemented in practice and so cannot 
be deemed to have failed; and secondly, because adherence to the model 
was abandoned in the early 2000s, notably by the World Bank, as evidence 
of  its unsuitability came to light.
Although both of  these are true, our research leads us to believe that 
the ‘standard model’ still holds considerable sway as a ‘mental model’. 
The standard model is clear, coherent and logical. It was generally 
regarded as a success in England and Wales, Chile and Norway. Despite 
accepting the need for context specificity, development partners have 
struggled to adjust because there is no other compelling ‘mental model’ 
to which to refer. Rather, a set of  path-dependent ‘hybrid’ models 
has begun to develop (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008) based on local 
experimentation within different political contexts. However, most 
international consultants, on whom donor officials depend, are still 
most familiar with the standard model. As a result, it has been difficult 
for donors to shift their advice, whilst developing countries have found 
it hard to gain donor acceptance of  the somewhat expedient and 
path-dependent approaches that have been implemented in practice.
5.5 There may be an opportunity to build domestic demand for reform
One of  the surprising findings from the project documentation and 
interviews was that development partners have put relatively little effort 
into building a wider domestic constituency for reform in the countries 
in which they operate. In general, donors appear to have interpreted 
the ‘country ownership’ principle of  the Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development to mean government ownership. None of  the projects 
reviewed in Tanzania included activities to build support for reform 
outside of  government.
There are several reasons for this. First, in some countries donor projects 
are tightly controlled by the government, which may be unsympathetic 
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towards activities that attempt to support advocacy activities. Moreover, 
many donors, particularly the multilateral development banks, typically 
work directly with government counterparts, making work with other 
stakeholders more challenging. Indeed, some respondents argued that, 
in certain countries, it was neither possible nor necessary to engage with 
wider civil society since all the key decisions were taken by a narrow 
group centred on the government.
Second, several donor officials said that engaging groups outside of  
government in favour of  support was not possible because there simply 
was not a constituency of  support for reform. For example, large 
industrial customers, who constitute the majority of  electricity demand, 
can have significant influence over policy – but their interest is primarily 
in maintaining low prices. Small businesses without electricity might be 
expected to support improvements in access, but generally do not wish to 
pay a significantly higher tariff to obtain it. And the majority of  households 
in Tanzania are poor and are not believed to support cost-reflective tariffs 
that would significantly increase the price of  access and supply.
This lack of  interest in building coalitions in support of  reform is 
nonetheless surprising, given the growing literature on the importance 
of  building broader coalitions to achieve sustainable reform (see 
Faustino and Booth 2014; Buckley, McCulloch and Travis 2017). Whilst 
no one is likely to be in favour of  price increases in the short term, 
there are constituencies that would benefit from reform in the longer 
term (e.g. businesses that obtain more reliable supply; households and 
communities that can be connected because the utility is able to invest 
in expansion; civil society groups campaigning against corruption in the 
sector, etc.). There are strong parallels with the literature on fuel subsidy 
reform, where effective communication about the issue to build a wider 
constituency of  support has been an essential part of  successful reforms 
(Beaton et al. 2013; Kojima et al. 2014).
6 Conclusion
Our central finding is that, whilst development partners are often fully 
aware of  the political nature of  reform of  the power sector, they appear 
to devote much less attention to the analysis of  these political constraints 
and that what analysis there is has little or no influence on the nature 
of  programmes that are put in place. Moreover, many development 
partners appear to be unaware of  the emerging aid modalities for 
engaging with such dynamic political contexts or, for structural or 
political reasons, are unable or unwilling to adopt them.
We suggest that, at a minimum, future programme designs should 
start with a detailed analysis of  the underlying motivations of  the key 
actors and institutions in order to identify reform pathways that are 
politically feasible, rather than just those that are technically desirable. 
In general, donor interventions in this field should be based around 
the concept of  ‘politically feasible and technically sound’ rather than 
the present approach of  proposing technically sound solutions with the 
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lack of  political feasibility treated as a risk to be mitigated. Our work 
also suggests that development partners face a difficult choice between 
two rather different principles. One the one hand, where the political 
analysis indicates that certain reforms are likely to be impossible, they 
must find ways to ‘work with the grain’ (Levy 2014), i.e. to identify 
useful activities that are consistent with the current political equilibrium 
to maximise the chances of  success. On the other hand, sometimes 
long-term sustainability requires a change in the political equilibrium. 
This suggests that development partners should consider ways in which 
they can support legitimate, credible domestic actors to challenge the 
status quo. Such interventions are common in the wider governance field, 
but rare in power sector reform.
Finally, our work poses an empirical challenge. Our theory is that 
new, more politically savvy approaches may help development partner 
interventions on power sector reform to be more successful. Insofar as 
such approaches are adopted going forward, there is a need to test this 
empirically to see whether such programmes are actually more effective 
and how their success or failure depends on the nature of  the political 
context and the way in which they are implemented.
Notes
1 We would like to thank Catherine Wolfram and Paul Gertler for 
their overall intellectual guidance of  the Energy and Economic 
Growth research programme for which the working paper preceding 
this article was originally produced, as well as Marcela Tarazona, 
Carson Cristiano and Felicity Le Quesne for their excellent 
management of  the process. John Besant-Jones, Anton Eberhard, 
Vivien Foster, Catrina Godinho, Alan Lee, Joyashree Roy and 
Jonathan Walters, as well as two anonymous reviewers, provided 
helpful comments and suggestions, and Ana Pueyo and Simon 
Bawakyillenuo gave excellent editorial guidance. We are grateful 
for financial support from UK Aid, through the Department for 
International Development (DFID). Our principal debt is to the 
senior aid officials from a range of  agencies who gave generously of  
their time to explain how donors have attempted to engage with the 
complex political economy of  power sector reform.
2 Donors interviewed include: DFID, USAID, Power Africa, 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the World 
Bank and the African Development Bank.
3 There is, of  course, a live debate about how developing countries 
might ‘leapfrog’ Western centralised power systems by adopting 
technology which allows a more distributed form of  production, 
transmission, and distribution.
4 Hall, Lobina and de la Motte (2005) document civil society 
opposition to water and electricity privatisation in developing 
countries; Wood (2005) notes that fundamentally different 
understandings of  public participation amongst stakeholders have 
stunted meaningful dialogue around reform.
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5 Interview, September 2016. 
6 Interview, September 2016.
7 It is possible that donors may undertake these assessments but not 
publish them because of  their sensitivity. Whilst this may be true, our 
interviews suggest that formal assessments of  this kind are rare and 
that these issues, if  tackled at all, are typically addressed informally 
through discussions around assumptions and risks.
8 Interview, September 2016.
9 This said, flexibility is not always seen as positive – one experienced 
donor official commented that ‘flexibility in reform tactics is often 
necessary, whereas flexibility in reform strategy is seldom advisable’ 
(interview, September 2016).
10 Although not impossible – see Ladner (2015) for recent work in this 
area.
11 Indeed, one of  the challenges in building these relationships can 
be that work in the power sector may be a small component of  the 
overall work of  some donors and so resources are devoted to building 
relationships elsewhere.
12 Interview, September 2016.
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Glossary
ACEP Africa Centre for Energy Policy [Ghana]
AEECT Applied Electrical Engineering and Computing  
 Technologies
AEG Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft [General  
 Electricity Company, Germany]
AFD French Development Agency
AfDB African Development Bank [Côte D’Ivoire]
AGI Association of  Ghana Industries
AICD Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
ANC African National Congress [South Africa]
APEC Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation [Singapore]
AURES Auctions for Renewable Energy Support [Denmark]
BMZ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche  
 Zusammenarbeit [Federal Ministry for Economic  
 Cooperation and Development, Germany]
BNEF Bloomberg New Energy Finance [USA]
BSM benefit-sharing mechanism
CAFOD Catholic Agency for Overseas Development [UK]
CGE Computable General Equilibrium
COFEK Consumer Federation of  Kenya
CPI consumer prices index
CSIC Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas  
 [National Research Council of  Spain]
CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research  
 [South Africa]
CSP concentrated solar power
C-SIREA Capacity for a Successful Implementation of  the  
 Renewable Energy Act in Ghana
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food & Rural  
 Affairs [UK]
DFID Department for International Development [UK]
DG DEVCO European Commission International Cooperation  
 and Development [Belgium]
DME Department of  Minerals and Energy [South Africa]
DoE Department of  Energy [South Africa]
DTI Department for Trade and Industry [South Africa]
EAPP East Africa Power Pool [Kenya]
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and  
 Development [UK]
ECG Electricity Corporation of  Ghana
ECOWAS Economic Community of  West African States  
 [Nigeria]
ECREEE ECOWAS Centre for Renewable Energy and  
 Energy Efficiency [Cape Verde]
186 | Glossary DOI: 10.19088/1968-2017.169
Vol. 48 No. 5–6 November 2017: ‘Green Power for Africa: Overcoming the Main Constraints’
EENS expected energy not served
EIB European Investment Bank [Luxembourg]
EMPD Energy Management and Power Delivery
EnCG Energy Commission of  Ghana
EPC engineering, procurement, and construction
EPSRC Engineering and Physical Sciences Research  
 Council [UK]
ERA Electricity Regulatory Authority [Uganda]
ERC Energy Regulatory Commission [Kenya]
EUEI PDF European Union Energy Initiative Partnership  
 Dialogue Facility [Germany]
EWURA Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority  
 [Tanzania]
EY Ernst & Young
fFIP fixed feed-in premium
FIP feed-in premium
FIT/FiT feed-in tariff
FPIC free, prior, and informed consent
GAA generation adequacy assessment
GAMS General Algebraic Modelling System
GCRA Gold Coast Railway Administration [Ghana]
GDC Geothermal Development Corporation [Kenya]
GDP gross domestic product
GFPPM the GET FiT Premium Payment Mechanism
GGDA Green Growth Diagnostics for Africa [UK]
gGmbH gemeinnützige GmbH [limited non-profit company]
GGPS Ghana Generation Planning Study
GHG greenhouse gas
GII Ghana Integrity Initiative
GIPC Ghana Investment Promotion Council
GIS Geographic Information Systems
GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit  
 [German Corporation for International  
 Cooperation]
GLSS Ghana Living Standards Survey
GMF Green Mini-Grid Facility
GMSP Grid Management Support Programme [Kenya]
GoG Government of  Ghana
GSDRC Governance and Social Development Resource  
 Centre [UK]
GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
GSS Ghana Statistical Service
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project [USA]
GW gigawatt
GWh gigawatt hour
GWS Gesellschaft für wirtschaftliche Strukturforschung  
 [Institute of  Economic Structures Research,  
 Germany]
HFFP high fossil fuel price
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IASS Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies  
 [Germany]
IDA International Development Association [USA]
IDC Industrial Development Corporation [South Africa]
IDE-JETRO Institute of  Developing Economies-Japan External 
 Trade Organization
IEA International Energy Agency [France]
IEEE Institute of  Electrical and Electronics Engineers  
 [USA]
IET Institution of  Engineering and Technology [UK]
IFC International Finance Corporation [USA]
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute [USA]
IGC International Growth Centre [Ghana]
IGGS Institute of  Green Growth Solutions [Ghana]
ILO International Labour Organization [Switzerland]
IMF International Monetary Fund [USA]
IPP independent power producer
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency [UAE]
IRP Integrated Resource Plan for Electricity [South  
 Africa]
ISSER Institute of  Statistical, Social and Economics  
 Research [Ghana]
IZA Institut zur Zukunft der Arbeit [Institute for the  
 Study of  Labor, Germany]
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
KAM Kenya Association of  Manufacturers
KENGEN Kenya Electricity Generating Company
KENINVEST Kenya Investment Authority
KEPSA Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KEREA Kenya Renewable Energy Association
KETRACO Kenya Electricity Transmission Company
KIPPRA Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and  
 Analysis
KITE Kumasi Institute of  Technology and Environment  
 [Ghana]
KLEM Capital (K), Labour, Energy, Materials
KPLC Kenya Power and Lighting Company
KPMG Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler [Netherlands]
KWh kilowatt hour
LCOE levelised cost of  electricity
LCPDP Least Cost Power Development Plan [Kenya]
LOLE loss of  load expectation
LTWP Lake Turkana Wind Power Plant [Kenya]
MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation [USA]
MEA Middle East and Africa
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MiDA Millennium Development Authority [Ghana]
MoDP Ministry of  Devolution and Planning [Kenya]
MoE Ministry of  Energy [Ghana]
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MoENR Ministry of  Environment and Mineral Resources  
 [Kenya]
MoEP Ministry of  Energy and Petroleum [Kenya]
MoWI Ministry of  Water and Irrigation [Kenya]
MT multi-technology
Mt metric tonne 
MW megawatt
MWh megawatt hour
MWp peak megawatt
NDPC National Development Planning Commission  
 [Ghana]
NEB National Energy Board [Ghana]
ODI Overseas Development Institute [UK]
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and  
 Development [France]
PAB pay-as-bid
PDIA problem-driven iterative adaptation
PE political economy
PEA political economy analysis
PEACH Political Economy Analysis of  Climate Change  
 Policies
PEF Private Enterprise Federation
PPA power purchasing agreement
PPIAF Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility [USA]
PRG Partial Risk Guarantee
PS Principal Secretary
PSRC Power Sector Reform Committee [Ghana]
PURC Public Utilities Regulatory Commission of  Ghana
PUWU Public Utilities Workers Union [Ghana]
PV photovoltaic
PWD public works department [Ghana]
R&D research and development
REA Rural Electrification Agency/Authority  
 [sub-Saharan Africa]
RECAI Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index
REF Rural Electrification Fund
REFIT Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff
RE IPPPP renewable energy independent power producer  
 procurement programme
REMP Rural Electrification Master Plan
RES-E renewable energy sources of  electricity/renewable  
 electricity
RETs renewable energy technologies
RoK Republic of  Kenya
SAFCEI Southern African Faith Communities’ Environment 
  Institute
SAM social accounting matrix
SAPVIA South African Photovoltaic Industry Association
SAREC South African Renewable Energy Council
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SARETEC South African Renewable Energy Technology  
 Centre
SEZ Special Economic Zone [South Africa]
sFIP sliding feed-in premium
SHS solar home system
SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation  
 Agency
SPDSS Spatial Decision Support Systems
SREP Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Programme
SSA sub-Saharan Africa
SUT supply-and-use table
SWER Single Wire Earth Return
SWERA Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment
T&D transmission and distribution
TA Technical Assistance
TANESCO Tanzania Electricity Supply Company
TFP total factor productivity
TN technology-neutral
TNT The National Treasury [Kenya]
TS technology-specific
TUC Trades Union Congress [Ghana]
TWh terrawatt hour
UNDESA United Nations Department of  Economic and  
 Social Affairs [USA]
UNDP United Nations Development Programme [USA]
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme [Kenya]
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on  
 Climate Change
UNSD United Nations Statistical Division [USA]
UNU-WIDER United Nations University World Institute for  
 Development Economics Research [Finland]
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USDA US Department of  Agriculture
VG variable [renewable] generation
VRA Volta River Authority [Ghana]
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
 [Switzerland]
WFP World Food Programme [Italy]
WIDER World Institute for Development Economics  
 Research [Finland]
WWF World Wildlife Fund [Switzerland]
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